On 03/24/2010 02:23 PM, Anthony Liguori wrote:
On 03/24/2010 05:42 AM, Avi Kivity wrote:
The filtering access part of this daemon is also not mapping well onto
libvirt's access model, because we don't soley filter based on UID in
libvirtd. We have it configurable based on UID, policykit, SASL,
TLS/x509
already, and intend adding role based access control to further filter
things, integrating with the existing apparmour/selinux security
models.
A qemud that filters based on UID only, gives users a side-channel
to get
around libvirt's access control.
That's true. Any time you write a multiplexer these issues crop up.
Much better to stay in single process land where everything is
already taken care of.
What does a multiplexer give you that making individual qemu instances
discoverable doesn't give you? The later doesn't suffer from these
problems.
You don't get a directory filled with a zillion socket files pointing at
dead guests. Agree that's a poor return on investment.
Maybe we want a O_UNLINK_ON_CLOSE for unix domain sockets - but no,
that's not implementable.
--
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
