On 24/08/15 14:03, Gavin Shan wrote: > This supports RTAS calls "ibm,{open,close}-errinjct" to manupliate > the token, which is passed to RTAS call "ibm,errinjct" to indicate > the valid context for error injection. Each VM is permitted to have > only one token at once and we simply have sequential number for that. > It's notable that the least bit of the token is reserved to indicate > if the token has been opened, meaning the valid token should be always > odd. > > Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gws...@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > --- > hw/ppc/spapr.c | 6 ++++- > hw/ppc/spapr_rtas.c | 60 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > include/hw/ppc/spapr.h | 9 +++++++- > 3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/hw/ppc/spapr.c b/hw/ppc/spapr.c > index 06d000d..591a1a7 100644 > --- a/hw/ppc/spapr.c > +++ b/hw/ppc/spapr.c > @@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ static bool version_before_3(void *opaque, int > version_id) > > static const VMStateDescription vmstate_spapr = { > .name = "spapr", > - .version_id = 3, > + .version_id = 4, > .minimum_version_id = 1, > .post_load = spapr_post_load, > .fields = (VMStateField[]) { > @@ -1202,6 +1202,10 @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_spapr = { > VMSTATE_UINT64_TEST(rtc_offset, sPAPRMachineState, version_before_3), > > VMSTATE_PPC_TIMEBASE_V(tb, sPAPRMachineState, 2), > + > + /* Error injection token */ > + VMSTATE_UINT32_V(errinjct_token, sPAPRMachineState, 4), > + > VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST() > }, > }; > diff --git a/hw/ppc/spapr_rtas.c b/hw/ppc/spapr_rtas.c > index e99e25f..64924c6 100644 > --- a/hw/ppc/spapr_rtas.c > +++ b/hw/ppc/spapr_rtas.c > @@ -604,6 +604,62 @@ out: > rtas_st(rets, 0, rc); > } > > +static void rtas_ibm_open_errinjct(PowerPCCPU *cpu, > + sPAPRMachineState *spapr, > + uint32_t token, uint32_t nargs, > + target_ulong args, uint32_t nret, > + target_ulong rets) > +{ > + int32_t ret; > + > + /* Sanity check on number of arguments */ > + if (nargs != 0 || nret != 2) { > + ret = RTAS_OUT_PARAM_ERROR; > + goto out; > + } > + > + /* Check if we already had token */ > + if (spapr->errinjct_token & 1) { > + ret = RTAS_OUT_TOKEN_OPENED; > + goto out; > + } > + > + /* Grab the token */ > + rtas_st(rets, 0, ++spapr->errinjct_token); > + ret = RTAS_OUT_SUCCESS; > +out: > + rtas_st(rets, 1, ret); > +} > + > +static void rtas_ibm_close_errinjct(PowerPCCPU *cpu, > + sPAPRMachineState *spapr, > + uint32_t token, uint32_t nargs, > + target_ulong args, uint32_t nret, > + target_ulong rets) > +{ > + uint32_t open_token; > + int32_t ret; > + > + /* Sanity check on number of arguments */ > + if (nargs != 1 || nret != 1) { > + ret = RTAS_OUT_PARAM_ERROR; > + goto out; > + } > + > + /* Match with the passed token */ > + open_token = rtas_ld(args, 0); > + if (!(spapr->errinjct_token & 1) || > + spapr->errinjct_token != open_token) { > + ret = RTAS_OUT_CLOSE_ERROR; > + goto out; > + } > + > + spapr->errinjct_token++; > + ret = RTAS_OUT_SUCCESS; > +out: > + rtas_st(rets, 0, ret); > +}
This basically now looks fine to me! I am just wondering what happens when the guest opens a token, but then resets the system before it closes it again? I.e. shouldn't the errinjct_token be set to 0 back again during the reset handler? Thomas