Hi Michael,
Ping...
Regards,
-Gonglei
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gonglei (Arei)
> Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2016 11:01 AM
> To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
> Cc: m...@redhat.com; Gonglei (Arei)
> Subject: [PATCH v3] virtio-crypto: zeroize the key material before free
>
> Common practice with sensitive information (key material, passwords,
> etc). Prevents sensitive information from being exposed by accident later in
> coredumps, memory disclosure bugs when heap memory is reused, etc.
>
> Sensitive information is sometimes also held in mlocked pages to prevent
> it being swapped to disk but that's not being done here.
>
> Let's zeroize the memory of CryptoDevBackendSymOpInfo structure pointed
> for key material security.
>
> [Thanks to Stefan for help with crafting the commit message]
>
> Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gong...@huawei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefa...@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <ebl...@redhat.com>
> ---
> v3:
> - rework the commit message [Eric]
> - add Eric's R-by tag.
>
> hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
> index 4f11fee..48288e8 100644
> --- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
> +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
> @@ -337,7 +337,18 @@ static void
> virtio_crypto_free_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *req)
> {
> if (req) {
> if (req->flags == CRYPTODEV_BACKEND_ALG_SYM) {
> - g_free(req->u.sym_op_info);
> + size_t max_len;
> + CryptoDevBackendSymOpInfo *op_info = req->u.sym_op_info;
> +
> + max_len = op_info->iv_len +
> + op_info->aad_len +
> + op_info->src_len +
> + op_info->dst_len +
> + op_info->digest_result_len;
> +
> + /* Zeroize and free request data structure */
> + memset(op_info, 0, sizeof(*op_info) + max_len);
> + g_free(op_info);
> }
> g_free(req);
> }
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
