From: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefa...@redhat.com>
virtiofsd needs access to /proc/self/fd. Let's move to a new pid
namespace so that a compromised process cannot see another other
processes running on the system.
One wrinkle in this approach: unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) affects *child*
processes and not the current process. Therefore we need to fork the
pid 1 process that will actually run virtiofsd and leave a parent in
waitpid(2). This is not the same thing as daemonization and parent
processes should not notice a difference.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefa...@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berra...@redhat.com>
---
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 86 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 0d061de438..752beb459a 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -50,7 +50,10 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -1944,24 +1947,95 @@ static void print_capabilities(void)
}
/*
- * Called after our UNIX domain sockets have been created, now we can move to
- * an empty network namespace to prevent TCP/IP and other network activity in
- * case this process is compromised.
+ * Move to a new mount, net, and pid namespaces to isolate this process.
*/
-static void setup_net_namespace(void)
+static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
{
- if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) != 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_NEWNET): %m\n");
+ pid_t child;
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new pid namespace for *child* processes. We'll have to
+ * fork in order to enter the new pid namespace. A new mount namespace
+ * is also needed so that we can remount /proc for the new pid
+ * namespace.
+ *
+ * Our UNIX domain sockets have been created. Now we can move to
+ * an empty network namespace to prevent TCP/IP and other network
+ * activity in case this process is compromised.
+ */
+ if (unshare(CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWNET) != 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNS): %m\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ child = fork();
+ if (child < 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "fork() failed: %m\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (child > 0) {
+ pid_t waited;
+ int wstatus;
+
+ /* The parent waits for the child */
+ do {
+ waited = waitpid(child, &wstatus, 0);
+ } while (waited < 0 && errno == EINTR && !se->exited);
+
+ /* We were terminated by a signal, see fuse_signals.c */
+ if (se->exited) {
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ if (WIFEXITED(wstatus)) {
+ exit(WEXITSTATUS(wstatus));
+ }
+
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* Send us SIGTERM when the parent thread terminates, see prctl(2) */
+ prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM);
+
+ /*
+ * If the mounts have shared propagation then we want to opt out so our
+ * mount changes don't affect the parent mount namespace.
+ */
+ if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_REC | MS_SLAVE, NULL) < 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/, MS_REC|MS_SLAVE): %m\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* The child must remount /proc to use the new pid namespace */
+ if (mount("proc", "/proc", "proc",
+ MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID | MS_RELATIME, NULL) < 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc): %m\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* Now we can get our /proc/self/fd directory file descriptor */
+ lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc/self/fd", O_PATH);
+ if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/proc/self/fd, O_PATH): %m\n");
exit(1);
}
}
-/* This magic is based on lxc's lxc_pivot_root() */
-static void setup_pivot_root(const char *source)
+/*
+ * Make the source directory our root so symlinks cannot escape and no other
+ * files are accessible. Assumes unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) was already called.
+ */
+static void setup_mounts(const char *source)
{
int oldroot;
int newroot;
+ if (mount(source, source, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(%s, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n", source, source);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* This magic is based on lxc's lxc_pivot_root() */
oldroot = open("/", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
if (oldroot < 0) {
fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/): %m\n");
@@ -2008,47 +2082,14 @@ static void setup_pivot_root(const char *source)
close(oldroot);
}
-static void setup_proc_self_fd(struct lo_data *lo)
-{
- lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc/self/fd", O_PATH);
- if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/proc/self/fd, O_PATH): %m\n");
- exit(1);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Make the source directory our root so symlinks cannot escape and no other
- * files are accessible.
- */
-static void setup_mount_namespace(const char *source)
-{
- if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) != 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "unshare(CLONE_NEWNS): %m\n");
- exit(1);
- }
-
- if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_REC | MS_SLAVE, NULL) < 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/, MS_REC|MS_PRIVATE): %m\n");
- exit(1);
- }
-
- if (mount(source, source, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
- fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(%s, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n", source, source);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- setup_pivot_root(source);
-}
-
/*
* Lock down this process to prevent access to other processes or files outside
* source directory. This reduces the impact of arbitrary code execution bugs.
*/
-static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo)
+static void setup_sandbox(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
{
- setup_net_namespace();
- setup_mount_namespace(lo->source);
+ setup_namespaces(lo, se);
+ setup_mounts(lo->source);
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
@@ -2172,10 +2213,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
fuse_daemonize(opts.foreground);
- /* Must be after daemonize to get the right /proc/self/fd */
- setup_proc_self_fd(&lo);
-
- setup_sandbox(&lo);
+ setup_sandbox(&lo, se);
/* Block until ctrl+c or fusermount -u */
ret = virtio_loop(se);
--
2.24.1
