While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic kvm_init() code.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <da...@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <coh...@redhat.com> --- accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 14 -------------- accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 4 ++-- target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/sev.c | 7 ++++++- 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c index 3d820d0c7d..7150acdbcc 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c @@ -2180,20 +2180,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) kvm_state = s; - /* - * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory - * encryption context. - */ - if (ms->cgs) { - Error *local_err = NULL; - /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */ - ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); - if (ret < 0) { - error_report_err(local_err); - goto err; - } - } - ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s); if (ret < 0) { goto err; diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c @@ -17,6 +17,6 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */ - g_assert_not_reached(); + /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */ + return 0; } diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c index 6dc1ee052d..4788139128 100644 --- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c +++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h" #include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h" +#include "sysemu/sev.h" #include "hw/pci/pci.h" #include "hw/pci/msi.h" @@ -2135,6 +2136,25 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s) uint64_t shadow_mem; int ret; struct utsname utsname; + Error *local_err = NULL; + + /* + * Initialize SEV context, if required + * + * If no memory encryption is requested (ms->cgs == NULL) this is + * a no-op. + * + * It's also a no-op if a non-SEV confidential guest support + * mechanism is selected. SEV is the only mechanism available to + * select on x86 at present, so this doesn't arise, but if new + * mechanisms are supported in future (e.g. TDX), they'll need + * their own initialization either here or elsewhere. + */ + ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err); + if (ret < 0) { + error_report_err(local_err); + return ret; + } if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) { error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM"); diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index f9e9b5d8ae..11c9a3cc21 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) { - SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs); + SevGuestState *sev + = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST); char *devname; int ret, fw_error; uint32_t ebx; uint32_t host_cbitpos; struct sev_user_data_status status = {}; + if (!sev) { + return 0; + } + ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true); if (ret) { error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__); -- 2.29.2