On 23.12.21 13:29, Chao Peng wrote: > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shute...@linux.intel.com> > > Introduce a new seal F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE indicating the content of > the file is inaccessible from userspace in any possible ways like > read(),write() or mmap() etc. > > It provides semantics required for KVM guest private memory support > that a file descriptor with this seal set is going to be used as the > source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such > as Intel TDX/AMD SEV but may not be accessible from host userspace. > > At this time only shmem implements this seal. > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shute...@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.p...@linux.intel.com> > --- > include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 1 + > mm/shmem.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h > index 2f86b2ad6d7e..e2bad051936f 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h > @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ > #define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */ > #define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */ > #define F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE 0x0010 /* prevent future writes while mapped */ > +#define F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE 0x0020 /* prevent file from accessing */
I think this needs more clarification: the file content can still be accessed using in-kernel mechanisms such as MEMFD_OPS for KVM. It effectively disallows traditional access to a file (read/write/mmap) that will result in ordinary MMU access to file content. Not sure how to best clarify that: maybe, prevent ordinary MMU access (e.g., read/write/mmap) to file content? > /* (1U << 31) is reserved for signed error codes */ > > /* > diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c > index 18f93c2d68f1..faa7e9b1b9bc 100644 > --- a/mm/shmem.c > +++ b/mm/shmem.c > @@ -1098,6 +1098,10 @@ static int shmem_setattr(struct user_namespace > *mnt_userns, > (newsize > oldsize && (info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW))) > return -EPERM; > > + if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_INACCESSIBLE) && > + (newsize & ~PAGE_MASK)) > + return -EINVAL; > + What happens when sealing and there are existing mmaps? -- Thanks, David / dhildenb
