在 2022/4/8 21:33, Eugenio Pérez 写道:
From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <phi...@redhat.com> Per https://discourse.gnome.org/t/port-your-module-from-g-memdup-to-g-memdup2-now/5538 The old API took the size of the memory to duplicate as a guint, whereas most memory functions take memory sizes as a gsize. This made it easy to accidentally pass a gsize to g_memdup(). For large values, that would lead to a silent truncation of the size from 64 to 32 bits, and result in a heap area being returned which is significantly smaller than what the caller expects. This can likely be exploited in various modules to cause a heap buffer overflow. Replace g_memdup() by the safer g_memdup2() wrapper. Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <phi...@redhat.com> ---
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasow...@redhat.com>
hw/net/virtio-net.c | 3 ++- hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c index 1067e72b39..e4748a7e6c 100644 --- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c +++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c @@ -1443,7 +1443,8 @@ static void virtio_net_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq) }iov_cnt = elem->out_num;- iov2 = iov = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num); + iov2 = iov = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, + sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num); s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0, &ctrl, sizeof(ctrl)); iov_discard_front(&iov, &iov_cnt, sizeof(ctrl)); if (s != sizeof(ctrl)) { diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c index dcd80b904d..0e31e3cc04 100644 --- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c +++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq) }out_num = elem->out_num;- out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); + out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); out_iov = out_iov_copy;in_num = elem->in_num;@@ -605,11 +605,11 @@ virtio_crypto_handle_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *request) }out_num = elem->out_num;- out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); + out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num); out_iov = out_iov_copy;in_num = elem->in_num;- in_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num); + in_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num); in_iov = in_iov_copy;if (unlikely(iov_to_buf(out_iov, out_num, 0, &req, sizeof(req))
