On Thu, Oct 27, 2016 at 04:34:10PM +0000, entr0py wrote: > Andrew David Wong: > > On 2016-10-26 16:19, tonyinfin...@tutanota.com wrote: > >> I've tried to search this topic but not come to any clear answers. > > > >> Are there any plans to implement this for Qubes? > > > >> Usecase: If you are unexpectedly legally or extra-legally coerced to > >> decrypt your laptop. > > > >> This project looks very intriguing. However currently I have a system of > >> plausible deniability, but as far as I'm aware this is limited on Qubes. > > > >> Could you tell me if the following is possible technically/whether it is > >> planned? In order of most desired to least: > > > >> 1) Deniable FDE > >> e.g. TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt-style hidden OS. I'm also not sure if these > >> deniable encryption tools currently work with Qubes as is? > > > >> 2) Deniable encrypted partitions > > > >> 3) Deniable encrypted VMs > > > >> Thanks for your assistance! > > > > > > Yes, we currently have an open issue on this: > > > > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/921 > > > > There have also been several threads on this in the past. Here is one of > > the most recent ones: > > > > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/qubes-users/1Qu0v2b7-bg/discussion > > > > Here's an older thread on the topic: > > > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/qubes-users/tKOVanAupFE/jkOYaN44zksJ > > > > And here are some others: > > > > https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/qubes-devel/deniable$20encryption > > https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/qubes-users/deniable$20encryption > > > > > > I will cough up my passphrase at the mere *suggestion* of torture. I would > probably give up my passphrase if a scary person were to just ask nicely for > it. > > If Qubes were to incorporate any deniability features, I (and anybody who > dislikes being tortured) would require a means to show absolutely that such > features were not enabled. These are dangerous features because the moment > they are incorporated we would all be using them, whether we are or not.
Note that there's no way to prove that an encrypted partition doesn't contain
hidden data. See for example my old prototype, stegbak, for Steganographic
Backups:
https://github.com/petertodd/stegbak
I forget if I actually implemented the following or not, but the ideal
implementation has three steps:
1. Fill partition with random looking "marker" data with a specific HMAC tag
computed with H(block-# | key).
2. Format the prepared partition w/ an encrypted file system and fill with data
you're willing to disclose.
3. Scan through partition and overwrite untouched blocks - identified by a
valid HMAC tag - with authenticated encrypted data.
To extract, just scan the partition again and extract/decrypt the blocks that
pass the authentication step.
This is indistinguishable from an encrypted partition that has been previously
filled with encrypted data and then reformatted. One exception is SSD's w/ TRIM
enabled that erase unused blocks, but Qubes OS has that disabled by default.
--
https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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