On Wednesday, June 7, 2017 at 9:11:24 PM UTC+2, Peter Todd wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 05, 2017 at 03:17:46PM -0700, Axel wrote: 
> > > I think that indirection just confuses the issue, so better to put the 
> > > proof-of-freshness in the signature itself. Fortunately the OpenPGP 
> > > standard 
> > 
> > has something called "signature notation data" that allows you to add 
> > > arbitrary 
> > > (signed) data to OpenPGP signatures. In fact, I used to have a cronjob 
> > > that 
> > > periodically set my gpg.conf to include a recent blockhash as a 
> > > proof-of-freshness with the notation bloc...@bitcoin.org 
> <javascript:>=<blockhash> 
> > > 
> > > 
> > 
> > Agree. As I said, the best thing would be if a proof of freshness could 
> be 
> > part of every signed message. I only suggested proof of freshness as 
> part 
> > of the commit as a second-hand option since I didn't know about the 
> > notational data support. 
>
> Ah good, I misread your original message. Glad we're on the same page! 
>
> > > Even better would be if GPG had the ability to run a command on demand 
> to 
> > > get 
> > > the value a notation should be set too, but as far as I know that 
> feature 
> > > doesn't exist yet. That said, I could easily add it to the 
> OpenTimestamps 
> > > Client as part of the git commit timestamping support. 
> > > 
> > 
> > What exactly would you add to OTS git support? 
> > Did you mean adding proof-of-freshness functionality to the git tag 
> signing 
> > override provided by OTS? I think that would be very useful. 
>
> Basically, because the OTS git support is a wrapper *around* the gpg 
> binary, 
> it's easy for that wrapper to also pass the --set-notation option with a 
> proof-of-freshness blockhash. This *is* a bit of a hack, but at least on a 
> technical level it will work, and I can easily add a mechanism for that 
> wrapper 
> to get a recent block hash from the OpenTimestamps calendar servers. In 
> fact, 
> adding proofs-of-freshness is something I've been thinking about adding to 
> OpenTimestamps anyway; the main reason I haven't already is that what 
> exactly 
> it proves is easily misunderstood. 
>
> > Moreover, I think it would be useful to add something to 
> > qubes-secpack/utils to help make GPG signatures with a suitably old 
> block 
> > hash as notational data. 
>
> Yup, although a tricky part there is you of course need to communicate 
> with the 
> outside world to get such a blockhash, which makes this difficult to 
> implement 
> on a truly off-line system; I'll admit that it may very well be simpler to 
> put 
> the blockhash in the thing being signed (e.g. git commit) rather than in 
> the 
> signature as notation data under that circumstance. 
>

I guess that depends on how split-gpg is implemented. If notational data 
can be added only on the vault side, then I agree.

One good thing is that security does not depend on the ability to verify 
the hash before using it as freshness proof. It will either produce a proof 
of freshness or not. It can hardly hurt. Even if you type it up manually, 
reading it off of another machine and getting a typo in it, it could still 
serve as proof of freshness: you can argue that getting a hash that close 
to the real thing would be computationally/statistically/fortune-tellingly 
unfeasible. It can be compared to citing a news article and forgetting the 
period character.

 

>
> Though, that's another neat thing about the OTS git support: it works just 
> fine 
> with Qube's split-gpg support. It'll also work with the signature notation 
> scheme as qubes-gpg-client-wrapper passes unknown options like the 
> --set-notation option to GPG (that does smell like a possible security 
> hole!). 
>
> > > -- 
> > > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 
> > > 
> > 
> >  btw, nice anti-spam measure! 
>
> Thanks! I've had this signature for something like 10+ years, and you're 
> maybe the 
> second or third person to comment on it. :) 
>
> -- 
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 
>

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