Dear Qubes Community, *Update*: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki’s PGP signature is now available (see below).
We have updated [Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 101: Register File Data Sampling (XSA-452) and Intel Processor Return Predictions Advisory (INTEL-SA-00982)](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/345734de68d6994d99f461f26e63a09043d4c09c/QSBs/qsb-101-2024.txt). The text of this updated QSB (including a changelog) and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions. ## Qubes Security Bulletin 101 ``` ---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 101 ]===--- 2024-03-12 Register File Data Sampling (XSA-452) and Intel Processor Return Predictions Advisory (INTEL-SA-00982) Changelog ---------- 2024-03-12: Original QSB 2024-03-17: Add information about INTEL-SA-00982 User action ------------ Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is required in response to this QSB. Summary -------- On 2024-03-12, the Xen Project published XSA-452, "x86: Register File Data Sampling" [3]: | Intel have disclosed RFDS, Register File Data Sampling, affecting some | Atom cores. | | This came from internal validation work. There is no information | provided about how an attacker might go about inferring data from the | register files. For more information, see Intel's security advisory. [4] In addition, Intel published INTEL-SA-00982/CVE-2023-38575 [6] on the same day: | Non-transparent sharing of return predictor targets between contexts | in some Intel® Processors may allow an authorized user to potentially | enable information disclosure via local access. Information about this vulnerability is very sparse. Impact ------- On systems affected by Register File Data Sampling (RFDS), an attacker might be able to infer the contents of data previously held in floating point, vector, and/or integer register files on the same core, including data from a more privileged context. On systems affected by INTEL-SA-00982, an attacker might be able to leak information from other security contexts, but the precise impact is unclear. Affected systems ----------------- At present, Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) is known to affect only certain Atom cores from Intel. Other Intel CPUs and CPUs from other hardware vendors are not known to be affected. RFDS affects Atom cores between the Goldmont and Gracemont microarchitectures. This includes Alder Lake and Raptor Lake hybrid client systems that have a mix of Gracemont and other types of cores. At the time of this writing, Intel has not published information about which systems INTEL-SA-00982 affects. Systems that are still receiving microcode updates from Intel [7] and that received a microcode update as part of the microcode release on 2024-03-12 [5] may be affected, even if they are not affected by RFDS. Patching --------- The following packages contain security updates that address the vulnerabilities described in this bulletin: For Qubes 4.1, in dom0: - Xen packages version 4.14.6-7 - microcode_ctl 2.1-57.qubes1 For Qubes 4.2, in dom0: - Xen packages version 4.17.3-4 - microcode_ctl 2.1-57.qubes1 These packages will migrate from the security-testing repository to the current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested by the community. [2] Once available, the packages are to be installed via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1] Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the updates to take effect. If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new Xen binaries. Credits -------- See the original Xen Security Advisory. References ----------- [1] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/ [2] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/testing/ [3] https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-452.html [4] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/register-file-data-sampling.html [5] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/blob/main/releasenote.md#microcode-20240312 [6] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00982.html [7] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000022396/processors.html -- The Qubes Security Team https://www.qubes-os.org/security/ ``` *Source*: <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/345734de68d6994d99f461f26e63a09043d4c09c/QSBs/qsb-101-2024.txt> ## [Marek Marczykowski-Górecki](https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-górecki)'s PGP signature ``` -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmYAyxAACgkQ1lWk8hgw 4GoD/Q/9GJJpOV2zsq24axcePxhbjx0HKVrhR8oOPZMaVTUmr2hqbuFB+d73DBtE L6J0bTCst3TPDRvMSCt2xi3bO1KsjCWtgupJZd3KSHa0UZT4XKQN0S4F+mXvwmF1 b7278Wh62e20yN1+GYqmYuIXBOVuMcthCGPS6FtJwJqUWLVhU4Zx4lNqUeSJn03l x8t5pXUUbLW5ODu0qi+CHIBEarx/GtVuFSc5Tv9GZoS6XTU/HTlc0U43EMRfrGjM nvE84LTY1U4XxpvoyZ4vBdajruO4d1U+p+F+9CbxcidgKUoS5K9Kn8zNF/QO/o+H /OC/kcxm3p4UqrLT2bh+3GhFhPPiGZvHsWwbRxpUFczmghU+X2I9VcEjt3ARFAwV QA2ONCrGs1+PHLKN/SKBJg1Nu2ACj4Sx8kQk11ztjCfM+IqeJnvgDgVuPqkiUvBQ yaEOoNP22ic2gH+rCV79Wb11Yibsc+9ywZ7PaAea6OEM6ZaXqBkyutOpDbNRGQg8 a7AzPB0/iacfWPdqJ7AhXE2u5ii+DeRZdZYjcmm6E0QE89SeBzYOX2BTnTunc/jX MwYjl0edZ7I/b89Vja6fXSEYS6LYdTpRL4ZtswfwwAE8fRqdVo7qmPTTU1XoHZYs jJIM2hxAB+JbEZNPzYL2MtGkkzsb4xMX6LQDEMXEZzjAXIlM5L0= =SBLT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ``` *Source*: <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/345734de68d6994d99f461f26e63a09043d4c09c/QSBs/qsb-101-2024.txt.sig.marmarek> ## [Simon Gaiser (aka HW42)](https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)'s PGP signature ``` -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmX3fZEACgkQSsGN4REu FJAHCg/5AYLGAcnMRzZ1JgSJXQLLuQqIXfpNfZWHT4e9u6gkDYcrI4Z4AEzab5Lv YqSeNbtMys1WCxCUXyPUNG+ZNrD9xcCfmaZuC+MNINwRoAcg+V5+B8cCMU9NUB+V IquFrepWJcimsBeAvCPkCV4nk1BABqEu0vsViifwFvS0MWr7VFUkQom5/XkXwmZY uUTrNWSKoJzmzwq3x0yWVNhLmjD2nMg2BKeJUiwpy1wE9Q0w9dLrHEwwewuHP7t1 JAiOFLvEAw55D9Cw8YbOWskIfHWeyhA4a8nrbPVMRTBJAryUgRtDQx6GCcn5uLiM +/vnYu26UigX9eQy2T/O5fs3ti4BF+/D7XO9QnKXVsmAtSTfvP7/nzY8nWL9SzpB 7cBX5AH9QTHa2Rji/EpqSsZawXXs5pMTWbzObkBORObNgkHUMPOhaM+8qZaEhm5h DMZrsCHbOsi38pmrXhuIhzY/j5Sk+wp3Wgvkqq4CXO8n7H+jjPNTrMEfcgYI/C8U U17OvqA/iC/C/z1BRQnhiAp98/fYN6jgNWAGVMBM+XgbrCHExnP/OCH6X5pgTYwY JbwMyFxv9XuQMDFc9zF4AVPHdAAGssU9qZDZlJg/72Az7J4kxHNlT3m9u02ljmgC POHJyjO071i6xlCMMEuYyrgT/1qs5NjocpWaXfYSl45a3DWeHMo= =ZGQ8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ``` *Source*: <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/345734de68d6994d99f461f26e63a09043d4c09c/QSBs/qsb-101-2024.txt.sig.simon> ## What is the purpose of this announcement? The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published. ## What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)? A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) is a security announcement issued by the [Qubes security team](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them. For a list of all QSBs, see [Qubes security bulletins (QSBs)](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). ## Why should I care about QSBs? QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by [updating normally](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-update/). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs. ## What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs? A [PGP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic [digital signature](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the [OpenPGP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like [GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)](https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures. ## Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic? A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project. ## How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB? The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with `git` and `gpg` installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see [OpenPGP software](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#openpgp-software).) 1. Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.: ```shell_session $ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc' gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1 ``` (For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see [How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).) 2. View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: `gpg>` indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.) ```shell_session $ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494 gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key gpg> fpr pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494 ``` 3. *Important*: At this point, you still don't know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you *must* authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. *Do not skip this step*! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from *multiple independent sources in several different ways* and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see [How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/verifying-signatures/#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key). *Tip*: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don't have to repeat this step in the future. 4. Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 ("ultimate"), then quit GnuPG with `q`. ```shell_session gpg> trust pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys (by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.) 1 = I don't know or won't say 2 = I do NOT trust 3 = I trust marginally 4 = I trust fully 5 = I trust ultimately m = back to the main menu Your decision? 5 Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: unknown [ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key Please note that the shown key validity is not necessarily correct unless you restart the program. gpg> q ``` 5. Use Git to clone the qubes-secpack repo. ```shell_session $ git clone https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack.git Cloning into 'qubes-secpack'... remote: Enumerating objects: 4065, done. remote: Counting objects: 100% (1474/1474), done. remote: Compressing objects: 100% (742/742), done. remote: Total 4065 (delta 743), reused 1413 (delta 731), pack-reused 2591 Receiving objects: 100% (4065/4065), 1.64 MiB | 2.53 MiB/s, done. Resolving deltas: 100% (1910/1910), done. ``` 6. Import the included PGP keys. (See our [PGP key policies](https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/#pgp-key-policies) for important information about these keys.) ```shell_session $ gpg --import qubes-secpack/keys/*/* gpg: key 063938BA42CFA724: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/core-devs/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 8C05216CE09C093C: public key "HW42 (Qubes Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DA0434BC706E1FCF: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes OS signing key)" imported gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: 2 signatures not checked due to missing keys gpg: key 8CE137352A019A17: public key "Andrew David Wong (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key AAA743B42FBC07A9: public key "Brennan Novak (Qubes Website & Documentation Signing)" imported gpg: key B6A0BB95CA74A5C3: public key "Joanna Rutkowska (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key F32894BE9684938A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 6E7A27B909DAFB92: public key "Hakisho Nukama (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key 485C7504F27D0A72: public key "Sven Semmler (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key BB52274595B71262: public key "unman (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key DC2F3678D272F2A8: public key "Wojtek Porczyk (Qubes OS documentation signing key)" imported gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: 1 signature not checked due to a missing key gpg: key FD64F4F9E9720C4D: public key "Zrubi (Qubes Documentation Signing Key)" imported gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: "Qubes Master Signing Key" not changed gpg: key 1848792F9E2795E9: public key "Qubes OS Release 4 Signing Key" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/release-keys/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key D655A4F21830E06A: public key "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" imported gpg: key ACC2602F3F48CB21: public key "Qubes OS Security Team" imported gpg: qubes-secpack/keys/security-team/retired: read error: Is a directory gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found. gpg: key 4AC18DE1112E1490: public key "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" imported gpg: Total number processed: 17 gpg: imported: 16 gpg: unchanged: 1 gpg: marginals needed: 3 completes needed: 1 trust model: pgp gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 6 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u gpg: depth: 1 valid: 6 signed: 0 trust: 6-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 0u ``` 7. Verify signed Git tags. ```shell_session $ cd qubes-secpack/ $ git tag -v `git describe` object 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 type commit tag marmarek_sec_266e14a6 tagger Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 1677757924 +0100 Tag for commit 266e14a6fae57c9a91362c9ac784d3a891f4d351 gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:52:04 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] ``` The exact output will differ, but the final line should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. The `[full]` indicates full trust, which this key inherits in virtue of being validly signed by the QMSK. 8. Verify PGP signatures, e.g.: ```shell_session $ cd QSBs/ $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 04:05:51 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify qsb-087-2022.txt.sig.simon qsb-087-2022.txt gpg: Signature made Wed 23 Nov 2022 03:50:42 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] $ cd ../canaries/ $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.marmarek canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 03:51:48 AM PST gpg: using RSA key 2D1771FE4D767EDC76B089FAD655A4F21830E06A gpg: Good signature from "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (Qubes security pack)" [full] $ gpg --verify canary-034-2023.txt.sig.simon canary-034-2023.txt gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Mar 2023 01:47:52 AM PST gpg: using RSA key EA18E7F040C41DDAEFE9AA0F4AC18DE1112E1490 gpg: Good signature from "Simon Gaiser (Qubes Security Pack signing key)" [full] ``` Again, the exact output will differ, but the final line of output from each `gpg --verify` command should always start with `gpg: Good signature from...` followed by an appropriate key. For this announcement (QSB-101), the commands are: ``` $ gpg --verify qsb-101-2024.txt.sig.marmarek qsb-101-2024.txt $ gpg --verify qsb-101-2024.txt.sig.simon qsb-101-2024.txt ``` You can also verify the signatures directly from this announcement in addition to or instead of verifying the files from the qubes-secpack. Simply copy and paste the QSB-101 text into a plain text file and do the same for both signature files. Then, perform the same authentication steps as listed above, substituting the filenames above with the names of the files you just created. This announcement is also available on the Qubes website: https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2024/03/18/qsb-101-update/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/de0a117c-9138-4911-bf97-25879359b286%40qubes-os.org.
