However I would not use the "move to VM" command like this, as I
experienced those requests getting lost One time files were
actually deleted, since that time I always use copy instead of
move.
Sounds troubling. Do you remember the last Qubes release version
where you experienced this kind of data loss?
[...][...]
qvm-move-to-vm *should* be safe since R3.1
(unless the destination VM was debian-7 based, which had an old glibc
without syncfs() support).
Rusty
3.1 - but I dont remember src & dest types
My thoughts are more about continuing the attack to other QubesVMs or
even other systems by means of installed Software like a VNC client.
But I only ever allow the ports I require to be used at that time. I do have
one area that is set up as a complete, but they can only talk to each other,
nothing else.
So if you configure Qubes correctly, including the VMs, it will be very
difficult to actually attack other VMs in the way I think you may be thinking
it's easy?
Good point, Drew. The problem is reduced significantly if you reduce the
firewall exceptions to a minimum.
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