On 03/11/2017 11:56 AM, Unman wrote:
On Sat, Mar 11, 2017 at 04:43:41PM +0000, sm8ax1 wrote:
7v5w7go9ub0o:
Yep! And ISTM this is an argument for using dispvms to handle mail
(or any other WAN-exposed client/server): start a dispvm; copy mail
client and mail "file" into it; do your mail; copy out and save the
updated mail file (which is text); flush away the dispvm - all
handled by a script(s).
How do you figure that's less of a pain in the ass than typing a sudo
password?
You're missing the point - that procedure is trivial to set up in
Qubes and addresses real security concerns. Just putting a password on
root access, or requiring some dom0 interaction doesn't.
This is important - security IS a pain in the ass. Qubes can make it
less so.
Yes, sm8ax1 got you there. :)
DispVMs are nice to have when we think that certain operations carry
threats. But its ridiculous to expect a typical user to do a majority of
their tasks in them.
--
Chris Laprise, [email protected]
https://twitter.com/ttaskett
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