I found the following humourous: "there is no credible engineering rationale to support the contention that SGX enclaves will provide confidentiality guarantees in the face of these new micro-architectural cache probing attacks." https://idfusionllc.com/2018/01/25/sgx-after-spectre-and-meltdown-status-analysis-and-remediations/
And in a post here from June 28, 2016: "VM CPU mapping - countermeasurements against covert channels via cpu caches?" "With SGX, the memory is encrypted so that it cannot be "read", however, the CPU still does calculations of an SGX enclave the same way as without them which creates the opportunity for the very same covert channels to form." https://mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg01200.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/8b7bc8580b77b7b41096f49ccbd6e658.squirrel%40tt3j2x4k5ycaa5zt.onion. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
