There are cases where something like contents or "contains/contained in"
relationships obviously matter at the work level. For example, consider
the stories in a canonical collection like "In our time"--each story is
usefully regarded as a FRBR work in its own right, as is the collection,
and there's a significant relationship between them. But how do we
distinguish between that relationship and the relationship of "Big
two-hearted river," one of Hemingway's stories in "In our time," to the
many other anthologies in which it appears, each of which could also be
regarded as a FRBR work?
As a matter of practical implementation, we'd be wise to set aside the
"workness" of a large number of aggregates. In most cases, a
manifestation-level treatment of such aggregates is all that's needed to
anchor all the relationships that matter with other FRBR entities. To
promote such aggregates to being described as works purely as a matter
of principle would be to bury the limited population of works that most
of us care about under an avalanche of "works" that are largely
redundant, e.g., all the editions of "In our time" which become new
aggregate FRBR works because a new introduction or commentary has been
added. As Jonathan notes, users think of "Hamlet" as one work, not hundreds.
FRBR allows us some flexibility when deciding how we define and describe
works and expressions. If FRBR seems poised to step off a cliff, we
don't have to follow it. We can instead set it on a better path.
Stephen
Jonathan Rochkind wrote:
For works with more than one manifestation, I would guess that MOST
users are not looking for a particular manifestation. Or don't know
which manifestation they are looking for until they see the options.
Or at least many are not. Users that aren't a particular kind of
humanities scholar don't come to the library looking for a particular
edition, they just come looking for "Hamlet" or "Godel, Escher, Bach,"
or what have you. "Which edition would you like?" "There are more
than one? What are the differences?"
This is just me guessing, actual evidence of some kind would indeed be
good.
Jonathan
Daniel Paradis wrote:
Ed Jones wrote:
"(1) Yes, if you were looking for a particular manifestation you
certainly wouldn't want to be presented with work/expression
information, but if you're unsure what exactly you're looking for, it
can be very helpful in clarifying things."
The CastAlbumCollector website (http://www.castalbumcollector.com) is
a very good example of how a database (in this case of recordings of
musicals) based on FRBR entities can help users navigate large
results sets and clarify what they're looking for. The website lets
you browse by show (=Work), by recording (=Expression) or by release
(=Manifestation); you can also do a keyword search by show or
recording. If you search for the work "Les misérables", you will be
presented with only two results: the musical by Schönberg or the one
by Spencer (who knew there was another musical on the same subject?).
Once you select the Schönberg work, you can pick among the 55
recordings of the musical in the database. Only after you selected a
recording are you offered with specific releases. At this stage, the
details pertaining to the work and expression entities are neatly
grouped together under "Show details" and "Recording details." I was
not surprised to read on his personal website that the creator of
this database has an MLS...
(By the way, Schönberg's musical is represented by authority record n
87120341 (Schönberg, Claude-Michel. Misérables). Authority record
no97072905 [Misérables]) is for a dramatic adaptation for children,
by Jean Avran, of Hugo's novel.)
Daniel Paradis
Bibliographic Access Librarian
Concordia University Libraries
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. West, LB 317-3
Montreal QC H3G 1M8
514-848-2424, x7752
daniel.para...@concordia.ca
--
Stephen Hearn
Authority Control Coordinator/Head, Database Management Section
Technical Services, University Libraries, University of Minnesota
160 Wilson Library
309 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Ph: 612-625-2328 / Fax: 612-625-3428
