This patch introduces object audit filters based on the elements
of the SELinux context.
Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
kernel/auditfilter.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 40a9931..7f2ea8b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -475,6 +475,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
if (IS_ERR(str))
goto exit_free;
@@ -616,6 +621,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_kru
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
break;
@@ -659,6 +669,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct aud
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
return 1;
break;
@@ -779,6 +794,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_ru
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
@@ -1542,6 +1562,11 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
return 1;
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index e183a6f..b171c1f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -342,6 +342,46 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas
ctx);
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
+ also applies here */
+ if (f->se_rule) {
+ /* Find files that match */
+ if (name) {
+ result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ name->osid, f->type, f->op,
+ f->se_rule, ctx);
+ } else if (ctx) {
+ for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
+ if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ ctx->names[j].osid,
+ f->type, f->op,
+ f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Find ipc objects that match */
+ if (ctx) {
+ struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ for (aux = ctx->aux; aux;
+ aux = aux->next) {
+ if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
+ struct
audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ if
(selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ ++result;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 112484f..5132002 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1858,12 +1858,17 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
/* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1885,6 +1890,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
switch (field) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
if (!userdatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1892,6 +1898,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
if (!roledatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1899,6 +1906,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
if (!typedatum)
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1907,6 +1915,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
break;
}
@@ -1959,6 +1969,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid,
without a match */
switch (field) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
@@ -1969,6 +1980,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid,
}
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
@@ -1979,6 +1991,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid,
}
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
@@ -1990,7 +2003,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid,
break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
+ field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
&ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
switch (op) {
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
--
Darrel
--
redhat-lspp mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/redhat-lspp
