03/05/2007 lspp Meeting Minutes:
===============================
  Attendees

  Lawrence Wilson (IBM) - LW
  George Wilson (IBM) - GW
  Kris Wilson (IBM) - KEW
  Loulwa Salem (IBM) - LS
  Joy Latten (IBM) - JL
  Kylene J Hall (IBM) - KH
  Kent Yoder (IBM) - KY
  Irina Boverman (Red Hat) - IB
  Steve Grubb (Red Hat) - SG
  Dan Walsh (Red Hat) - DW
  Eric Paris (Red Hat) - EP
  Linda Knippers (HP) - LK
  Amy Griffis (HP) - AG
  Matt Anderson (HP) - MA
  Paul Moore (HP) - PM
  Klaus Weidner (Atsec) - KW
  Chad Hanson (TCS) - CH

Agenda:
         Agenda and Meeting Formats
         Bug Discussion
         Around the Room

RHEL 5+ Packages:
         kernel-2.6.18-8.el5.lspp.65
         kernel-devel-2.6.18-8.el5.lspp.65
         kernel-doc-2.6.18-8.el5.lspp.65
         mcstrans-0.2.3-1.el5
         selinux-policy-2.4.6-38.el5
         selinux-policy-devel-2.4.6-38.el5
         selinux-policy-mls-2.4.6-38.el5
         selinux-policy-strict-2.4.6-38.el5
         selinux-policy-targeted-2.4.6-38.el5
         audit
         vixie-cron


    IB: george we should skip over closed and modified bugs
    GW: yes, I just copied all the list, also there are a couple that Lou
        mentioned that are not on the list. there maybe others that people want
        to bring up. Irena are you going to make edits directly into the
        tracking bug.
    IB: steve wanted developers to make them directly.
    GW: while waiting. I did hack on self tests and policy. I gave base program
        massive mls overrides, idea is that it'll kick off a helper in
        appropriate domain to conduct BLP test and that domain will lack mls
        overrides. I've gotten a helper script that does a read/write of file
        at the right level. Joy pointed out I need to add interface to allow me
        to get if selinux is in enforcing or not. so once I added that, it
        helped in other areas. This is the first time I am able to create the
        test files and have an executable. I'll post my work in progress. For
        somethings I didn't get AVC like setfscreatecon, it will fail but when I
        gave program ability to check selinux mode, it allowed one of the
        setfscreatcon to work when it wasn't working before. I got no avc which
        was troubling, also found that audit2allow doesn't always give right
        rules. Anyway, I hacked on it and gotten it farther than before. That's
        my update. I should open bug to say we need it so we can bring it in.
    SG: lspp yum repo is up and live as of five minutes ago. it'll have most
        recent kernel, it is simpler to keep just one copy. I need to go through
        and find the lost packages, acl and kernel are there, and a pam, I
        didn't see vixie cron and don't remember seeing policy. I need to go and
        see what's going on.
    GW: where would we find that
    SG: same place, off my people page.
    GW: I still see the 65 and 66 kernels
    SG: I just updated it ..
    GW: ok, thanks for that
    SG: I need to get the audit package, and just need to get vixie cron and
        policy and we should be good
    CH: I see all the old kernels as well
    LK: yeah, me too
    SG: I went to the audit page, and there is link at bottom that says yum
        repo, and my files are there. Maybe something went wrong
    GW: any issues before we move on to bug list?
    JL: in .67 kernel, when I try to build and make initrd, I get all kind of
        permission denied errors in there, I tried it on 2 systems, and I see
        same behavior. only time I can build is if I am in permissive.
    DW: make initrd?
    JL: yeah
    DW: are you doing this as sysadm
    JL: yes, I get permission denied from mknod /tmp/initrd
    DW: make initrd is doing very heavy duty things on system, which we don't
        allow it to do
    JL: some of avc messages complain that it can't do block file create...
    DW: I can add these, but not sure if there'll be a need for them or customer
        requirement for that
    GW: if we don't fix it, should we document it?
    SG: I doubt anyone would install gcc on production system
    GW: I agree, so this is worthy of documentation only
    EP: it is not a very common operation.
    SG: that would be unsupportable
    EP: doesn't likely sound it'll ever be a problem
    DW: George, steve was saying you were not generating AVCs
    GW: I hacked on self tests some , for certain things, I needed to add
        interface to be able to determine if selinux is enforcing or not, I
        added that and wasn't getting any AVC. That also fixed fscreatcon
        failings. I gave my program mls overrides, in enforcing mode
        setfscreatcon would fail with no AVC messages
    DW: what if you run not in enforcing, does it generate AVC
    GW: it works fine, so I don't see AVC.
    DW: getenforce is not a privileged action
    GW: there is an interface and I couldn't do it
    EP: your program didn't have permissions
    DW: your problem is that you couldn't read /etc/selinux maybe
    GW: why couldn't I get AVC on it
    KH: which setfscreate where you using
    GW: setfscreatecon
    KH: were you running lspp policy?
    GW: yes
    KH: cause I had to make changes to that for the sockcreate
    GW: first setfscreatecon works, but if it create a file at system high, it
        fails
    DW: and it generates AVC
    GW: no
    DW: Ok, I would like to see that
    GW: I have another way to do it with helper program, but I was surprised I
        wasn't seeing AVC with this. I've at least got a way out through policy
        and by not calling runcon or the shell, I am simply doing my own
        equivalent of runcon. I still have more work ahead. I'll post what I
        have and if people can give advice, I'll be happy to see it. this is the
        first time I am able to do this. no matter what we have it do, we need
        the overrides, so I think this is the correct approach.
    DW: just make sure it is not able to do much since it is powerful
    GW: that's why I think the helper function is necessary and it only creates
        files with specific naming convention, so it is contained. Any other
        issues?
    LS: Dan, I talked to you last week about the /etc/selinux/mls/modules
        context that gets changed in some instances. basically the active
        directory context gets changed when using semanage sometimes,
        and the next time I try to use semanage, it fails
    DW: if you ran semanage in permissive, it will cause the label to change
    LS: I was 100% sure I was running in enforcing. Camilo is Brazil was seeing
        something similar as well.
    JL: I see a problem like that as well sometimes
    LS: I should open a bug for this ..
    DW: yes definitely ... we can't update anything unless we have a bug
    GW: we need very soon to talk about locking things down so we can run formal
        testing in next couple of weeks
    SG: now that I have repo, we can change easily
    GW: yeah, because any changes are going to mean re-testing
    LK: we are only fixing things that affect test now anyway
    SG: at RH right now, we are locked down
    GW: we need to at some point accept no bugs unless they are blocking
        evaluation
    LK: I thought we are in that mode already
    GW: we must be in hard lock mode, I think right now we are in soft lock mode
    EP: I think there is one bug that won't block, like the kernel memory that I
        know of.
    IB: if we don't need to fix some bugs, then we don't close them, but we can
        remove them from the dependency list
    GW: we need to take absolutely what we have to take


218386 [ASSIGNED - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: labeled ipsec does not work over loopback.
    JL: been working on it. I was seeing double SAs. I did a test to have
        packets using ESP and AH, I was seeing 4 SAs. I was seeing 8 or 16
        instead, and I thought maybe it was that loopback patch. the patch seems
        fine, but I think there is a bug in the kernel, it is result of the
        patch to not drop first packet. for example when you do a ping, it sends
        multiple packets, and tries to establish multiple SAs until the first SA
        is established. need to look more at it, I might have to send question
        since I don't know much about this queue. I think the loopback patch is
        good
    GW: was this part of Dave miller's patch? it would be good to contact him
    JL: yes .. I'll send to netdev
    CH: you can copy Venkat on this as well
    JL: I'll also document in bug report. since I tested loopback patch, I'll
        send maybe tomorrow to ipsec list


223532 [ASSIGNED - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] [LSPP] crontab manpages reference older environment variable.
    SG: I think it's fixed. it's a matter of me locating the package and getting
        it into repo, so you can try it
    GW: should be changed to modified
    SG: we'll chase that one down

223840 [NEW - high - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] [LSPP] getfacl fails to correctly display all information about links explicited as arguments.
    KW: this is an older bug
    SG: this just needs to be verified. it's in the new yum repo.
    KW: I had unofficially checked patch and it worked, last question was where
        the updated package is and you just answered that
    SG: might just be mirroring problem

223864 [NEW - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: Exceptions to expected audit behavior should be documented.
    LS: we had talked about putting this in configuration documentation
    SG: I left it open as courtesy, I am leaving it open so we don't forget
        about it.
    KH: last I knew Klaus was putting that in our config file. Best way is maybe
        mark as "fixed in documentation" and we'll document it
    SG: if I change it to fixed, it'll drop off this list
    LK: yeah, that would be ok
    SG: ok, will close it


223918 [ASSIGNED - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: audit logs bogus obj label in some PATH records.
    AG: needs to be verified .. I've done that
    EP: if you put a comment in there, I'll get it sent for inclusion. I don't
        think we figured a way to make those disappear off this list
    SG: was very busy, so I didn't look into this
    EP: I'll think of something


223919 [ASSIGNED - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: audit does not log obj label when opening an existing POSIX message queue.
    AG: I've verified, I'll update the bug


225328 [ASSIGNED - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: ipsec drops first packet when using IKE daemon.
    JL: that's the one giving us problem. I'll send email to Dave Miller


226780 [ASSIGNED - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: audit of writes to files of bin_t produces no records.
    SG: that one, I have fix for and need to get audit package into repo


228107 [ASSIGNED - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] [LSPP] Labels for labeled printing don't linewrap.
    MA: patch is set, I need to get it merged up with RH, and run through one
        last round of testing
    GW: so we need to add cups patch

228366 [ASSIGNED - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: audit does not log obj label for signal recipient.
    SG: need review
    EP: This causes audit panic in lspp.67
    SG: Al said he'll look at signal patch and will maybe show up for some
        teleconf
    EP: see if Amy has a fix for that

228384 [ASSIGNED - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: audit does not log obj label for traced process.
    SG: Al sent patch today, need to grab and put into new kernel
    AG: I had a question about it, I thought I saw it wasn't grabbing the sid,
        it looked like it was doing conversion of string right away, and was
        wondering what you thought of that?
    SG: I told Al that it was grabbing number and was doing conversion. I
        mentioned to Al and he seemed unphased by it.

228409 [ASSIGNED - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: regular ipsec in upstream kernel crashes.
    JL: that's that transform_audit. Eric, remember that bug I reported to you
        where I get the bug in .67 kernel .. that's applicable to this one
    EP: I think we have patch for it, just need to look at it

228422 [ASSIGNED - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: cleanup xfrm_audit_log interface.
    EP: that's the patch I think solves the other one. Who are those assigned to
    SG: Al viro
    PM: they look like they are assigned to Eric just by looking at the bug
    SG: I think they are assigned to Eric since he is doing the kernel build

228557 [ASSIGNED - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: In labeled ipsec, permissions are checked after deleting the policy.
    JL: that one is one I need to check and close out
    EP: I sent fix upstream and didn't hear much from Venkat other than he liked
        it

228927 [NEW - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: odd audit argument on some 32 bit syscalls.
KW: this is also doc fix that we are adding to config guide
GW: should we close it out then and document it
KW: yes.. it's not really error, just system behaves a bit oddly


229094 [ASSIGNED - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: audit records for some f*xattr syscalls don't include object info.
    LK: that one was verified
    GW: need to update bugzilla then
    KW: there is kernel patch for it but not sure if it is built in kernel
        already
    LK: I tested with .65 kernel
    EP: I'll find way to get that one off list too
    GW: thanks

229527 [ASSIGNED - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: flow cache entries remain valid even after selinux policy reload. JL: I just sent email to venkat on how to test those, same for one below

229528 [ASSIGNED - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: memory leak in flow cache code.
    EP: this is the one I don't think it is necessary an evaluation blocking bug

229543 [NEW - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: odd avc message.
    SG: I think Stephen smalley explained that one, I think it's closed as not a
        bug
    KH: we wanted to keep it for things to do better for later ..
    GW: so lessons learned, and we'll take it off the list              

229673 [ASSIGNED - urgent - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] [LSPP] cups is overriding mls when querying jobs with lpq -al.
    MA: I think that one has been released as updated package, we can add it to
        repo so we can test around that.                

229720 [NEW - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: pfkey_spdget does not audit xrfm policy changes.
    JL: that'll be included, and I think I need to test it out.
    GW: already patched and patch need testing
    EP: correct

229732 [NEW - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: pfkey_delete and xfrm_del_sa audit hook is misplaced..
    JL: that one too
    GW: just needs to be tested
    EP: yeah, there should be patches and I sent them all upstream

230144 [NEW - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: panic in audit_receive 
filter.
    EP: I'm closing it as dup of another one

230255 [NEW - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: cipso mapping settings prevents login into system.
    LS: This one that turned out to be an expected behavior, but uncovered that
        some packages were getting sent when they shouldn't have been. Paul
        posted a patch
    PM: the patch was sent upstream and quickly acked by James morris and it is
        already into the tree, so it is probably good to pull into the next lspp
        kernel
    SG: so we have two patches
    EP: I think there are three patches
    SG: I am concerned we are not getting good tests since the kernel is oopsing
    EP: I'll come up with kernel that won't oops

230613 [ASSIGNED - urgent - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Reopened] [LSPP] cups is allowing users to delete other user's job.
    SG: there is ongoing discussion if it is feature or bug
    MA: from our perspective, it is a bug .. I sent klaus some lines to put in
        config file. for evaluation it is not bug ...
    KW: Let me see if I understand this correctly, anybody can remove jobs from
        queue that other user queued without authentication. problem is that the
        cups never used to check anyway so people think it's not a bug. it's
        broken behavior, but we can change config to always ask for
        authentication
    LK: you can also queue job as anyone else
    KW: looks like user it is queued as is just informative or does it really do
        something
    LK: you get audit log with auid as the real user, but the id is the user you
        are impersonating
    MA: ...
    KY: is there such a thing as printing quotas that can be bypassed
    LK: when we configure it to do authentication, the way it uses pam, it
        wasn't counting against failed attempts, so you can use it to do
        password cracking
    KW: is it prompting for your user or password of user you are using in -u
    LK: it's user specified with -u
    KW: so you can use it for password guessing. this is broken
    SG: you can still use the pam tally to count
    MA: there is a bug that just got opened (231062) for that
    GW: what are we going to end up doing with that, are we using the
        authentication mechanism
    MA: yes, we have to
    LK: we will need a policy change, and config changes to cups
    GW: we need to make sure these get filtered to klaus. and I'm sure patches
        are all very appreciated

230663 [NEEDINFO - medium - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: random problems with the python rpm.
    KH: you asked me to open a bug on. I was trying to do something on my older
        partition. I think they are waiting on info from me to do memtest 86,
        and I don't know how to do that, so I asked for instruction for s390
    SG: I think it would be for intel only.
    GW: how about amtu, is there another generic test that can be run that is
        equivalent
    SG: I don't think there is an equivalent
    GW: maybe we can ping the s390 people
    SG: if you see it on two machines, put that in the bug, so they know it's
        not a hardware problem.
    KH: I am seeing it on two partitions of the same machine, does that count
    SG: I'm not sure

230740 [NEW - normal - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - ] LSPP: ausearch -se doesn't work with object label.
    SG: should get that one through build system in the next day once the repo
        is set up

230620 - xfrm_add_sa_expire bug
    JL: This is the bug Kent found by inspecting the code
    KY: Dave miller submitted patch and I put reference for it on the bug
    JL: we need to make sure we pick that one up. Eric can you pick it up
    EP: I'll look at it

231021 - amtu -n fails with MLS policy in enforcing mode
    DW: should that go in base policy
    GW: ideally, it would be base, but it is really your call Dan.
    DW: amtu, is that a packet we are shipping. I'll pull that in then. wasn't
        sure what we were deciding to do with it.
    GW: steve, you wanted that enhanced for ipv6
    SG: yes, DOD is switching soon I think. It didn't look hard. and it looked
        like a matter of using unified address storage parameter instead of 32
        bit location for ipv6 addresses.
    GW: I agree, it looked simple
    SG: I want to think Erlok Drepper(?) has some code to determine preferred
        address for the machine. So the code doesn't even care.

    GW: other things we need
    IB: I have bugzilla query that is using a different way to find LSPP bugs,
        I'll send it to you George and linda. Steve and Eric, this will give us
        what we are looking for.
    LK: there was some mail posted to lspp list about posix_msg_queue. it was a
        question about if you can use them as system high. there is policy in
        fs.te file. do people think it is a behavior people want to use if
        enforced properly or is it a system high thing
    GW: I think there was also question about what applications it would break
        if it is at system high
    LK: I'm wondering what is the correct behavior ought to be and if people
        agree with that
    GW: normally that wouldn't be mounted. so there is now policy that allows
        everyone to mount it
    LK: I don't know about that. so if it's not mounted then the msg-queues work
    GW: you can access them through syscalls, but you can't use the filesystem
        interface, at least that's what my understanding is.
    LK: I need to do some more experimenting ..
    GW: I think general answer is that you should use what mechanism is on
        machine within policy
    LK: I think it was related to how it was working at the time
    GW: you can only mount at system high but make use of them at different
        levels ... I think you can use them as to whatever your policy dictates.
        I don't see any reason why they would only be restricted to system high

    SG: Dan walsh and myself are going to be tied with meeting over next couple
        of days, but will be back on Thursday.
    GW: ok
    SG: As for the symposium, I want to mention that the audit BOF was only one
        registered, so they have open slots. Maybe we can get together and have
        an informal talk ... I know steve you were interested in getting work to
        have gov buy in
    SG: yeah, there are other standards that we can consider ...
    PM: If we are going to do a BOF about this, we might as well announce it so
        that we can get customers and partners that don't attend this call, to
        attend if they like.
    SG: I'll see if we can schedule another session after the audit BOF
    GW: point well taken Paul, it is a really good opportunity.

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