Edward Shishkin wrote: > Hans Reiser wrote: > >> Edward Shishkin wrote: >> >> >> >>>> >>>> When you load a key, who can access the file? Only the person who >>>> loaded it, yes or? >>>> >>>> >>> >>> Currently standard unix permissions work here. >>> >> >> >> but the idea is to use keys instead of standard unix permissions.... >> >> I think you need to store keys in a per process place, and allow >> specifying whether children of a process inherit the keys somehow. >> >> > > Unfortunately the encrypt-on-flush violates all this beauty: the flush, > which serves all the files, can not look for a key in the process > keyring (*), therefore besides the process keyrings, reiser4 should > create and manage its own keyring (accessible to the flush). It means > additional charges on searching, hashing, updating, etc.. > > (*) Because: > 1) the flush does not have needed task_struct; > 2) the flush can not return an error if someone killed the key in > the process keyring. > > Edward. > > per process is not the same as "in user space and under user control"
Also the key to encrypt a given file with should be specified to the fs at open() or at sys_reiser4() time, not at flush time. Please consider these thoughts, and then revise and resend your opinion on this.
