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> Slouching Toward Baghdad > by Mike Davis > ZNet > February 28, 2003 > > Imperial Washington, like Berlin in the late 1930s, has become a > psychedelic capital where one megalomaniacal hallucination succeeds > another. Thus, in addition to creating a new geopolitical order in > the Middle East, we are now told by the Pentagon's deepest thinkers > that the invasion of Iraq will also inaugurate "the most important > 'revolution in military affairs' (or RMA) in two hundred years." > > According to Admiral William Owen, a chief theorist of the > revolution, the first Gulf War was "not a new kind of war, but the > last of the old ones." Likewise, the air wars in Kosovo and > Afghanistan were only pale previews of the postmodern blitzkrieg that > will be unleashed against the Baathist regime. Instead of old- > fashioned sequential battles, we are promised nonlinear "shock and > awe." > > Although the news media will undoubtedly focus on the sci-fi gadgetry > involved - thermobaric bombs, microwave weapons, unmanned aerial > vehicles (UAVs), PackBot robots, Stryker fighting vehicles, and so on > - the truly radical innovations (or so the war wonks claim) will be > in the organization and, indeed, the very concept of the war. > > In the bizarre argot of the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation > (the nerve center of the revolution), a new kind of "warfighting > ecosystem" known as "network centric warfare" (or NCW) is slouching > toward Baghdad to be born. Promoted by military futurists as a > "minimalist" form of warfare that spares lives by replacing attrition > with precision, NCW may in fact be the inevitable road to nuclear war. > > FROM DESERT STORM TO WAL-MART > > Military "revolutions" based on new technology, of course, have come > and gone since air-power fanatics like Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, > and Hugh Trenchard first proclaimed the obsolescence of traditional > armies and battleship navies in the early 1920s. This time, however, > the superweapon isn't a long-distance bomber or nightmare H-bomb but > the ordinary PC and its ability, via the Internet, to generate > virtual organization in the "battlespace" as well as the marketplace. > > Like all good revolutionaries, the Pentagon advocates of RMA/ NCW are > responding to the rot and crisis of an ancien regime. Although Gulf > War I was publicly celebrated as a flawless victory of technology and > alliance politics, the real story was vicious infighting among > American commanders and potentially disastrous breakdowns in > decision-making. Proponents of high- tech warfare, like the 'smart > bomb' attacks on Baghdad's infrastructure, clashed bitterly with > heavy-metal traditionalists, while frustrated battlefield CEO Norman > Schwarzkopf threw stupefying tantrums. > > The battles continued back in the Pentagon where the revolutionaries > -- mostly geekish colonels bunkered in a series of black-box think > tanks -- found a powerful protector in Andrew Marshall, the venerable > head of research and technology assessment. In 1993, Marshall - a > guru to both Dick Cheney and leading Democrats - provided the > incoming Clinton administration with a working paper that warned that > Cold War weapons "platforms" like Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and > heavy tank battle groups were becoming obsolete in face of precision > weapons and cruise missiles. > > Marshall instead proselytized for cheaper, quicker, smarter weapons > that took full advantage of American leadership in information > technology. He warned, however, that "by perfecting these precision > weapons, America is forcing its enemies to rely on terrorist > activities that are difficult to target." He cast doubt on the > ability of the Pentagon's fossilized command hierarchies to adapt to > the challenges of so-called "asymmetric warfare." > > The revolutionaries went even further, preaching that the potentials > of 21st century war-making technology were being squandered within > 19th century military bureaucracies. The new military forces of > production were straining to break out of their archaic relations of > production. They viciously compared the Pentagon to one of the "old > economy" corporations -- "hardwired, dumb and top-heavy" -- that were > being driven into extinction in the contemporary "new economy" > marketplace. > > Their alternative? Wal-Mart, the Arkansas-based retail leviathan. It > may seem odd, to say the least, to nominate a chain store that > peddles cornflakes, jeans and motor oil as the model for a leaner, > meaner Pentagon, but Marshall's think-tankers were only following in > the footsteps of management theorists who had already beatified > Wal-Mart as the essence of a "self-synchronized distributed network > with real-time transactional awareness." Translated, this means that > the stores' cash registers automatically transmit sales data to > Wal-Mart's suppliers and that inventory is managed through > 'horizontal' networks rather than through a traditional head-office > hierarchy. > > "We're trying to do the equivalent in the military," wrote the > authors of Network Centric Warfare: developing and leveraging > information superiority, the 1998 manifesto of the RMA/NCW camp that > footnotes Wal-Mart annual reports in its bibliography. In > "battlespace," mobile military actors (ranging from computer hackers > to stealth bomber pilots) would be the counterparts of Wal-Mart's > intelligent salespoints. > > Instead of depending on hardcopy orders and ponderous chains of > commands, they would establish "virtual collaborations" (regardless > of service branch) to concentrate overpowering violence on precisely > delineated targets. Command structures would be "flattened" to a > handful of generals, assisted by computerized decision-making aides, > in egalitarian dialogue with their "shooters.'" > > The iconic image, of course, is the Special Forces op in Pathan drag > using his laptop to summon air strikes on a Taliban position that > another op is highlighting with his laser designator. To NCW gurus, > however, this is still fairly primitive Gunga Din stuff. They would > prefer to "swarm" the enemy terrain with locust-like myriads of > miniaturized robot sensors and tiny flying video cams whose > information would be fused together in a single panopticon picture > shared by ordinary grunts in their fighting vehicles as well as by > four-star generals in their Qatar or Florida command posts. > > Inversely, as American "battlespace awareness" is exponentially > increased by networked sensors, it becomes ever more important to > blind opponents by precision air strikes on their equivalent (but > outdated) "command and control" infrastructures. This necessarily > means a ruthless takeout of civilian telecommunications, power grids, > and highway nodes: all the better, in the Pentagon view, to allow > American psy-op units to propagandize, or, if necessary, terrorize > the population. > > THE PENTAGON'S WHIRLING DERVISHES > > Critics of RMA/NCW have compared it to a millennial cult, analogous > to bible-thumping fundamentalism or, for that matter, to Al Queda. > Indeed, reading ecstatic descriptions of how "Metcalfe's Law" > guarantees increases of "network power proportional to the square of > the number of nodes,'" one wonders what the wonks are smoking in > their Pentagon basement offices. (Marshall, incidentally, advocates > using behavior-modifying drugs to create Terminator-like > 'bioengineered soldiers.') > > Their most outrageous claim is that Clausewitz's famous "fog of war" > -- the chaos and contingency of the battlefield -- can be dispelled > by enough sensors, networks, and smart weapons. Thus vice-admiral > Arthur Cebrowski, the Pentagon director for "force transformation," > hallucinates that "in only a few years, if the the technological > capabilities of America's enemies remain only what they are today, > the US military could effectively achieve total "battlespace > knowledge." > > Donald Rumsfeld, like Dick Cheney (but unlike Colin Powell), is a > notorious addict of RNA/NCW fantasies (already enshrined as official > doctrine by the Clinton administration in 1998). By opening the > floodgates to a huge military budget (almost equal to the rest of the > world's military spending combined), 9.11 allowed Rumsfeld to go > ahead with the revolution while buying off the reactionaries with > funding for their baroque weapons systems, including three competing > versions of a new tactical fighter. The cost of the compromise - > which most Democrats have also endorsed - will be paid for by > slashing federal spending on education, healthcare, and local > government. > > A second Iraq war, in the eyes of the RNA/NCW zealots, is the > inevitable theater for demonstrating to the rest of the world that > America's military superiority is now unprecedented and unduplicable. > Haunted by the 1993 catastrophe in Mogadishu, when poorly armed > Somali militia defeated the Pentagon's most elite troops, the war > wonks have to show that networked technology can now prevail in > labyrinthine street warfare. To this end, they are counting on the > combination of battlefield omniscience, smart bombs, and new weapons > like microwave pulses and nausea gases to drive Baghdadis out of > their homes and bunkers. The use of "non-lethal" (sic) weapons > against civilian populations, especially in light of the horror of > what happened during the Moscow hostage crisis last October, is a war > crime waiting to happen. > > But what if the RNA/NCW's Second Coming of Warfare doesn't arrive as > punctually promised? What happens if the Iraqis or future enemies > find ways to foil the swarming sensors, the night- visioned Special > Forces, the little stair-climbing robots, the missile-armed drones? > Indeed, what if some North Korean cyberwar squad (or, for that > matter, a fifteen-year-old hacker in Des Moines) manages to crash the > Pentagon's "system of systems" behind its battlespace panopticon? > > If the American war-fighting networks begin to unravel (as partially > occurred in February 1991), the new paradigm - with its "just in > time" logistics and its small "battlefield footprint" - leaves little > backup in terms of traditional military reserves. This is one reason > why the Rumsfeld Pentagon takes every opportunity to rattle its > nuclear saber. > > Just as precision munitions have resurrected all the mad omnipotent > visions of yesterday's strategic bombers, RNA/NCW is giving new life > to monstrous fantasies of functionally integrating tactical nukes > into the electronic battlespace. The United States, it should never > be forgotten, fought the Cold War with the permanent threat of "first > use" of nuclear weapons against a Soviet conventional attack. Now the > threshold has been lowered to Iraqi gas attacks, North Korean missile > launches, or, even, retaliation for future terrorist attacks on > American city. > > For all the geekspeak about networks and ecosystems, and millenarian > boasting about minimal, robotic warfare, the United States is > becoming a terror state pure and simple: a 21st century Assyria with > laptops and modems. > > Mike Davis is the author of City of Quartz, Ecology of Fear, and most > recently, Dead Cities, among other works. He now lives in San Diego. > > [This article first appeared on http://www.tomdispatch.com, a weblog > of the Nation Institute, which offers a steady flow of alternate > sources, news and opinion from Tom Engelhardt, long time editor in > publishing and author of The End of Victory Culture.] > > [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ______________________________________________________________________ Yahoo! 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