On 6/2/04 10:52 PM, "Paul Finkelman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Mr. Beckwith: > > It is hard to imagine how one can treat someone with respect and at the > same time believe that such a person is not entitled to the same rights > that you have. Yes, it is hard to imagine that I would hold that belief, since I don't hold it. > > Quite frankly, your position reminds me of those southern whites who > treated blacks with "respect" while segregating them, denying them full > legal rights, and turning a blind eye to their persecution. It is worth > remembering that for more than 150 years Christians defended both > slavery and segregation with religious and biblical arguments. This is precisely the sort of disreputable tactic that I was talking about in my last post. Instead of engaging the modest case I put forth (which, by the way, never dealt with the legal rights of gay citizens, but rather, the legal rights of religious citizens), I am passive-aggressively compared to someone who defended segregation and/or slavery. Here's what I wrote: "I think that the gay rights movement has corrupted our public discourse by the rhetorical trick of changing the topic from the plausibility of onešs position to whether the one who embraces that position is a virtuous person. So, for example, if a concerned parent sincerely believes that homosexuality is immoral, and has informed himself of all the relevant arguments and remains unconvinced of the otheršs position, that parent is `homophobic.' I am not convinced that is how adults ought to conduct their disagreements in public." All was I suggesting is that the parent's concern is legitimate and ought to be treated with respect, since she, after all, has the same rights as the rest of us. Your slavery analogy, however, raises an interesting question that is outside the scope of this listserv though relevant to your view on the relationship between law and morality: why was slavery wrong? Was it wrong because the slaves did not consent to their imprisonment, or was it wrong because human beings are by nature the sorts of beings that are not property? If the latter, then there are acts between consenting adults--namely voluntary slavery--that the law could proscribe on clearly moral and metaphysical grounds. On the other hand, if the former, then slavery is not intrinsically wrong; it is only conditionally wrong, depending on whether the prospective slave consented to his servitude. Perhaps I was unclear in my posting, and for that I apologize. All I was doing was trying to do was humanize the predicament of the serious, caring citizen who feels under siege by cultural warriors who will call her names and marginalize her perspective simply because she is thoughtfully unconvinced that her critics are correct. Frank _______________________________________________ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
