Temporary Stay of Injunction in "Hoasca Tea" Case

Three weeks ago, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction that would prevent the U.S. government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act with respect to the importation, possession and distribution of hoasca (a tea containing dimethyltryptamine, or DMT, a substance regulated under Schedule I of the Act) for use in religious ceremonies of a church known as O Centro Espirita Beneficients Uniao Do Vegetal, or "UDV." The court of appeals' mandate issued on Tuesday.

Yesterday, the Acting Solicitor General moved the Supreme Court to stay the preliminary injunction pending a filing of a cert. petition, and made an emergency application to the Court for a temporary stay of the injunction pending the disposition of the Government's motion to stay the injunction.

Justice Breyer granted the application for a temporary stay, pending disposition of the motion for a stay pending petition. He ordered the plaintiffs to file responsive papers by the end of the day tomorrow (Friday), with the SG's reply due on Tuesday.

The injunction is based upon the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which requires the United States to grant an exemption to one of its laws when the law substantially burdens the exercise of religion, unless denial of the religious exemption would be a narrowly tailored way of advancing a compelling governmental interest. (The Court in Boerne invalidated RFRA as applied to the States; but it remains constitutional as applied to the federal government.) The Government claims that there are two compelling interests that support denial of the RFRA exemption here: (i) preventing the risks of danger caused by ingestion of the tea and/or its possible diversion to nonreligious uses; and (ii) ensuring that the U.S. remains in strict compliance with the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic substances, which generally requires signatories (including the U.S.) to prohibit almost all use of certain psychotropic substances, including DMT. The second argument is not that strict treaty compliance is a "compelling interest" in and of itself, but instead that if the U.S. violates the Convention in any respect, it will undermine U.S. efforts to secure worldwide cooperation in the international fight to control psychotropic substances.

In his concurring opinion in the en banc proceeding, Tenth Circuit Judge Michael McConnell identified what will probably be one of the principal issues in the case as it is argued in the Supreme Court: Judge McConnell contends that the U.S. will be hard-pressed to demonstrate that something is a "compelling interest" under RFRA if the government allows other exemptions that also undermine that interest in analogous ways. (The Bush Administration has generally agreed with this understanding of the "compelling interest" test in RFRA and related contexts. See, e.g., its explanation for why RFRA would dictate an exemption for religious organizations to a statutory requirement that recipients of certain social-service funds not discriminate on the basis of religion in employment decisions: 67 Fed. Reg. 77,351-52 (Dec. 17, 2002).) Judge McConnell points, in particular, to a statute that permits members of recognized Native American tribes to use peyote, a Schedule I substance, in religious ceremonies. 42 U.S.C. 1996a. He argues that this peyote exemption demonstrates that "concerns for religious freedom can sometimes outweigh risks that otherwise justify prohibiting Schedule I substances," shows that "[n]either Congress nor the Executive has treated the CSA's general findings about Schedule I substances as precluding a particularized assessment of the risks involved in a specific sacramental use," and "indicates Congress?s belief that at least some use of substances controlled by the Act are 'consistent with the public health and safety,' despite the generalized congressional finding that any Schedule I substance is not safe to consume even under the supervision of medical personnel." The Government, in response to such arguments, has argued that the health and diversion risks created by the plaintiffs' use of DMT would be greater than the risks created when Native Americans use peyote. There are factual disputes on this question between the parties.

The plaintiffs and Judge McConnell also argue that the peyote exception demonstrates either that the U.N. Convention permits limited religious exemptions, and/or that the U.S. does not suffer serious damage to its efforts to ensure international drug interdiction when it permits such minor exemptions, even if they might be technical violations of the treaty. The U.S. has argued in response that whereas the congressionally sanctioned peyote exemption does not violate the Convention (because the U.S. took a timely reservation to the treaty that covered such an exemption), a RFRA exemption for hoasca would be a treaty violation, and would be understood as such by our treaty partners from whom we seek cooperation. Judge McConnell notes that "the United States permits the exportation of [peyote] to Native American Church groups in Canada, despite the fact that exportation of a Schedule I substance for other than scientific or medical purposes would appear to violate the Convention," and that "[t]his suggests that, in practice, there is room for accommodation [under the Convention] of the legitimate needs of religious minority groups. . . . This case . . . raises the question of why an accommodation analogous to that extended to the Native American Church cannot be provided to other religious believers with similar needs. As the panel majority noted, the apparent workability of the accommodation for Native American Church peyote use strongly suggests that a similar exception would adequately protect the government?s interests here." The United States contends, however, that it does not "permit" the export of peyote to Canada.

DISCLOSURE: While I was employed at DOJ (OLC), I worked on the case in 2000-2002, when the Government was considering whether RFRA required an exemption and when the ensuing litigation began in district court. Nothing in this or other posts should be understood as necessarily representing the views of the United States, or of OLC, either then or now.
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