As I read this, I found myself wondering what the point is of having
constitutionally protected free exercise if the exercise is only free when the
legislature decides it is. The scenario you describe seems to be one where
the legislature is free to demand or prohibit any conduct they like, and to the
religious adherent who is unable to comply without violating the tenets of their
faith is simply out of luck unless they can get the legislature to exempt
them. The legislature can then, out of either hostility or indifference,
simply say, "We're not singling you out. Everybody has to do it."
Using your theory as I am understanding it, would you say that the
Catholic Church is required, by anti-discrimination laws, to hire women as
priests unless the anti-discrimination law was to specifically exempt the
Church? That certainly is a neutral, generally applicable law, and women
who want to be priests could certainly claim that they would be harmed by
an accomodation to allow the Church to only have men as priests. And
yet, if the Church is required by law to violate what it understands to be the
constraints placed upon it by God, how does that equate with the free exercise
of religion?
Am I missing something in terms of your understanding of accomodation and
free exercise?
Brad Pardee
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