I am late to this thread. I apologize if my comment is redundent to earlier posts.
Perhaps the issue here should be understood to focus on religious divisivenss which may include, but may also have a broader meaning than, religious strife. Religious divisiveness might refer to two additional concerns -- not only whether religious people get angry at each other because of the government's actions. 1. Whether we increase the likelihood that religious groups defined in denominational terms will be advantaged or disadvantaged if they gain control over government. 2. Whether we promote the fragmentation of our communities along denominational religious lines both for political reasons (because a significant number of co- religionists in a community can accrue political power)and for institutional reasons (because only a sufficiently large group of co- religionists can develop an institutional infrastructure capable of obtaining a fair share of the public sector pie.) A vigorously enforced free exercise clause and establishment clause reduces both the risks of being a religious minority in a community and the benefits of being a member of a large minority or the majority in a community. These joint guarantees promote religious integration -- in the sense of people of different faiths living and working together and developing the kind of understanding and empathy that regular interactions may foster. Government leading religious observances or endorsing religious messages, on the other hand, is religiously divisive in this sense. So is the government funding of religious institutions -- if the services those institutions provide are infused with religious content and if they discriminate on the basis of religion. If Justice Scalia's understanding of the Establishment Clause in McCreary was adopted; Hindus, Buddhists, and members of other non-monotheistic faiths would have a significant additional incentive to congregate together in communities to avoid marginalization. If Scalia's understanding of the Establishment Clause in Mitchell v. Helms was adopted, Jewish social workers, for example, would have to think carefully about moving to communities with small Jewish populations -- because a significant number of publicly funded jobs in their field might be religiously restricted -- substantially limiting their employment opportunities. I recognize that not everyone on the list views this kind of divisiveness as problematic, much less constitutionally significant. But for those of us who do -- and that may just be me -- it is another factor to consider. Alan Brownstein UC Davis _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
