Some interpretations:  

Congress cannot forbid the free exercise of religion

Congress cannot stop all exercise of religion

Congress may limit the exercise of religion

Congress may limit the exercise of religion in any way it wants so long as it doesn't prohibit it

Congress is forbidden from regulating religious beliefs

Congress permitted to regulate any and all manifestations or physical actions constituting the putting into action of those beliefs (the Garman interpretation)

Congress is prohibited from interfering at all with any and all manifestations or physical actions constituting the putting into action of those beliefs 

Gene, it says "exercise" -- not "belief."  It says Congress cannot make any law which forbids the exercise of religion.  It does not say Congress cannot make any law that forbids certain beliefs.

Reynolds says that the first amendment free exercise clause includes both -- but that right to any belief is absolute, but that the right to exercise those beliefs is not of necessity absolute.  But Reynolds does not therefore say that it is open season on putting beliefs into practice -- that Congress can do whatever it wants.  To the contrary, Reynolds says that Congress has some power to regulate exercise.

Use the dictionary to define exercise.  Not surprisingly it includes stuff like activity, actions -- not merely beliefs.

So, if Congress cannot completely prohibit the putting into action of religious beliefs, what can it do?  Can it prohibit all public exercise?  Mass?  Sermons?  Reading the Bible?  None of those things totally prohibit the exercise of religion -- there would always be some scintilla of exercise left.

That is not what it means and cannot be what it means.  Jefferson and Madison were much more in the world than your interpretation would require them to be.

I suspect that Article 18 of the ICCPR is pretty close to what they actually intended and had they thought of the Bill of Rights in affirmative terms rather than as strictly limits on the government, they would have ended up with something quite different.  Since we now treat (properly) the amendments not merely as limits on Congress but also as embodying affirmative rights, the limitation approach, if it ever was functional, is not.  Reynolds recognized that.

Steve



On Nov 21, 2005, at 4:34 PM, Gene Garman wrote:

Professor Laycock,

Without use of the word "totally" I understand the meaning of "prohibiting" as meaning totally. I do not find a different definition of what "prohibiting" means in Webster's. I do find a difference between the meaning of "abridging" and "prohibiting." The two words are not the same and do not have the same meaning. I use the word "totally" merely as a means of emphasizing the difference in meaning to readers who do not seem to recognize that difference. The 1789 joint Senate-House committee which created the final draft of the First Amendment used a different word in respect to the exercise of religion than to speech, press, peaceable assembly, and petition. Hopefully, the precise definition of terms is helpful to understanding.

Allow me to add, within two years time, James Madison personally helped write all three of the Constitution's specific religion commandments, and they are not in conflict in terms of understanding. Of course, there have always been unionists and accommodationists who reject the constitutional principle of "separation between religion and government" (James Madison, "Detached Memoranda"). In two February 1811 messages, President Madison vetoed bills passed by Congress and had to explain to Congress the meaning of the no "establishment of religion" commandment by pointing out that "governments are limited by the essential distinction between civil and religious functions" and cannot make laws respecting an establishment of "religion." Too bad Madison did not leave specific commentary as to the significance of the use of the different words "prohibiting" and "abridging" in the same First Amendment. I guess he figured most Americans would understand the meaning of the words used or would use Webster's. The fact is the word "abridging" (which means reducing) is not the word used in regard to the free exercise of religion, but it is the word which accommodationists prefer and promote as if there is no difference in meaning between "prohibiting" and "abridging." I welcome your input as to a definition of "prohibiting" having a meaning different from totally.

Gene Garman


-- 

Prof. Steven D. Jamar                               vox:  202-806-8017

Howard University School of Law                     fax:  202-806-8567

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"No place affords a more striking conviction of the vanity of human hopes than a public library."


Samuel Johnson, 1751



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