"That kind of jockeying for government recognition of particular denominations-- or for an implicit government statement rejecting supposed antireligious views-- seems to be just the kind of political divisions along religious lines that the Establishment Clause was supposed to prevent."
Yes indeed to Professor Friedman's statement, and (I would add) it's also the sort of divisions that Marsh itself was trying to prevent. I tend to see Marsh as an earlier Van Orden -- government gets to act religiously, but not too much. Breyer says in Van Orden that upholding the momument (not striking it down) is the best way to avoid "religiously based divisiveness." I bet Marsh court had a thought or two along those lines -- that the best way to keep the peace was by approving legislative prayer with some (what it thought to be modest) strings attached. Can we all agree that Marsh has utterly failed in this regard? Best, Chris Christopher C. Lund Assistant Professor of Law Mississippi College School of Law 151 E. Griffith St. Jackson, MS 39201 (601) 925-7141 (office) (601) 925-7113 (fax) >>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 07/25/08 8:14 AM >>> I think we need to ask why so much passion is expended on the question of invocations to begin meetings of government bodies. I find it hard to believe that proponents feel legislators will make significantly different decisions if the form of prayer at the beginning of their meeting is slightly different. Isn't this really about garnering government recognition of the validity, or at least respectability, of a particular religious belief? Isn't that why it is newsworthy when for the first time a Hindu or Sikh or Buddhist offers an invocation at city council or in a state legislature? I suspect that if a quiz were given to those in attendance, almost no one could repeat any of the content of an invocation a half hour after it was offered. But they could tell you who delivered it, or what religious denomination the person represented. That kind of jockeying for government recognition of particular denominations-- or for an implicit government statement rejecting supposed antireligious views-- seems to be just the kind of political divisions along religious lines that the Establishment Clause was supposed to prevent. Howard Friedman ________________________________ From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Jean Dudley Sent: Thu 7/24/2008 8:16 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Appeals Court Bans Prayer 'in Jesus' name' On Jul 24, 2008, at Thu, Jul 24, 2:51 PM, Gordon James Klingenschmitt wrote: > Professors Lund and Essenberg seek the larger question, which I > believe seems to involve whether a government can pray, at all. We > all agree individuals can pray, and the First Amendment protects > individual speech by private citizens. But can governments pray? Ostensibly, one particular form of government can pray; a theocracy. I suppose a monarchy such as the United Kingdom can pray as well, if the monarch is also the head of the state church. However, we are a representative democracy, and if *our* government prays, the prayer will of necessity be sectarian, and therefore exclusionary of other sects, and by default will be endorsing one religion over another and thus we have ipso facto a state religion. All well and fine it it's *your* religion, but not so fine if its not *your* religion. Perhaps, Mr. Klingenschmitt, your question should be "should governments pray?". To which I would answer a resounding, emphatic, "Not just no, but HELL NO!" Jean Dudley _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.