Alan, I'm not predicting two more justices, let alone with any certainty, or 
talking about all lay teachers.  I was only making the point that three 
justices adopted a broader standard than the majority, and the fact that one of 
them was Kagan is notable and makes the road to additional votes significantly 
easier than otherwise.  My sense, from oral argument among other things, was 
that Roberts and Scalia would be easier fifth votes than Kennedy to go further 
than these facts.  On your second point, in many religious schools, at least 
some lay teachers have a central role, not just some role, in communicating the 
religious message, as Lemon and many other cases have emphasized.  

Finally, I agree that funding complicates things.  I assume that government has 
authority to refuse to fund positions where discriminatory selection criteria 
operate (although, as you know, I think religious-belief selection criteria are 
a different case concerning religious organizations).  I wouldn't turn that 
authority into carte blanche for funding restrictions.  Would you say the mere 
fact that some lay teachers at a school would be classified within the 
ministerial exception would justify excluding all students at that school from 
participating in a "true private choice" voucher program, or (at the college 
level) from receiving state scholarships?  Would you say this even if the 
school had not been shown to discriminate but merely referred to such teachers 
as "ministers"?

-----------------------------------------
Thomas C. Berg
James L. Oberstar Professor of Law and Public Policy
University of St. Thomas School of Law
MSL 400, 1000 LaSalle Avenue
Minneapolis, MN   55403-2015
Phone: 651 962 4918
Fax: 651 962 4881
E-mail: tcb...@stthomas.edu
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/author='261564
Weblog: http://www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
________________________________________
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
on behalf of Alan Brownstein [aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu]
Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2012 12:01 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Supreme Court sides with church on decision to fire employee on    
religious grounds

Tom,

I have long since given up trying to predict how Supreme Court justices will 
decide future cases (or to assume that there will be logical consistency or 
even intellectual integrity in all opinions.) But Justice Roberts clearly and 
repeatedly emphasizes the title, status, and acknowledged role of minister or 
clergy as significant factors in reaching his decision in this case. Why are 
you so confident that all of this language in the opinion is superflous? I 
agree that Alito and Kagan's concurrence provides more support for including 
some lay teachers in the exception. But even they say "What matters is that 
respondent played an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious 
message and as a leader of its worship activities."  The words "important role" 
and "a leader" arguably mean something different than "some role" and "a 
participant."

Finally, of course, there is the question of how the understanding of who 
qualifies for the ministerial exception relates to the question of what 
positions the government can fund in religious institutions. Can the government 
fund the salary of teachers who play an important role as an instrument of 
their church's religious message and as a leader in its worship activities? If 
the answer to that question is "Yes" and it is also true that such teachers are 
enough like clergy in their religious functions to be included in the 
ministerial exception, would it follow that government can also fund the salary 
of clergy? Is it constitutionally permissible for the government to refuse to 
fund teaching positions at a religious school which refuses to hire 
African-Americans, women, and the disabled as teachers?

Alan



________________________________________
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
on behalf of Berg, Thomas C. [tcb...@stthomas.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2012 7:47 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Supreme Court sides with church on decision to fire employee on    
religious grounds

Alan,

I agree that the majority leaves open the issue of lay teachers.  But since 
three justices take a broader approach to defining a minister, all you need for 
a majority in a later case is two more votes, and Roberts and Scalia seem 
reasonable prospects to me in a case that presents the issue.  Thomas would 
defer heavily to the religious organization's characterization of an employee 
as a minister.  And Alito and Kagan say that ordained or "commissioned" status 
isn't crucial, that the criterion is “positions of substantial religious 
importance”—including those “teaching and conveying the tenets of the faith to 
the next generation”--and that "the constitutional protection of religious 
teachers is not somehow diminished when they take on secular functions in 
addition to their religious ones.  What matters is that respondent played an 
important role as an instrument of her church’s religious message and as a 
leader of its worship activities."  I can see many lay teachers in seriously 
religious schools satisfying such a test.  Kagan’s agreement with that standard 
is quite significant, as is her joining the Alito concurrence overall.

Tom

-----------------------------------------
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