Will beat me to it. There is a category of clothes that aren't kosher (clothes made with both linen and wool fibers). But of course this isn't a big category of clothing!
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014, Alan Brownstein <aebrownst...@ucdavis.edu> wrote: > My dad had a hardware/housewares store in the Bronx. He was not an > observant Jew. Everyone was closed on Sunday. He was open on Saturday. He > told me he did half of the week's business on Saturday and that it was > impossible to be in business and be closed both days. > > > > Alan > ------------------------------ > *From:* > religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu');>[ > religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu');>] > on behalf of Ira Lupu > [icl...@law.gwu.edu<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','icl...@law.gwu.edu');> > ] > *Sent:* Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:00 PM > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > *Subject:* Re: Hobby Lobby transcript > > Braunfeld did not sell meat. From the opinion: "Appellants are > merchants in Philadelphia who engage in the retail sale of clothing and > home furnishings within the proscription of the statute in issue." > > > On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 5:53 PM, Levinson, Sanford V < > slevin...@law.utexas.edu> wrote: > > With regard to Braunfield, given that the customers are a distinct subset > of people who want Kosher meat, isn't the argument more that they are > decidedly inconvenienced by being unable to shop on Sunday (which is just > another day to them), but NOT that they will refrain from buying kosher > meat from Braunfield. After all, no other kosher meat market will be open > on Saturday, and they're not going to buy non-kosher meat on Sunday. Or is > (was) the argument that non-Sabbath observant Jews would no longer buy > general grocery products from Braunfield that were easily available from > Stop and Shop on Saturday? In the former case, then Braunfield's overall > income should be roughly the same even with the forced Sunday closing. Is > this even a relevant way of approaching the case, instead of being upset, > as I was almost fifty years ago when I read it, at the simple inegalitarian > aspects of Jewish butchers being forced to close two days a week (one day > by the state, one day by their ! > religious duty) while (mainstream) Christians could remain open six days > a week. But, to repeat, this would be a competitive advantage only if > Jewish shoppers really didn't care that much about where they brought their > meat and other grocery products. It would be a different case, presumably, > if we were talking about, say, paint stores, where there's no category > called "kosher paint." > > sandy > > -----Original Message----- > From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: > religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Micah Schwartzman > Sent: Tuesday, March 25, 2014 4:30 PM > To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics > Subject: Re: Hobby Lobby transcript > > In the context of discussing Marty's substantial burden argument, Justice > Kagan invoked Braunfeld. I made a similar comparison on the listserv back > in December: > > > Braunfeld might support Marty's argument. The government provides an > option to all employers: (1) pay a tax, or (2) provide coverage. If (1) > doesn't burden religion, and even if it's somewhat more expensive, > Braunfeld seems to contemplate that laws will sometimes work in this way. > Provided a law doesn't directly compel anyone to violate their religious > beliefs, its imposition of additional costs on religious practice is not > sufficient to show a substantial burden. > > > > Marty didn't cite Braunfeld in his post, so maybe he wouldn't rely on > it. And maybe there are other problems with the analogy, but I wonder if > the "no employer mandate" argument turns on an empirical claim, at least if > the cost differentials are not so significant as to be tantamount to > coercion -- as in the 4980D tax for failing to comply with coverage > requirements. > > Here's Justice Kagan (transcript p. 24): > > > 15 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, let's say that that's > > 16 right. Let's say that they have to increase the wages a > > 17 little bit. I mean, still we are talking about pretty > > 18 equivalent numbers. Maybe it's a little bit less; maybe > > 19 it's a little bit more. But this is not the kind of > > 20 thing that's going to drive a person out of business. > > 21 It's not prohibitive. > > 22 It's like the thing that we talked about in > > 23 Braunfeld where we said, you know, maybe if the store > > 24 can't stay open 7 days a week, it makes a little bit > > 25 less money. But so be it, is what we said. > > If it works, I do think this argument raises factual questions that would > have to be addressed on remand. > > On Mar 25, 2014, at 4:19 PM, Marty Lederman <lederman.ma...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > is here: > > > > http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-354 > > _5436.pdf > > -- Hillel Y. Levin Associate Professor University of Georgia School of Law 120 Herty Dr. Athens, GA 30602 (678) 641-7452 hle...@uga.edu hillelle...@gmail.com SSRN Author Page: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=466645
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