Let me bring up again something that I think I mentioned 
earlier.  Say that in the state of Kennessee, death warrants have to be filed 
in a county clerk's office together with a county clerk's "acknowledgment of 
filing of death warrant" form, and by statute that acknowledgment form has to 
include the county clerk's name (though not her signature).

Say that Jane Smith, a county clerk, believes that the death penalty is murder, 
and thus a grave sin.  She also believes that complicity with the death penalty 
is itself sinful.  She realizes, though, that everyone in society is in some 
measure connected with everything - through paying taxes, through providing 
staple goods and services (such as selling the paper on which a death warrant 
will be printed), and so on.  That is especially so of government employees and 
officials.  So, after reflection, prayer, and fasting, she concludes that it 
would be permissible for her office to file the death warrant, but that having 
her name on an acknowledgement of a warrant authorizing a man's killing would 
be unacceptable complicity.  This is purely symbolic, of course, but she thinks 
this symbolism matters to God, just as symbolism matters in many other contexts 
to many other people.  She goes to state court, arguing that under the state 
RFRA, she should be allowed to have her office file the warrants with a form 
that excludes her name.

Why wouldn't that be a standard, relatively straightforward application of the 
state RFRA?  There is indeed a compelling government interest in making sure 
that the democratically authorized death penalty is implemented, 
notwithstanding the objection of one elected official.  But the requirement 
that the clerk have her office file documents with her name isn't necessary to 
serving that compelling interest; a court order stating that, under the state 
RFRA, the clerk can have her office file the documents without her name 
included, would make clear that the documents without the name are valid.  The 
compelling government interest is served.  The religious objector's religious 
beliefs, however unreasonable some might view them as being, are satisfied.  
Isn't that precisely what state RFRAs are supposed to do?

(Of course, I realize that many people have a very different view of the 
morality of the death penalty and of same-sex marriage - but I take it that 
those differences shouldn't affect the state RFRA analysis.)

Eugene
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