> On Jan. 15, 2019, 10:39 a.m., Gilbert Song wrote:
> > include/mesos/mesos.proto
> > Lines 3158-3159 (patched)
> > <https://reviews.apache.org/r/68017/diff/14/?file=2118633#file2118633line3158>
> >
> >     Seems like this was added recently.
> >     
> >     Is this field only used when there is a default agent wide seccomp 
> > profile provided from the agent flag? and we reply on it to give an 
> > opportunity for user/framework to get rid of seccomp?
> >     
> >     (probably more comment needed)
> >     
> >     If it is the case, do we have other options for naming? e.g., 
> > `no_seccomp` (maybe more explicit)
> 
> Gilbert Song wrote:
>     after second thought, I would suggest to remove this field for now. since 
> there is not use case yet (I understand your motivation: you want users could 
> get rid of seccomp if there is a default one). We could add this field later 
> if necessary. For now:
>     
>     two options:
>     1. remove it
>     2. do it implicitly by using the optional profile_name: if seccompinfo 
> isSome but profile_name is None. do not set seccomp filtering for container
> 
> Gilbert Song wrote:
>     I would prefer option #2.
>     
>     The reason we want to avoid introducing `unconfined` now is that 
> framework could set both field at the same time and ideally we may need an 
> `enum type`. given the use case is not clear yet (people may not necessary to 
> use it yet). lets make it implicit for now.
> 
> Qian Zhang wrote:
>     > do it implicitly by using the optional profile_name: if seccompinfo 
> isSome but profile_name is None. do not set seccomp filtering for container
>     
>     So the semantic will be:
>     1. seccompinfo is None: The default seccomp profile (if any) will be 
> applied for the container.
>     2. seccompinfo is Some but profile_name is None: No seccomp filtering for 
> the container.
>     
>     This is kind of unintuitive to me because none-seccompinfo and 
> none-profile_name will have totally different result.

Second thought, do we really need to support framework to disable seccomp 
filtering? I think that may not be what the operator wants. If the operator 
specifies a default seccomp profile, that means the operator cares about the 
security of the agent host, and he/she would expect the default seccomp profile 
to be applied for each container unless framework overrides it with another 
seccomp profile. Override does not mean disable because any seccomp profiles 
that framework can use are also set up by operator under `--seccomp_config_dir` 
(i.e., still under the operator's control), but if framework can disable 
seccomp filtering for its containers, that means the security of the agent host 
is out of the operator's control which seems kind of security hole.

However, disabling seccomp filtering can still be supported (if some operators 
want it) by not specifying the default seccomp profile, and in this case if 
framework does not specify seccompinfo or profile_name, the seccomp filtering 
will be disabled. But if operator specifies a default seccomp profile, I think 
we should not support disabling seccomp filtering. And another way to support 
disabling seccomp filtering is, operator specifies the default seccomp profile 
and also put some other profiles under `--seccomp_config_dir` and names them 
like `strict`, `loose` and `none`, and there is no syscall filtering in the 
`none` profile which is equivalent to disabling seccomp filtering.


- Qian


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On Nov. 8, 2018, 11:24 p.m., Andrei Budnik wrote:
> 
> -----------------------------------------------------------
> This is an automatically generated e-mail. To reply, visit:
> https://reviews.apache.org/r/68017/
> -----------------------------------------------------------
> 
> (Updated Nov. 8, 2018, 11:24 p.m.)
> 
> 
> Review request for mesos, Gilbert Song, Jie Yu, James Peach, and Qian Zhang.
> 
> 
> Bugs: MESOS-9033
>     https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MESOS-9033
> 
> 
> Repository: mesos
> 
> 
> Description
> -------
> 
> See summary.
> 
> 
> Diffs
> -----
> 
>   include/mesos/mesos.proto 2ef6ba3aef67cf34227569948fd3ddc8dfd5879d 
>   include/mesos/seccomp/seccomp.hpp PRE-CREATION 
>   include/mesos/seccomp/seccomp.proto PRE-CREATION 
>   include/mesos/slave/containerizer.proto 
> 5b4dcdda0f55ea3355c78d1447c7be9ca54d9dc9 
>   include/mesos/v1/mesos.proto 1a701da65f653fe4191f92ff1fb1436809b50acb 
>   src/CMakeLists.txt a574d449dc26b820cbef7ff0b5e94b42b6fe86cf 
>   src/Makefile.am 188a47017221a931d8b965a4af5e033b77e6ce4e 
> 
> 
> Diff: https://reviews.apache.org/r/68017/diff/14/
> 
> 
> Testing
> -------
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Andrei Budnik
> 
>

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