On Tuesday 12 of October 2010 15:07:07 Sim IJskes - QCG wrote:
> On 10/12/2010 02:57 PM, Michal Kleczek wrote:
> >> No you don't. You can delegate it to the IntegrityVerifier. This is the
> >> place where you should check the integrity. You will have enough
> >> information there (coded in the codebase parameter), to load the code,
> >> check endpoints (dns name, ip address, TLS) if wanted, check signatures,
> >> certificates, checksums.
> > 
> > Right - but it looks to me we're turning circles right now. Maybe I just
> > don't understand what you're saying so let me describe a scenario that I
> > would like to support:
> > 1. Prerequisite - you and I are logged in to the same Kerberos realm and
> > I know your kerberos principal
> > 2. I got a piece of data - a marshalled object
> > 3. Before I deserialize an object I want to make sure the codebase of the
> > object I got is the one you wanted it to be (regardless of the contents
> > of the jar file I will download later - I'm going to check its integrity
> > later on)
> 
> My take on this, is that we should lower the prerequisite, and still
> have a robust implementation. We are talking about the internet are we?
> How many of us share a kerberos realm?

C'mon - that's not fair :) . I've choosen kerberos to show we can (and should) 
support something more than PKI stuff.

But make it simpler - you have a TLS certificate but you don't have code 
signing certificate (you know - it is much more expensive).

Or your code is signed with PGP - but I don't have a PGP verifier installed.
Is it possible for you to provide me with third party PGP verifier code that in 
turn is signed with a standard X509 certificate?

> 
> I dont like the idea, that we allow full deserialization before we have
> had a change to let the IntegrityVerifier have a look at it. 

But suppressing recursive readAnnotation already does that!!!
Doesn't it?

Michal

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