http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/03/how-do-you-know-if-rng-is-working.html
Snowden: We need all those brilliant Belgian cryptographers to
go "alright we know that these encryption algorithms we are
using today work, typically it is the random number generators
that are attacked as opposed to the encryption algorithms
themselves. How can we make them [secure], how can we test
them?"
Statistical, Known-Answer, and Runtime Health Checks are discussed.
Dual-EC DRBG covered.
Intel Ivy Bridge RNG theoretical backdoor design discussed:
The CTR-DRBG design relies on two features. First, an AES key is
selected at random along with some input seed. This pair goes
into the AES cipher, where it is processed to derive a new key
and data. The result should be unpredictable to most attackers.
But if you were able to change the way keys were updated (in the
key_in_mux hilighted) so that instead of updating the key and/or
using an unpredictable one, it chose a fixed key known to the
attacker, you would now have a very powerful backdoor.
--
http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/
I'm feeling a little uncertain about this random generator of numbers.
pgp81UvROP_KO.pgp
Description: PGP signature
_______________________________________________ RNG mailing list [email protected] http://lists.bitrot.info/mailman/listinfo/rng
