On Tue, Oct 26, 2021 at 11:50:53AM +0200, Justus Winter wrote:
> I think what you are saying is that RPM expects certificates to be
> canonicalized before they are fed to RPM.  But, that is exactly what led
> to CVE-2021-3521.
> 
> https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2021-3521

No, that's about rpm not checking any signature in the certificates
at all. Which is actually not that bad if you insist that the
used must only import trusted certificates. It depends on how
you define the attack vector: can you convince the admin to
do a 'rpm --import' on unsafe material? E.g. something downloaded
from a public key server?

It's certainly sane to verify that at least the self-sigs are valid
and protect the data that needs protection.

> No, that is not the old RFC that Werner has been working on.  The
> document that Werner worked on is
> 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis/
> 
> It is true that a lot of changes that were in RFC4880bis were cleaned
> up, improved, and merged into the openpgp-crypto-refresh.  But, in
> contrast to RFC4880bis, the openpgp-crypto-refresh has been written by
> the working group's design team and represents a broad consensus among
> active OpenPGP implementations.

Well, if you diff the two documents it certainly looks like most
changes are taken from the RFC4880bis (with some exotic things
removed).

-- 
Michael Schroeder          SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
m...@suse.de      GF: Felix Imendoerffer HRB 36809, AG Nuernberg
main(_){while(_=~getchar())putchar(~_-1/(~(_|32)/13*2-11)*13);}
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