On Dec 27, 2009, at 10:43 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
Hi,
On 2009-12-28 14:17, Xu Xiaohu wrote:
...
This argument fails for exactly the same reason that geographically
based BGP aggregation fails.
Brian, who has ever done it ?
Nobody, as far as I know.
Why do you say this and what do you mean by saying this ?
There have been a lot of geo-based or metro-based proposals over
the years. Most recently, draft-hain-ipv6-geo-addr.
As far as I know, none of them has ever been deployed, because
this isn't how Internet economics works. There is no financial
incentive to deploy geographically based exchange points which also
act as address delegators to customers. (Note, there is no technical
argument against it. But nobody knows how to make money out of it.)
I'm curious. Has anyone ever fully/clearly articulated the *reasons*
behind the absence of financial incentive to embrace addressing and
routing solutions that would create (actually, to restore) a binding
association between addressing and geography -- or better yet, made a
positive argument for the financial incentives and broader economic
factors that often recommend deploying networks in aggressively
geography-indifferent patterns?
I tend to think that the reasons are so obvious as to be self-evident,
but I'd be quite surprised to find that everyone's list of self-
evident reasons is identical.
Can anyone point me to some approximation of an "authoritative list"
of reasons? If not, does anyone see any merit (or problem) in the idea
of compiling such a list?
Thanks in advance,
TV
By the way, I don't consider HRA locators to be geo-based. They
are fundmentally PA locators. The geographic part is secondary.
In RANGI, you don't mention any geo component of the locators.
But this was all a side comment. What I meant is that the problem
of mapping PI identifiers to PA locators is just the same as
mapping geo addresses to topological addresses. I don't see any
evidence that the mapping can be significantly more compact
than if the identifiers are assigned randomly. Wei Zhang seemed
to argue that by some special assignment scheme for identfiers,
we can get a significantly smaller map. I would like to see
the data supporting that.
It must be something quite different from what I understand.
This thread "Aggregatable EIDs" is concerned about aggregating EIDs
and the problems with mapping the prefixes to RLOCs. This objective
wouldn't even exist if both EID and RLOC-ID are asigned a "third"
information (I proposed it not long ago) which itself is
universally routable and which wouldn't need any authoritative
provisioner either. No need for aggregating any two EIDs! No need
for mapping any EID-IP-address to any RLOC-IP-address provided that
they share a common attribute that is derived from geographical
coordinates.
My point is that aggregation of EIDs is basically artificial.
By sticking to non-routable identifiers none of the 14 solutions
becomes any better than LISP.
At some level they are probably all isomorphic, yes. Except maybe
ILNP.
Note, not only IPv4 / IPv6 addresses are non-routable, AS numbers
aren't either.
But there are about 10 times fewer active AS numbers than there are
active
prefixes. So flat-routing on AS numbers would gain one order of
magnitude
immediately.
With 99 % of the hosts being mobile, wouldn't it be appropriate to
have mainly provider-independent FQDNs
Well, yes, which is why Christian Vogt's proposal for name-based
sockets is very interesting. But actually it only hides the problem
in the socket layer; the problem doesn't go away.
and a DNS that is fairly up-to-date with the correlation between a
respective HIT and the current location, i.e. completely
independent of the current AS?
If the locator is PA, sure. But that's the problem - making the
locator PA.
Since the HIT is already a provider-independent host identifier,
why should each host be assigned with a FQDN as another provider-
independent ID? Taken the current cell-phone mobile network as an
example, does every cell-phone need a FQDN-like global name besides
the cell-phone number itself?
Well, until people drop the stupidity of reverse DNS lookup as a
"security check"
it's very hard to drop this. Of course it's bogus. (Do you really care
that my FQDN right now is 121.98.142-??.bitstream.orcon.net.nz?)
Brian
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