Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-routing-large-dc-11: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-routing-large-dc/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I would have liked to know a bit more about how these schemes behave if some of the servers or say a ToR device in the DC are considered as attackers e.g. having been compromised, but you only mention attacks from outside the DC. I assume the answer is to not accept servers as BGP speakers, but I'm not sure how you do that reliably. And I also don't know whether or not ToR devices are successfully attacked often. _______________________________________________ rtgwg mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg
