The Times of India January 24, 2005 Tightrope Walk: India's Nuclear Programme at the Crossroads by P R Chari
India and Russia are keen to cooperate in areas such as information technology, combating global terrorism and running oilfields. However, a cloud of uncertainty hangs over a much earlier arrangement - the transfer of nuclear technology. In supplying nuclear reactors and fuel to India, Russia would not like to rub other members of the nuclear club the wrong way. The joint declaration signed by the Rus-sian Federation and India after president Putin's recent visit to New Delhi expresses this intent: "Both sides are determined to continue their cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, incorporating innovative technologies to ensure energy security, with due regard to their commitments to non- proliferation norms". According to the Rus-sian deputy prime minister, the declaration aims at expanding bilateral linkages in the civilian sector beyond the present two- reactor Koodankulam power project. In the same breath, Russia also drew India's attention to international treaty commitments made to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). What was this supposed to mean? During Putin's visit, the director of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency clearly said Russia would be unable to supply any more reactors for the Koodankulam atomic power project and low enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur Atomic Power Plant. Apparently, the Russia's supply of enriched uranium for Tarapur in 2001 was made on "safety" considerations, but had evoked "a very negative reaction from the NSG". Therefore, Russia expressed inability to supply uranium fuel to India, unless India accepted IAEA inspection over its entire nuclear programme, including its military aspects, as part of NSG norms. India has consistently resisted this dispensation as it would obviously and erode its sovereignty. As for the US, even if it is keen to further its strategic partnership with India, it is unlikely to make India an exception to its domestic laws and its own commitments to the NSG. New Delhi needs to appreciate that the 'next steps' are designed to forge an engagement with India that would permit a close monitoring of its nuclear, missile and space programmes. Corrective measures could then be taken whenever it appears that India is contemplating aberrant actions. Russia has always supported India's nuclear programmes despite considerable opposition from the US and the NSG. There was great pressure on Russia to refrain from exporting the two atomic reactors that are currently under construction in Koodan- kulam; Russia bridged over this problem by arguing that the original contract for their supply was signed in 1988, before the new and more stringent NSG guidelines came into force in 1992. Similar problems were raised in respect of Russia's supply of cryogenic engines for India's geostationary satellite launch vehicle programme. These were ultimately supplied without any transfer of technology. Whether Putin will find it possible to favour India in future remains an open question. Russia's relations with the US are under some strain with the Bush administration encouraging anti-Russian sentiments in Ukraine and the Central Asian Republics. What are the other alternatives before India to obtain supplies of advanced reactor designs and technology and uranium fuel for Tarapur? Could India gain entry into the nuclear suppliers' group as a nuclear weapon state? The non-proliferation treaty is clear that no new entrants to the five-member nuclear club are permitted. If the argument were to be that India, having acquired nuclear capabilities, should be accepted as a member of the nuclear club and the NSG, a similar dispensation cannot be denied to Pakistan, Israel and, possibly, North Korea. This would be opposed by the nuclear club. The other option before India is to go it alone. India would have to base its future atomic power programme on the same Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) designs that have been perfected over the years. These are, perhaps, not as efficient as the Rus-sian-supplied VVER reactors, but can be constructed much earlier due to India's experience with them. Similarly, low enriched uranium supplies can be ensured through indigenous technology. The Atomic Energy Commission has been working on centrifuge technology to enrich uranium for several years, but there is no transparency regarding its capabilities and capacities. If India is unable to produce sufficient quantities of low enriched uranium to fuel Tarapur, there are two options that remain. First, to seek these supplies from other non-NSG members that have the capability to produce enriched uranium. This includes Pakistan and Israel. Would it be politically feasible for India to enter into a purely commercial relationship with Israel for the supply of low enriched uranium, since it would be politically difficult to seek these supplies from Pakistan? The second option is to replace the low enriched uranium fuel in the Tarapur reactors with MOX or mixed oxide (a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides), which is an unproven technology, although limited admixtures of the two fuels have been used in the past to operate Tarapur. Changes in the reactor designs would, however, be necessary, and adequate safety measures ensured. A crisis brews in India's atomic energy programme. Attention would have to be paid not only to its technical dimensions, but also the political implications of India's relations with Russia and the US. _________________________________ SOUTH ASIANS AGAINST NUKES (SAAN): An informal information platform for activists and scholars concerned about Nuclearisation in South Asia South Asians Against Nukes Mailing List: archives are available @ two locations May 1998 - March 2002: <groups.yahoo.com/group/sap/messages/1> Feb. 2001 - to date: <groups.yahoo.com/group/SAAN_/messages/1> To subscribe send a blank message to: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> South Asians Against Nukes Website: www.s-asians-against-nukes.org ------------------------ Yahoo! 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