The Economic and Political Weekly February 5, 2005 Nuclear Notebook
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT : Building a Movement in South Asia The principal regional goal of our nuclear disarmament movement can only be the call and demand for a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. From a political-tactical point of view this is far superior to alternatives like calling for unilateral disarmament in India or Pakistan. [by] Achin Vanaik There are always two stages in the process of developing an effective progressive force like the nuclear disarmament movement, whether regionally in south Asia, or globally. In the first phase it cannot hope to change policy but aims to attack and undermine the popular legitimacy that all governments seek to obtain from the public for their policies. It is only when such disarmament movements develop on a very large-scale and achieve a critical mass that they can then hope to impact on actual policy. The Indian and Pakistani anti-nuclear weapons movements are, and will remain for a considerable period of time, in the first phase. But to expand in the first phase and then to transit towards and further expand in the second phase, the prerequisite conditions are the same - to develop the appropriate political perspectives that must guide propaganda and agitational activities and to develop the necessary organisational skills and practices to carry out such activities successfully. This paper aims to be a modest contribution in clarifying thinking in respect of building a strong disarmament movement in India, specifically, and in south Asia more generally. Developing Appropriate Political Perspectives Six-and-a-half years down the line from Pokhran and Chagai in May 1998, where do matters stand for south Asians committed to regional and global nuclear disarmament? The US remains committed doctrinally to developing the Ballistic Missile Defence system and Theater Missile Defence systems, to developing battlefield and mini-nukes, to blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons on one hand, and to doing the same with respect to weapons of mass destruction, so that the use of nuclear weapons might be justified as a retaliation against enemy use of chemical or biological ones. India and Pakistan have not made overt deployments of nuclear weapons systems but remain committed to further quantitative and qualitative development of warheads and of related delivery vehicles. The Indian government reiterates from time to time its commitment to no first use (NFU), even as this pledge has now been diluted to exclude non-nuclear allies of nuclear opponents, and to allow for possible retaliation against a non-nuclear opponent using other weapons of mass destruction against India. It has called on Pakistan to follow suit with a similar NFU pledge, while Pakistan under Musharraf's reign has, on a number of occasions, declared its willingness to contemplate regional nuclear disarmament as a way of obtaining diplomatic one-upmanship vis-a-vis India. There can be no doubt that regional disarmament is greatly facilitated by progress in respect of global nuclear disarmament and that the latter must mean, above all, changing the behaviour of the US. How is this to be achieved? There are two strategic directions that a global disarmament movement can take, faced as it is today by the determination of the US government and political establishment to secure an informal global empire. The crucial foundation for this project of empire-building is, of course, the US's exceptional military power including its expanding nuclear capacities. It is the credibility of this military foundation that must be undermined. One way of trying to do this is to demand that the global anti-war movement recognise the importance of the specifically nuclear dimension, and shift some of its resources and some of its focus to precisely the issue of pursuing global nuclear disarmament. The other way is to press the global nuclear disarmament movement to recognise the priority of opposing the US occupation of Iraq and its general imperial ambitions, and therefore for it to shift some of its resources and some of its focus towards support for this anti-war/anti-imperialist movement, even as it must maintain its distinctive concern with the nuclear issue. The second way is, to my mind, the better strategic avenue to follow today. Iraq (and behind it Palestine) is the crucible of world politics now and for some time into the future. The best way to undermine the credibility of claims made for the military-political value of nuclear weapons, is to help undermine the general credibility of the military-political value of the US's military might. And the best way to do that is to be part of a global movement that will help defeat the US's imperial ambitions in west Asia, where Iraqi resistance (and Palestinian resistance to Israel/US) is already undermining the political will and authority of the US-led occupying forces and its local puppets. In short, the best route towards generating a greater momentum in the future against nuclear weapons is to generate an ever greater and stronger momentum of opposition to the US's imperial ambitions today. A political defeat of the US in west Asia in the coming years will have profoundly positive effects for all progressive movements concerning issues of global scope. It is sometimes claimed that to build the widest possible nuclear disarmament movement we must not allow this single focus to be diluted by taking positions on issues, which many actual or potential supporters of nuclear disarmament would disagree with it. In today's political context, such an approach would be seriously mistaken. If it is mistaken for the worldwide anti-nuclear movement and for the specifically US branch of this global anti-nuclear movement, it is even more so for the Indian and Pakistani anti-nuclear movements. Both the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC) and the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), as the two main umbrella bodies opposing regional nuclearisation, must be deeply involved in the development of the wider anti-war/anti-imperialist movement in solidarity with Iraq and Palestine. We introduce our specific concern with nuclear issues into this broader movement of opposition to US imperialism, a movement whose breadth and strength we are ourselves committed to consolidating and expanding. In India it is precisely this perspective that justifies the involvement of the CNDP in the Indian Anti-War Assembly. Modest Aims But if the role of the south Asian nuclear disarmament movement in the anti-war movement is more modest, namely, to be a serious participant in it; it still has the responsibility to be the leading spearhead in the more specific struggle against nuclear weapons. In this respect one cannot hope to build a strong campaign and an enduring movement simply by talking about and fighting for global nuclear disarmament or concentrating overwhelmingly on the P-5 or on the US as the biggest culprit, which it is. We have to have a movement focusing on the iniquities of our own governments in south Asia, namely, the governments of India and Pakistan, and to mobilise against them. The principal regional goal of our nuclear disarmament movement can only be the call and demand for a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). From a political-tactical point of view this is far superior to alternatives like calling for unilateral disarmament in India or Pakistan. This can, of course, be a demand expressed by individuals and groups within a wider movement united by collective agreement to this particular demand for a regional NWFZ. The merits of such a demand are several: (i) it is much more politically attractive than say, unilateral disarmament, to people in India and Pakistan; (ii) it brings in, as it should, the governments and peoples of the neighbouring countries of south Asia who do not like what happened in 1998 and resent the new danger that is also imposed on them since a nuclear exchange is not likely to leave their countries unscathed. The wider and deeper is the spread of anti-nuclear sentiment in south Asia, the better. Here, the already existing sentiments against the 'big brother' attitudes of India and Pakistan are an invaluable asset that progressives need to collectively tap into. Moreover, two other developments since the 1998 tests make this call for a regional NWFZ the best overarching objective that should guide the propaganda and agitational activities of the anti-nuclear movements in south Asia. Since General Musharraf's accession to power in Pakistan, there have been six occasions on which he has officially declared his government's willingness to entertain and move towards such a denuclearised zone provided India is willing to do the same. Obviously, much of the motive for Musharraf making such a declaration is simply embarrassing an Indian government that he knows will not accept this, as well as projecting a more 'responsible' image for himself. But being an official government position it provides anti-nuclearists with a handle it would be extremely foolish not to use. The second positive development is that the CPM, the major mainstream party of the left in India has finally come out with a signed article by its current general secretary, Harkishen Singh Surjeet, (in the October 3, 2004, issue of Peoples' Democracy - the party paper) declaring for the first time that even as the goal of global nuclear disarmament must be pursued, we must also seek denuclearisation of this region. In mid-December 2004, at the closing plenary of the Anti-War Assembly in Hyderabad, Prakash Karat, senior politburo member and likely future general secretary of the CPM, has been reported in the press as saying the same thing. This too, is a political advance that must now be seized upon, especially by disarmament activists in India. There can be no successful movement without clarity regarding final objective, and maximum unity in support of achieving that objective. In my view, the CNDP must move towards achieving this clarity, the sooner the better. The same can be said of the PPC and it would be tremendous if both coalesce around the same central demand - hence the cross-border value of a call for a South Asian NWFZ. Of course, arriving at such an agreement will be done through the distinct national structures and norms of the PPC and of the CNDP, separately from each other. Nuclear-Free Zones Apart from making the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ our central demand, the very concept of an NWFZ lends itself to all kinds of fruitful tactical possibilities. Even though it might seem to go against the idea of a South Asian NWFZ, could not the idea of Nepal as a 'nuclear free-nation' along the lines of existing declarations to this effect by Mongolia and Austria, be seen as a useful plank to promote discussion around in Nepalese civil society; and one whose achievement is quite compatible with the eventual achievement and declaration of a wider and encompassing regional NWFZ? It could even be seen as a valuable transitional approach towards popularising the general idea of NWFZs and of introducing the thin end of the wedge to legitimise NWFZs in the south Asian region. Moreover, this is something that, unlike a wider regional NWFZ, would not require agreement between several governments but is something that Nepal can on its own declare under pressure from its own populace. There is something of a political precedent for this in the earlier idea of Nepal declaring itself a 'zone of peace'. This angered the Indian government, which correctly saw this as partly or largely directed against it, expressing a suspicion of its possible intentions and of its future behaviour. It also suffered from being the proposal of a reactionary monarchist government in Nepal's past. But it was still a good proposal. Nepali anti-militarist groups can begin pushing both the ideas of a wider South Asian NWFZ and that of a Nuclear Free Nepal which in turn can have as its corollary demands not just the call for India and Pakistan to respect such a zone formally, but also to show their respect in a more practical form by 'thinning' their own deployments, i e, by declaring that they will not deploy nuclear-armed delivery systems near the Nepali border nor overfly Nepal with such delivery systems (don't forget the India-China nuclear face-off). Also, what about the idea of stretching the existing South-east Asian NWFZ or Bangkok Treaty to include Bangladesh and/or Sri Lanka? Again, while such demands might seem to go against the idea of fighting for the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ, could they not also be seen as transitional demands towards this goal or as measures that are not incompatible with the idea of an eventual single regional NWFZ, and perhaps even conducive towards its formation? Again, this is something that the Bangladesh government and civil society organisations, for example, can pursue irrespective of support from neighbouring governments and public. What in the end can the Indian and Pakistani governments do if in pursuit of its 'national interest' and in exercise of its sovereign independence Bangladesh decides to become a part of a 'stretched' (there is a precedence for this in the stretching of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to include parts of the Caribbean) Bangkok Treaty? They would certainly be unhappy about it and the political value lies of such a measure precisely in its being a resounding political slap in the face to the Indian and Pakistani governments and their nuclear postures. At the same time, since it is quite conceivable that the other nuclear weapons states (P-5) and the existing members of the South-east Asian NWFZ can see the value of such a stretching, there is real space for diplomatic negotiations between Bangladesh and the relevant countries irrespective of India and Pakistan. Once again, Bangladesh civil society can at least begin a public debate on this and the South Asian NWFZ proposal. Kashmir There is, again, yet another possible application of the NWFZ perspective in the south Asian context that, I believe, can prove very fruitful. We should also be consciously promoting the idea of a NWFZ in Kashmir, i e, a zone covering all of Kashmir on both sides of the border. In what way would this be useful? Consider the following points. Even the Indian and Pakistani governments say they don't like the constant references from other governments and 'outside' bodies about Kashmir being a nuclear flashpoint, suggesting as it does their distinctive irresponsibility in going nuclear as compared to other nuclear powers. Well, declaration of an NWFZ in all of Kashmir, we can argue, is an excellent way of both the governments assuring each other's public, the governments and public of neighbouring countries, and the governments and publics of the rest of the world that India and Pakistan are 'responsible' nuclear powers determined not to allow Kashmir to become such a feared flashpoint. What is more, it does not require either government to make any practical adjustments or changes to their nuclear preparations and deployments since neither country has or intends to have nuclear related deployments in their respective occupied parts of Kashmir. The value of such a declaration lies in it political message! It also becomes a form of reassurance on the part of both governments to the people of Kashmir itself! It is, furthermore, a truly creative political initiative whose impact on announcement would be quite dramatic. Pushing such a proposal allows us, the peace movement in south Asia to say to the two governments - "okay so unlike us, you think you must have nuclear weapons. You also say that you are responsible nuclear powers and that you will not let Kashmir drag the two countries into a nuclear war at least. Well, in that case, why are you afraid to declare Kashmir a NWFZ, especially since it does not hamper your nuclear preparations? Indeed, if you are serious about not letting Kashmir drag the two countries into any kind of war then what about a no-war pact? If on the Indian side you feel this might legitimise cross-border terrorism indirectly supported by the Pakistan establishment, then on this score you can certainly have no objections to declaring a NWFZ in all of Kashmir." Since even substantial sections of pro-nuclear people in both countries, who do not otherwise support the peace movement's call for nuclear disarmament, can be attracted to this idea it becomes on our part a creative initiative to strengthen our movements and to put pressure on our governments. But apart from its already described virtues, it is also of value for two other important reasons. Once you legitimise the existence of a part of south Asia as a NWFZ you are introducing the thin end of the wedge with regard to the general legitimisation of the concept and therefore strengthening the prospects of further such applications of the principle of the NWFZ in the region. In this way it would be a tremendous gain in our effort to mobilise support for a south Asian NWFZ. Second, one of the big problems so far in the discussion by the two governments over Kashmir is how the people of Kashmir are separated from each other and not allowed to propose any 'unified' initiative. An NWFZ for all of Kashmir (including Jammu and the northern territories) would also be the first such measure, if sanctioned, that implicitly, if not explicitly, expresses the unity of the region since its division in 1947-48. On this issue of south Asia and NWFZs, I believe, the respective peace and disarmament movements must now move very seriously towards the following actions and positions. (1) Adopt as its fundamental and unequivocal operational goal the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ. (2) Work towards a more selective workshop comprising legal experts, civil society activists, progressive media people, from all the main countries of south Asia - namely, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal - to discuss the various forms of NWFZ projects (including the idea of city and municipal NWFZs not discussed above) and whether and how they should be promoted and pursued collectively and/or nationally. (3) Actually go about preparing a model South Asian NWFZ Treaty along the lines of the Model Nuclear Weapons (Abolition) Convention, but of course learning from the already existing NWFZ treaties and making our own model treaty even better and stronger in its provisions. We should even spell out possible verification measures and mechanisms for monitoring any such Treaty. Regional Denuclearisation The point is that by undertaking and fulfilling such a task we can take the public debate to a higher level of not just demanding such a regional NWFZ, but actually declaring that there are really no serious technical difficulties in establishing regional denuclearisation, only the lack of political will on the part of governments. "While you the governments of India and Pakistan and your accompanying 'strategic establishments' pay lip-service to eventual nuclear disarmament we in the peace movement are more serious - we actually undertake the task of working out how such a disarmament regime would operate". This becomes another way of pushing the two governments, of embarrassing them, of putting pressure on them and winning over more public support. It is to the credit of Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament (MIND) and to such eminent anti-nuclear activists in India and Pakistan like M V Ramana, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Zia Mian, Abdul Nayyar, Rajaraman that they prepared in great detail, nuclear risk reduction proposals as a way of reducing current dangers. But these transitional measures are neither seen as, nor proposed as, substitute measures replacing the need for pursuing complete regional and global disarmament. Once again, our pro-nuclear experts have not done anything comparable, though they incessantly talk of the importance of nuclear risk reduction measures, although from their point of view, as a way of eliminating issues of actual nuclear disarmament from the public agenda. Even so, in the seven years after May 1998, all we have are prior notifications of missile test flights and hot lines for periodic and emergency communications - so much for serious thinking about nuclear risk reduction measures! Among the transitional risk reducing measures we in the peace movement should be promoting and demanding the following: (a) In the interests of enhancing nuclear safety there should be de-mating of warheads and delivery vehicles and maximisation of the time taken to then put the two components together. There should also be institutionalisation of transparent monitoring of this fact of separation and public accountability of what has been done in this regard in both countries. (b) There should be a certain no-deployment zone for all nuclear equipped delivery vehicles on both sides of the border between India and Pakistan. (c) Both countries should go in for a bilateral nuclear test ban pact. (d) There should be periodic joint inspection teams comprising scientific personnel from both countries to some of each other's nuclear related facilities to be followed by expansion of the frequency and range of such visits. Nuclear Power Issue What, finally, of the issue of nuclear power or energy? As far as the Indian anti-nuclear weapons movement is concerned, this continues to be a source of division. While for many the link between the two is seen as being of such an obvious character and of such obvious import that they would insist that the CNDP move towards declared rejection and opposition to the development of nuclear energy and all its attendant policies and apparatuses, others are not prepared to accept such a position. What holds as the position of the CNDP is the lowest common denominator of insisting on maximum transparency, the highest standards of safety, and appropriate compensation for all those harmed in one way or the other by the workings of the Department of Atomic Energy in India. Given the sharp difference on this score and the need for the CNDP to work unitedly despite this, perhaps the most that can be done is to more seriously help in whatever way it can, existing groups that are concerned about safety measures, issues of transparency and public accountability, and of adequate recompense to radiation sufferers, displaced people, etc. In particular, there is need to establish a new Atomic Energy Act which eliminates current secrecy, i e, which by clearly separating the civilian establishment from the military one (now that India has gone openly nuclear) prevents the former from hiding its activities behind the cloak of 'national security considerations'. Again, perhaps the CNDP in collaboration with say, the Right to Information Campaign (and sympathetic lawyers) could work towards drafting a new Model Atomic Energy Act to replace the old one and to thus push the issue onto the public agenda for debate and discussion. © Copyright 2001 The Economic and Political Weekly. All rights reserved. _________________________________ SOUTH ASIANS AGAINST NUKES (SAAN): An informal information platform for activists and scholars concerned about Nuclearisation in South Asia South Asians Against Nukes Mailing List: archives are available @ two locations May 1998 - March 2002: <groups.yahoo.com/group/sap/messages/1> Feb. 2001 - to date: <groups.yahoo.com/group/SAAN_/messages/1> To subscribe send a blank message to: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> South Asians Against Nukes Website: www.s-asians-against-nukes.org ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Give underprivileged students the materials they need to learn. 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