New York Sun WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 22, 2003 EDITORIALS & OPINION The Other Iraq Problem
Members of the democratic opposition to Saddam Hussein are growing increasingly uneasy about the Bush administrationšs planning, or lack thereof, for a post-Saddam Iraq. The concern is with Mr. Bush's special envoy for free Iraqis, Zalmay Khalilzad, whom Iraqi opposition sources describe as a timid figure easily pushed around. They complain he isn't up to speed on the situation in Iraq, that he's confused and indecisive. They argue he does not have the personality to deal with the Iraqi opposition movement, which is a diverse--and complicated--group of individuals. Some are good and some are decidedly not good. On the face of things, Mr. Khalilzad's credentials are impeccable; he was a student of the American foreign policy thinker Albert Wohlstetter, who died in 1997. But while Mr. Khalilzad is no doubt a first-rate intellectual with the best of intentions, America risks losing a historic opportunity if it invades Iraq without the proper post-war plans in store. Instead of focusing their support on those in the opposition who are unabashed democrats so as to ready them to govern a free Iraq, Mr. Khalilzad and the administration are dividing the opposition into groups and seeking to appease all the various factions. This strategy is sowing the seeds of confusion and creating more infighting among Iraqi dissidents. One reason for this may be the advice Mr. Khalilzad is taking from one of his key staffers, Ben Miller, a CIA operative who is the Iraq point man at the National Security Council. Mr. Miller invested years in planning failed military plots and coups in Iraq. There's no indication he has ever been committed to the democratic Iraqi opposition. In what can only be seen as an embarrassment to the administration, a meeting of the Iraqi opposition that was supposed to take place this week in northern Iraq was postponed, reportedly because Mr. Khalilzad said he could not ensure adequate security for the attendees. Opposition sources insist the real reason was that the Khalilzad-Miller duo tried to impose an opposition "secretariat" to act as an executive body for the 75-member opposition coordinating committee created at the recent Iraqi opposition conference in London. When democratic Iraqi oppositionists objected, the security problem excuse was conjured up to buy the administration more time. Yet if postwar Iraq is to become a vibrant and truly democratic, federal, and pluralistic state, it makes sense for the opposition to operate within a framework that adheres to those principles. For years, this was accomplished under the umbrella of the Iraqi National Congress, led by Ahmad Chalabi. But the State Department, the CIA, and other forces have been trying to undermine Mr. Chalabi and the structure he worked so hard to set up. The result of the incessant meddling by American officials is that we have marginalized the democratic forces of the opposition, especially those who offer the best prospects for a future of freedom in Iraq. This poses dangers far beyond annoying various opposition leaders and yielding the occasional embarrassment like the postponed meeting in the North. It sows confusion about Americašs purpose. Tomorrow, Secretary Wolfowitz, the deputy at the Pentagon, is scheduled to speak in New York on a topic that is being billed by the Pentagon as "Iraqi disarmament." Better the emphasis be on freedom and democracy and transparency throughout the Middle East. This, after all, has been the strongest part of President Bush's policy, but somehow it has been obscured lately in the scrum at the NSC over Iraq policy, the United Nations, and disarmament. Working quickly and decisively with the right elements of the Iraqi opposition is the best way to show the world that America is serious about not only taking away something from Iraq--weapons of mass destruction --but also about helping it to become an example of progress and liberty for the rest of the Arab world.
