U.S. Department of State Mailing List Transcript: AEI Scholar Gives Impressions of Iraq after Visit There (Pletka videoconference with Spanish journalists Oct. 10) (4500)
Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative public policy think-tank, spoke with Spanish journalists during a video conference October 10 from Washington, D.C., about the impressions she gained from a recent trip to Iraq. Pletka, who is AEI's vice president for foreign and defense policy studies, said she spent three days in Iraq, visiting several towns, "as a guest of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the United States military," and another week staying with friends in Baghdad. The international press is not giving a balanced picture of what is going on inside Iraq, she said. "If you stay in the Palestine Hotel [in Baghdad], you can talk to a lot of other reporters who will reinforce preexisting notions, but they are all behind barbed wire and it's not a very natural environment, and it's hard to talk to people." "The more you get out, the more you realize that there is an enormous openness in society, one that I think is all the more enthusiastically embraced by Iraqis because of the years of dreadful oppression that they were under," she said. "And I found people to be incredibly pro-American, pro-Western, open to ideas, open to suggestions, open to help. Any of us who expected unmitigated gratitude are going to get the shock of our lives; but that said, they are very positive and very hopeful about their future, notwithstanding some of the difficulties." The media seems to ignore positive stories, Pletka said, citing the example of the peaceful funeral following the assassination of Ayatollah Baqir Hakim, the spiritual leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. "Three hundred thousand people turned up at his funeral. Can you tell me how many people were killed in rioting at the funeral? Can you tell me how many calls for vengeance there were against Sunnis or Americans or, indeed, anybody at that funeral? Can you tell me whether there were demands made for Americans immediately to leave that were taken up by the masses? "Because I can tell you that none of those things happened. And that, in and of itself, is an unbelievably great, positive story about the people of Iraq and the people.... And I honestly believe that [Iraq] is unfairly represented by the press." Despite the loss of electricity and other services, the security problems, the loss of government, Pletka said, she was "amazed by the order, by the decency of normal people, by the way that people stand in line...talk to the people behind them, deal with each other, deal with us. This is really a 95 percent positive story about Iraqis." She answered a variety of questions from the Spanish journalists: successes and problems in the reconstruction effort; U.S. mistakes, including communications failures within Iraq and with the international community; security and communications difficulties for multinational forces; and a timetable for Iraqis to write a new constitution and achieve sovereignity. "The United States has to walk very carefully in understanding that at the end of the day, although Iraqis are very happy to be rid of Saddam, they would be very happy to be in control of their own lives," Pletka said. "Right now, in the post-Saddam Iraq, the issue is what can be done for the people of Iraq. This isn't about the United States, Spain, Brussels, Bush, Chirac or anything else. It's about Iraq and it's very important that we remember that." Bickering and "pettiness," she said "only hurts them, and that does them an enormous disservice." In conclusion, Pletka said, "What do we want for Iraq? Do we want Iraq to fail or do we want Iraq to succeed.... It seems to me that we take very few opportunities to step back and ask ourselves those very basic questions." "While there are things that we could all do better, this is a worthwhile endeavor because it is for the Iraqi people and because their lives have been hell for the last 30 years and surely they deserve something better; surely we who have more owe them a little bit of help in doing that." [Note: An international Iraq Donors' Reconstruction Conference is scheduled for October 23-24 in Madrid.] Following are excerpts from a transcript of the videoconference: (begin transcript) U.S. Department of State Office of International Information Programs Excerpts from Digital Video Conference: Danielle Pletka, Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute, in Washington, D.C., speaking with journalists in Madrid October 10, 2003 MODERATOR: Ms. Pletka, tell us everything we need to know about Iraq. MS. PLETKA: I'm the vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. I've been with AEI for about a year and a half, and prior to that, for ten years, I was the senior Middle East staffer for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee I just got back from Iraq on Saturday; I was there for three days as a guest of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the United States military, and there for a week in Baghdad staying with friends We all seem to forget this is actually a story about Iraqis; this is not a story about Spain, it's not a story about Washington, it's not really a story about Europe and America; it's a story about what we can do in Iraq. And the big question as we are in the run-up to the donors conference is: Is the ground ripe in Iraq for investment, is it ripe for reconstruction, is it ripe for political change, and how receptive are the people to what we propose to do? And when I say 'we,' I mean that in a very global sense, although financially, clearly, the burden is going to be borne by the U.S. taxpayer. First of all, attitudes. One of the things that I found as a consumer, an avid consumer of the American press, and also of the international press to a certain extent, is that you really don't get a very good picture of what's going on inside Iraq by reading the paper or certainly by watching TV. If you stay in the Palestine Hotel, you can talk to a lot of other reporters who will reinforce preexisting notions, but they are all behind barbed wire and it's not a very natural environment, and it's hard to talk to people. The more you get out, the more you realize that there is an enormous openness in society, one that I think is all the more enthusiastically embraced by Iraqis because of the years of dreadful oppression that they were under. And I found people to be incredibly pro-American, pro-Western, open to ideas, open to suggestions, open to help. Any of us who expected unmitigated gratitude are going to get the shock of our lives; but that said, they are very positive and very hopeful about their future, notwithstanding some of the difficulties. You have to remember, if you think about Baghdad -- if you think about the possibility of a major city, a major city losing its government, losing its electricity, and having every single hardened criminal let out of prison at the same time. And then you look at Baghdad. You are amazed by the order, by the decency of normal people, by the way that people stand in line, whether it's in a gas line or a payment line or a job line, and wait for -- you know, wait, talk to the people behind them, deal with each other, deal with us. This is really a 95 percent positive story about Iraqis. And there are definitely problems, but these things are, in context, really incredible. If this happened in Los Angeles, there would be riots, there would be unbelievable looting, and this is not happening. There are still minor periods without electricity, and we just don't see that -- not in Baghdad, not anywhere. Also, I was really struck -- because I know that many Americans think of Iraq as a brutally sectarian, ethnically-racially divided country. Certainly, there are latent suspicions, particularly among extremists of all parties -- but the general ambience between Shia and Sunni, and between all of them and the Kurdish population, is remarkably positive. These people recognize that their religious and their ethnic differences were manipulated by Saddam in order to divide and conquer the country, and they are not going to be made tools again. And they are really quite adamant -- and I spoke to a number of clerics as well -- quite adamant that this is not going to be something they are going to allow to be manipulated in order to hurt the well-being of their country and their own future and their children's future. That's a very positive thing and it's a very enlightened thing. Reconstruction is difficult because what we're doing is we're starting with a country that is basically put together with spit and chewing gum. And the attitude of the United States is that we don't believe that we should go in and just give you better spit and better chewing gun and stick it all back together again. We believe that when we rebuild and when we help to rebuild, we want to rebuild you according to 21st century lines, just like we would rebuild New York after September 11th. I think that's probably a little excessively ambitious for Iraq because it means that we have lengthened delivery times, it means that we're starting from zero trying to get to a hundred, when all the Iraqis are really expecting is that we get things working again. And a little bit of expediency goes a long way in this regard. Perhaps that is an area in which I think we really can criticize the initial efforts of the United States. Ironically, the military, which has far less money with which to operate and can only do grants up to $100,000, is far more efficient because it has to use its money more efficiently. And so what you see is that they're able to work with local engineers and Iraqis and really get projects up and running, not necessarily with the transparency that we require here in Washington, but with efficiency which goes a long way in answering the lack of transparency. So, you know, as we move forward, those are things to think about and they are realistic necessities. We need to deliver something decent, but we also need to deliver something quickly. But the Iraqis are ready, they're willing, they're able. They want a better country. And I think the story is not in any way one of failure. It is one, if you want to be negative, of missed opportunity, but one also, if you want to be positive, of enormous potential. QUESTION: You brought from Iraq very good impressions, but if you read the newspaper, you see television news, we have another vision about what's happening in Iraq. Is there a problem with the mass media, or is the problem that the North American government is not able to tell what's happening really? MS. PLETKA: Well, forgive me if I don't choose Option A or Option B. I think there are a lot of problems on both sides. I think the media has done an enormous disservice to the Iraqi people by telling only the negative stories that you see. There are positive stories absolutely everywhere that deserve to be told, whether they are in the functioning of the Governing Council, the functioning of ministries, the Iraqi participation in OPEC, in the World Bank-IMF meetings in Doha. Let's just pick a really simple fact. Ayatollah Baqir Hakim, the spiritual leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was brutally assassinated. It was a terrible thing that happened, and many other people were killed at the same time. I think there's probably a good deal of criticism to go around about the security environment and about how it happened, but let's talk about his funeral. He is an emblem of Shia resistance to Saddam, the spiritual leader of a significant political movement, and 300,000 people turned up at his funeral. Can you tell me how many people were killed in rioting at the funeral? Can you tell me how many calls for vengeance there were against Sunnis or Americans or, indeed, anybody at that funeral? Can you tell me whether there were demands made for Americans immediately to leave that were taken up by the masses? Because I can tell you that none of those things happened. And that, in and of itself, is an unbelievably great, positive story about the people of Iraq and the people who are involved in this. And I honestly believe that it is unfairly represented by the press. Yes, absolutely we need to cover terrorism, we need to cover Baathist resurgence, we need to cover the deaths of coalition soldiers. But that's not the only story in Iraq and it is, I would argue, only a very small part of the overall picture. Do you ever read anything about what's going on in the Kurdish areas? What about the predicted fighting between the KDP and the PUK? Is that going on? Where is it going on, if it is going on? In fact, it's not going on. And things are enormously positive. In fact, the Kurds have worked really, really hard, notwithstanding historical ambitions for independence, to integrate themselves and to cooperate inside the Governing Council. The new foreign minister, interim foreign minister, Hoshiyar Zebari, is a Kurd, someone I've known for many years. You know, these are great things. Now, that doesn't mean there aren't bad things. Why is this message not out? Well, partly it is because the media wants to tell one story. And the same is true in every country. This is the way it is, and it is something that is very hard to control. The second is that you can very easily criticize the government of the United States for failing to make clear: (a) what our long-term mission is; (b) how proud we are of a lot of these accomplishments; and (c) where we're going. So, you know, I wouldn't lay the blame wholly in one court or in another court. All I would say is it is important to get a grip on what reality is because, as I am sure you all know, it's not always exactly what you read in the paper. QUESTION: So, are you really losing the propaganda battle? MS. PLETKA: Well, it's a very hard question to answer. You know, I will continue to believe, as a person who values substance over propaganda, that it is more important to win on the ground than it is to win in The Washington Post. I think we could do a lot better. I think we could do a lot better not just here. I think we could do a heck of a lot better inside Iraq. I alluded to some of the things that we have done badly. One of the things that is absolutely pathetic is the way that we have been able to work with the Iraqis on the so-called Iraq media network, which has not exploited the enormous talents not only of Iraqi expatriates who have plenty of media experience, but, frankly, as it seems incapable of covering stories inside Iraq. They only got equipment a few weeks ago. They only received a teleprompter last week, so all of their reporters were spending their time looking down at the page in extraordinarily unprofessional fashion. These are real problems. You know, it's important to remember, America is not a former colonial power, we're not especially good at doing this kind of thing, and there's a lot of learning that needs to take place. I would argue that most of it isn't in the area of propaganda, but that, too, is an important aspect because people need to feel good about what they're doing. QUESTION: Mrs. Pletka, do you think that in Iraq the most important thing is what happened in international relations between the other countries in the world? MS. PLETKA: International relations have nothing to do with the day-to-day well-being of the Iraqi people, and I think that those of us who spend all of our time looking in the mirror and talking about "What do you think of me?" are confused. This is about Iraq. We assessed that Iraq was a threat to the United States. Your government [of Spain] agreed. There was a coalition that went in. That really is not the issue right now. Right now, in the post-Saddam Iraq, the issue is what can be done for the people of Iraq. Right now, there are representatives from several dozen nations inside Iraq. They are working hard for the well-being of the Iraqi people. If there were more nationalities, that would be fabulous, and I'm sure the Iraqis would be really excited. But this isn't about the United States, Spain, Brussels, Bush, Chirac or anything else. It's about Iraq and it's very important that we remember that. Any fighting, any bickering, any pettiness -- if I may use that word -- which I think has characterized a lot of the debate, any pettiness about this doesn't really, at the end of the day, hurt us. It only hurts them, and that does them an enormous disservice. QUESTION: Do you think reconstruction process will be easier with United Nation troops or United States troops? MS. PLETKA: It's always been unclear to me what virtue United Nations troops bring. I think this is something that's far more appealing in Western capitals than it is on the ground. When someone rebuilds a road for you, do you check what color their hat is? I would argue that the answer is no, and that legitimacy derives from what you deliver, not from the hat you're wearing. I can tell you from my own perspective that I think that a lot of the logistical problems that come from an international operation outweigh the potential benefits. In Iraq, we have some peacekeeping operations. The vast mass of the country is fairly peaceful and peacekeeping operations naturally lend themselves quite well to international coalitions, largely because rapidity of action, smoothness of coordination, are not necessarily at a premium. But in a situation where you need to contend with combat, hostilities, low-intensity warfare, then having six different divisions speaking ten different languages is a major problem. In Hilla, where I was a couple of weeks ago, the Poles are in command. Under them are El Salvadorans, Nicaraguans. I think there are some Italians. There are some Southeast Asians. And almost none of them speak the same language, including, by the way, English. That's fine when everybody is in the mess tent trying to figure out whether to have a hot dog or a hamburger. It's really not fine if there's a problem, because each particular nation has different rules of engagement, and that is true whether you operate under a blue hat or under a so-called 'coalition of the willing.' It's a problem. And so I am not a proponent of the virtues of internationalizing this in any way. QUESTION: How much time is needed for the Iraqis and the government to get a federal constitution? Six months, one year? MS. PLETKA: It's a great question. And I think that we are feeling rather overwhelmed with a desire for deadlines right now, which I'm not sure serve any of us really well. We want to do a good job, and a timely job, but the good has to come before the timely. How long do I think it will take? Let me be blunt with you. I have been very disappointed in the failure of our own administration to devolve more power and sovereignty onto Iraqis. I think that we have a very important role to play. I think we and all our allies have a very important role to play. But the truth is that the longer that we seek to control, seek to take credit for things that happen -- which is something that really appalls me -- seek to exercise overt authority in a whole variety of places, in a way that doesn't necessarily relate to security, the more we discredit the Iraqis with whom we had hoped to partner in leaving Iraq, and the more we discredit ourselves. When you liberate people, you liberate them to govern themselves; you liberate them to have control over their own lives. You don't liberate them to a better autocrat. You know, this isn't about 'Saddam Light,' or Saddam with a different mustache. And the United States has to walk very carefully, I think, in understanding that at the end of the day, although the Iraqis are very happy to be rid of Saddam, they would be very happy to be in control of their own lives, even though they may make a lot more mistakes, potentially, than we would make going forward. And that's something that we have to accept. Now in terms of timing: the constitution. The Constitutional Preparatory Committee submitted their recommendations to the Iraqi Governing Council last week. It didn't exactly pick a preference, and it threw the ball right back into the Governing Council's court, which will mean a lot of debate and a lot of difficulty, and I think this process will take a while. I don't think it will take six months; I think it will take longer than that. Don't forget, it's not just about finding the right constitution. I think in many ways, that will be the least difficult part. It's also about a census in the country, it's about adequate representation, it's about figuring out how to have a constitutional convention. All of these things are not simple, and we don't want to make the mistake that I think we've already made in a whole number of areas, of picking people by quota -- "Well, let's have six Shia, four Kurds, two Sunni, a Turkomen, and a Syrian." We want to make sure that Iraq is represented, is well-represented as Iraq, rather than as one particular sect of Islam versus another, one particular ethnicity versus another. A constitution will take at least a year, and it could take more, and we may not see the kind of government that can have a good handoff for some time after that. QUESTION: Which do you think are the main mistakes that America has committed, starting from the end of the war? MS. PLETKA: If I had to pick the A number one worst thing that we have done, it would be communications. It would be the fact that we have set up one of the lousiest cell phone networks to serve solely the Coalition Provisional Authority, and a few Iraqis and those who have managed to take them from the Iraqis that they know in Baghdad, and that basically, otherwise, communications in the country don't work. Some phone exchanges in Baghdad are back. International calling isn't possible. It's often difficult to call from one exchange to another. You certainly cannot communicate from Baghdad to the provinces. And the fact that we have been incapable of prioritizing this, incapable of moving forward more quickly on this, would be to my mind, the A, number one worse thing we've done. It's not just a source of enormous frustration to Iraqis just in the conduct of their everyday lives. It is also a source of disconnection between the capital and the provinces, which means that the whole vision that I think most Iraqis share of a federal Iraq, is running on empty at this point, because in fact there's zero connection between Baghdad and anywhere else. This lack of coordination has enormous political and social consequences. It has huge economic consequences. You want to talk about contracting, you want to talk about transparency and opportunities for Iraqis. Basically, only someone with a cell phone or Internet has access to bids. How do Iraqis get involved in bidding for contracts? How do they have a piece of the reconstruction of their future? They don't. So this has sort of this shockwave effect throughout Iraqi society that I think has been so deleterious that we should have solved that problem right away. The fact that we have not been able to do it until now, the fact that we, last week, cleared the cell phone contracts for the entire country after several delays, is to my mind a sign of a problem that we had in focusing and in prioritizing. QUESTION: How would you assess the permitting of the looting in the first days? MS. PLETKA: You know, I think there's been a lot of misinformation about that. You really do see that a lot of the major looting -- I mean a lot of the torching of buildings -- is not random. It is clearly organized burning and looting and, frankly, destruction of evidence against the regime. So a lot of the very, very dramatic evidence of looting was that. And then, of course, there was just a lot of opportunistic looting against targets of opportunity. Should we have let that happen? No. Absolutely not. It was a mistake, it was the wrong thing to do, it was a misunderstanding of what our role should be, and I think that we have learned from that. Finally, I would simply remind people to ask yourself a very basic question: What do we want for Iraq? Do we want Iraq to fail or do we want Iraq to succeed? Do we want Iraq to be a vibrant representative democracy that serves the interests of its people and serves as an example to the region, or do we want Iraq to slide back into Baathism, or Shia or Sunni or Islamic extremism? Do we want Iraq to be a place of internecine conflict or do we want it to be a place where people live in harmony? Those are very simple questions, but it seems to me that we take very few opportunities to step back and ask ourselves those very basic questions. And the answer from almost everybody is that we want to see it succeed. And so while there are things that we could all do better, this is a worthwhile endeavor because it is for the Iraqi people and because their lives have been hell for the last 30 years and surely they deserve something better; surely we who have more owe them a little bit of help in doing that. (end transcript) (Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
