http://edwardjayepstein.com/KSMQuestions.htm
Question: In his 2004 State of the Union Speech, President Bush named the "mastermind of September 11th:" Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (who had been captured in Pakistan in March 2003.) According to "leaks" from the U.S. government to the Associated Press, KSM is now not only talking to his American interrogators but supplying them with details of the plot. If so, he is presumably in a position to cast light on some of the key issues that now confront the 9-11 Commission. What questions should the Commission put to the KSM? Answer: Since KSM has been identified by the U.S. as the controlling case officer for both Ramzi Yousef, who helped organize the attack on the World Trace Center in 1993, and Mohammed Atta, who helped organized the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, he can clarify the planning, intelligence-gathering and logical support that aided both attacks. Questions for him should include: 1) You were indicted by a U.S. Grand Jury 1996 for plotting to destroying 12 U.S. airliners. At that time, your chief subordinate, Ramzi Yousef, had been operating under a stolen Kuwaiti identity-- "Abdul Basit Karim"-- and documentation backing up that identity legend, including Yousef's fingerprints, had been inserted in Kuwait's records when they were in the hands of the Iraq Intelligence Service. Why did the Iraq Intelligence Service provide this service to your subordinate? Did you yourself, or any other of your operatives, receive similar assistance in maintaining false identities from Iraq? If so, what was the quid pro quo of the assistance? 2) Farouk Hijazi, the Iraqi Foreign Intelligence chief, met in in Afghanistan in March 1998 with top Al-Qaeda leaders. Did he offer further assistance in providing Al-Qaeda operatives false identities? If so, was this offer accepted, and were these identities delivered? 3) Mohammed Atta applied for a Czech visa in May 2000 after receiving a U.S. visa. On May 30th-- one day before the visa arrived-- Atta flew to the Prague International Airport to spend 5 hours in the transit lounge and then hereturned to Hamburg. What was the purpose of Atta's brief trip? Why was it so time-sensitive that he could not wait until May 31, when his visa arrived? Who did he meet in the transit lounge? Why did Atta return to Prague on June 2, 2000, before he proceeded on his mission to America? 4) On April 4, 2001, Atta checked out of the Diplomat Inn in Virginia Beach, Virginia, and withdrew $8,000 in cash from his account at the Suntrust Bank-- the largest cash withdrawal he made-- and then disappeared for at least a week. Was this withdrawal authorized by KSM? If so, what was its purpose? 5) On April 8th, 2001, a Czech counterintelligence watcher identified Atta in Prague. Was Atta authorized to be in Prague at this time? If so, what was the purpose of his trip? What identity did he use to leave and re-enter the United States? Who did he meet on this trip? 6) A number of the 9-11 hijackers were supplied with false identities. For example, Atta's traveling companion used the stolen identity of Abdulaziz Alomari (a Saudi engineer, whose passport had been reported stolen in 1995 in Colorado). How many false identities do the conspiracy obtain for the hijackers and their logistical supporters? Were they backed up with documented legends, as in the case of Ramzi Yousef? Who supplied these false identities and back-up documentation? 7) On September 10, 2001, Atta and "Alomari" drove from Boston to Portland, Maine, and booked themselves onto a commuter flight back to Boston on September 11th. If that commuter flight was delayed by an hour, they would not have been able to participate in the 9-11 attack. What circumstances justified al-Qaeda taking this risk? What was the purpose of the trip to Portland? Corollary Question: Why has the 9-11 Commission been denied access, even over a remote television hook-up, to the "mastermind"?