IRAQ NEWS, SATURDAY, JANUARY 31, 2004 Ahmed Chalabi, member of the Iraqi Governing Council and head of the De-Ba'athification Commission, addressed the American Enterprise Institute on January 23 (full text below). Among other things, he said,
"The ideologies that have bedeviled the Arab world in the past half century have been starkly defeated in Iraq, and the debate in Iraq now is focused on the rights of the communities of Iraq -- platitudes about large phrases -- nationalism, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism -- are no longer the vocabulary of Iraqi politics. . . . "The Iraqi Mukhabarat . . . had a very organized economic system. It was called the Board for the Management of Projects. . . . [T]hey actually met regularly, and they took decisions about investment. And it's remarkable the extent of the investment they did outside the country. They went forward. And when it became not possible for them to recover -- to do what they wanted through the normal channels, they sent the matter down to N-14 -- N-14 being the Department of Assassination." What are the implciations for Iraq's role in international terrorism? Chalabi also explained: "[T]he Sunnis suffered under Saddam too, in Tikrit. I will mention this just -- it's a grotesque thing, but when Uday and Qusay's bodies were buried, the people of Tikrit who were victims of Saddam took them out and threw them to the dogs. Saddam also oppressed Sunnis. . . What is happening now is that there is this latent remnant of Saddam's organization, which he developed before the war and which is very well funded. Saddam made the biggest cash withdrawal in history on March 19, 2003. He withdrew $920 million and 90 million euros -- well over a billion dollars -- and put them in three trucks and took them. . . . When Saddam was captured . . . the U.S. forces found with him 1,000 pages, and among them was some detailed organization of terrorism." Federal News Service January 23, 2004 REMARKS BY IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL MEMBER AHMED CHALABI AT AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FORUM Moderator: Danelle Pletka, American Enterprise Institute American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC MR. CHALABI: (Applause.) Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to be here at AEI again. AEI was instrumental in our work in Washington to mobilize U.S. opinion, and also work with Congress to get the Iraq Liberation Act passed, and then to pursue the implementation of this act, and then to develop strategies for postwar Iraq. So AEI played an important role in the liberation of Iraq, and I'm grateful for Chris DeMuth (ph) for providing us with this platform in the olden days, and then also for Danny later. The process of liberating Iraq has been controversial in the United States. U.S. troops are in Iraq now, but after the last year it was not clear in fact whether this would happen at all, but it did happen and it is a great thing that it did happen. There has been much controversy after the liberation about who was wrong and who was right in the process of getting Saddam out of power. I am not going to get into that. This is for the history books, because there has been a great deal of misconceptions and half truths and manipulations of the truth, and it is now largely for Iraqis, not at a different point. The great thing in Iraq is that Saddam is in jail, that there is an open democratic political process in Iraq; there is free media in Iraq, and we are moving to improve our situation; and that the United States is for some time to come engaged in a serious way in Iraq, and that Iraq has become part of the political debate inside the United States, so that assures an interest in Iraq. That is good and it is important. It is important because that means that Iraq is likely to become a focus for democracy, human rights and new order in the Middle East. The ideologies that have bedeviled the Arab world in the past half century have been starkly defeated in Iraq, and the debate in Iraq now is focused on the rights of the communities of Iraq -- platitudes about large phrases -- nationalism, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism -- are no longer the vocabulary of Iraqi politics. The vocabulary of Iraqi politics is the protection of Iraq's unity, giving the various communities their rights, removing oppression and removing the scourge of the Ba'ath Party from Iraqi society. This is a major shift in the political discussion in Iraq. That is finding reflections in the Arab world and also in the Muslim world, and we are moving forward to actually implementing those ideas. Economically the scourge of Saddam has never been worse than in the realm of the economy. Iraq has a debt of at least $120 billion, without taking into account the reparations that are due to Kuwait and sanctioned by the U.N., which amount to a further $60 billion -- at least -- some people say more -- some people say in excess of 100. We have already paid, by the way, $17 billion in compensation to the Compensation Commission. Also, Iraq's credit is exhausted. The currency of Iraq, which we thought --we estimated to be about four trillion dinars -- when we exchanged currency, we received 6.3 trillion dinars in old currency. It turns out that the printing presses which were printing for the central bank were also printing for the security services and for Saddam's office, so that half the Iraqi currency in circulation was issued without reference to the Central Bank of Iraq. This fact is phenomenal. The presidency was forging its own currency. Just think of the devastation that this has wrought. In the economic field also we have passed some very liberal legislation. We have permitted 100 percent foreign ownership of enterprises and businesses in everything except the extraction of oil. We have also invited foreign banks to open branches or to make subsidiaries in Iraq. We have also passed an income tax law with a cap at 15 percent, and a graduated income tax. And we have passed a customs tariff law which makes the customs tariff very simp le: it's five per cent on everything, except on food, medicine, clothing and books, they are exempt. Now, the reason we did this is that there is basically no revenue to be had by the government from economic activity in the country, because Saddam has made it so that there is very little value added to any economic activity under his regime, and we are trying to get out of that. The main income of Iraqis now is composed of two items: free food and free fuel. Water is several times more expensive than petrol, gasoline. Fuel is in fact free. We subsidize fuel to the extent of $6 billion a year. And we give people food. I mean, the Iraqi people get food. They go to various neighborhood distribution centers and passed food items. This is the ration card system. One of the first things we must do --and, by the way, this is $11 billion out of a state budget of $14 billion So Saddam's policy has made the whole population of Iraq dependent on hand-outs. The people of Iraq are a proud people. They reject that, and they are working very hard to find ways to get of this situation, because that situation leaves little improvement for their life. And they are succeeding. Since the liberation of Iraq, salaries of Iraqi government employees, and hence other employees, have multiplied several times -- at least quadrupled, and some times have gone up by hundred fold. Iraqis have seen a very, very distinct improvement in their living standards. Just to give you an index to measure this by, Iraq since May imported one million cars, private cars, for people's use done by the Iraqi private sector. That is at least four to five billion dollars. And they are available. Since there is free gas, people use cars. Goods are available in Iraq which were absent from the market for a long time. And also there is new activity in private enterprise in Iraq, with new entrepreneurs showing up who will definitely defeat the vested interests that remain, and try to get back some of their old positions through the new emerging democracy, but they are being challenged and defeated. Iraq is also -- the Iraq society is finding a humane and clear procedural way to get rid of the Ba'ath Party. The Ba'ath Party as a political party and political ideology is not a concern in Iraq, because it has been defeated and their ideas are defunct. They are a fascist totalitarian party which committed genocide against the Iraqi people, and has upheld one of the worst tyrants of the 20th century, and the 21st for that matter, Saddam Hussein. We are not concerned about the Ba'ath as an ideology or a political party. What we are concerned about is that it was a parallel structure for control of the state. Party members and party organizations existed surreptitiously in all government organizations. And also they are very much under the control of any leadership that can emerge of the party to do sabotage and to do terrorism and to do operations that will disrupt the new order. And we have created the High National De-Ba'athification Commission in Iraq to take care of this issue We have several tasks. We have to remove the Ba'ath ideology from school curricula-- every book in every subject, from kindergarten to university, has a picture of Saddam and has the Ba'ath ideology and Saddam woven into the fabric of the book. We have to remove all of that. That's a monumental task. We have to remove the control of the Ba'ath from media. We have to remove the control of the Ba'ath from cultural activities, such as theater, movies, television, paintings, sculpture. And we have to work very hard to de-Ba'athify the economy, because the economy was not a socialist economy, contrary to the slogans of the Ba'ath, but rather an economy of crony capitalism, where most of the resources of the country were held by Saddam's family, important members of the Ba'ath Party, and their cronies. And no economic activity of any significance would actually take place in Iraq without those people coming in and staking a claim on the people through threats. The Iraqi Mukhabarat, by the way, had a very organized economic system. It was called the Board for the Management of Projects. (Speaks in Arabic) -- in Arabic. And they actually met regularly, and they took decisions about investment. And it's remarkable the extent of the investment they did outside the country. They went forward. And when it became not possible for them to recover -- to do what they wanted through the normal channels, they sent the matter down to N-14 -- N-14 being the Department of Assassination --complete mafia organization. That was how the Mukhabarat economic projects were run. And they extended all over the world. The role of Saddam in corrupting world leadership through bribes, through using the resources of the Iraqi people from oil, is unprecedented in history. The facts are so egregious they can no longer be hidden. And the Iraqi people demand that these facts come out in the open, and they will. Now, we are moving forward to sovereignty. President Bush, who ever will remain to be a great figure in Iraq, who will also continue to have the gratitude of the Iraqi people for a long time to come -- President Bush, who was responsible for the liberation of Iraq, has agreed, when he saw the facts, to hand over sovereignty to the Iraqis. Iraqi sovereignty for the Iraqis is something that has been agreed to and that is the timetable. This is the date that we must work hard to achieve. He's committed to it. The president is committed to it. We are committed to it, and we want to move forward to achieve it. The way to do that is an Iraqi provisional government takes authority and declares the end of occupation. The U.S. recognizes this provisional government as being the sovereign government of Iraq, and there is a timetable for full democratic elections after the drafting of a constitution by an elected constituent assembly. The issue that is bedeviling everyone at this time is how to get from here to June 30th, and how to get a provisional government established. Ayatollah Sistani in May declared that the body that will draft the Iraqi constitution, the permanent constitution of Iraq, should be an elected body. There was some controversy about that, but in the end this view prevailed There was resistance to handing over sovereignty to an Iraqi body before the drafting of our constitution. But in the end it became clear that it was the only way forward, that sovereignty must be handed over quickly to the Iraqis. Now we have some parameters to go forward on, and those parameters are the choice of the provisional government and the provisional assembly. The view that we hold in Iraq now is this: that democracy is associated with elections. Democracy, elections. What some people are trying to do now is try to explain how we can have democracy without elections. It's a hard thing to do. It's not a simple concept. We have ideas of caucuses, 15 selected by various people who will choose a few hundred who in turn will elect six or seven, or whatever the proportion of the province is in terms of the Iraqi population; and then those will form the provisional National Assembly. It's not an easy concept to reconcile with democracy. And, furthermore, it is also not clear that the people elected will actually be representative of the general population or will respond to their views. And it's also not clear that this process will guarantee the election of strong leaders to sit on the assembly. That of course is a sure-fire way to have instability, because such people will not be able to withstand the various huge movements that will take place after sovereignty is established. Because you have to remember that politically the legacy of Saddam has made Iraq into an atomized society, and it's now, only now, that the Iraqi society, as we have always expected, shows the resilience of its social links rather than its allegiance to the Ba'ath and Saddam. That we actually have now a political process, the Iraqi people are now trying to overcome the atomization and to seek political avenues of association. It is always clear that in times of trouble people flock to their primary sources of leadership. For the Shi'a of Iraq they have flocked to the marjah (ph), and this is an ancient office -- it's not an office, it's a position that has emerged in the Shi'ia world for several hundred years, many centuries. And the marjah in general -- the general trend is that they are not office seekers or engaged in promoting political parties. And Ayatollah Sistani comes from that tradition. He was a student of Ayatollah Kho'i (ph), who in turn was a student of Ayatollah Nihini (ph), and Ayatollah Nihini (ph) in the beginning of the 20th century was one of the most important advocates of constitutional government in Islam. And we are lucky actually to have Ayatollah Sistani to be the marjah (ph) now, because he is the friend of moderation, he is a friend of democracy, and he is insistent that all Iraqis, from whatever community they are, be represented by their own people in all national decisions. And his views have wide acceptance in the country. There is no answer yet on how the assembly will be chosen, but I believe that elections are possible. The U.N. sent an elections team to assess the situation of elections in Iraq back in August. It was led by Madame Karina Pareli (ph), who was the chief elections expert. And they wrote a report to the secretary general which he has declined so far to share with us, because he says it's an internal document. But we heard -- and we want to verify this -- that this report says elections are possible in six months from the date you start planning for them. Perhaps we should revisit that report. In the past month, the Governing Council has written to the secretary general of the U.N. requesting a U.N. mission, and of experts, to work together with the Governing Council and the CPA to determine whether elections are possible, and to suggest alternatives to elections if they are not possible in the view of the collected body of experts. This is not a carte blanche for the U.N. to come and dictate the agenda of transition in Iraq, because we recognize that there are people in the U.N. of influence who were not friendly to the liberation of Iraq, and they are part of the process to try to restore some semblance of the old order. We will work together with the U.N., jointly with the CPA, to produce a way forward. And I think that this process should take place quickly. We have asked for it during our meetings with the secretary general, and we were on the same page entirely with the CPA on these issues in our stand towards the United Nations. The Governing Council of Iraq has displayed remarkable unity in its deliberations. It's achieved many things. It inhabited a state which was devastated in every single way, and it is working together with a power of occupation. It has managed to maintain its strength and credibility in the country. It has achieved many things, and it has dealt with the occupying authority in a very good way, protecting its independence and easing the way for the transition to full sovereignty. And it has achieved through its negotiations strategies a commitment from the United States to hand over sovereignty to Iraq. I think I will stop here and wait for questions. MS. PLETKA: (Off mike.) We're going to take questions. First of all, I would like to acknowledge the presence of Rend Rahim Franke (ph), who is the Iraqi Governing Council representative to the United States. MR. CHALABI: She's ambassador. MS. PLETKA: No, no, she tells me that we're not supposed to say ambassador. MR. CHALABI: Well, we say actually ambassador. MS. PLETKA: Well, and to us she's always ambassador, and a very good friend of all of us. (Applause.) We're going to turn to questions and answers. And if I could just reiterate to everybody the ground rules, particularly as we have a large crowd. If you would be kind enough to wait for the microphone, which is there, and if you would identify yourself. And, as usual, as a request at AEI, please put your statement in the form of a question. (Laughter.) Yes, right here? Q Good morning. My name is Saeb Erekat from El-Quds newspaper. Today Jim Hoagland wrote an article saying we should give the Shi'a a chance, but we should not be so scared of them. We should allow in essence these elections. And in essence he is saying that really what is happening in the Sunni Triangle is isolated and so on. So I would like you to elaborate on this issue, especially in light of Ayatollah Sistani's declaration today as a matter of fact that he rejects the American proposal in total. MR. CHALABI: First of all, I want to make one point clear: We reject this notion of the Sunni Triangle. The Sunni Triangle is not a uniform geographic area opposed to democracy and opposed to liberation. That is wrong -- misnomer. The Ba'ath Party extended both -- (inaudible) -- When Saddam was caught, he was -- a list with him was pulled off seven people. Two of them were senior Shi'ite Ba'athist officials, one of them from Najaf, whom we caught. The point here is that the Sunnis suffered under Saddam too, in Tikrit. I will mention this just -- it's a grotesque thing, but when Uday and Qusay's bodies were buried, the people of Tikrit who were victims of Saddam took them out and threw them to the dogs. Saddam also oppressed Sunnis. And there are people there who are working together with us -- the majority of the Sunnis of Iraq oppose the Ba'ath and are working with us now. What is happening now is that there is this latent remnant of Saddam's organization, which he developed before the war and which is very well funded. Saddam made the biggest cash withdrawal in history on March 19, 2003. He withdrew $920 million and 90 million euros -- well over a billion dollars -- and put them in three trucks and took them. The Sunni Triangle is a term that is not reflective of the reality of Iraq. And, if fact, the insurgency and the terrorism and the sabotage that is being carried out, in fact it is limited to this organization. The quality of attacks has declined, and the ability of these people to plan strategically also has declined, because due to when Saddam was captured we were able to -- the U.S. forces found with him 1,000 pages, and among them was some detailed organization of terrorism. Now, on the idea of insurgency -- on the idea of elections and representation. The Shiia after all are a majority in the country. But that is not an automatic political majority. I want to make that clear. The Kurds were oppressed as Kurds, and they fought Saddam as Kurds united. But when they had the ability to organize freely, political differences emerged in the society naturally. So being a Shi'ite -- the Shi'as do not have a uniform and automatic majority. However, they will band together when they feel that they are being denied the right to participate in politics because they are Shiia. And of course given the opportunity to have free elections they will -- as long as they can participate, they will band with others. And there are people who are in various political parties across the country who are not organized along sectarian lines. So I think elections, free elections, will bring the country together and will let everybody participate. Q Ron Bagents (ph), Kuwait News Agency. Could you say how you feel about the Gulf War reparations to Kuwait as far as Iraqi debt relief, how that should play out in the future for the 1990-91 war? And how do you see Iraq-Kuwait relations unfolding in the future? MR. CHALABI: We are committed to respecting United Nations resolution on Iraq. And we are determined to be part of the international system through the U.N. and through other international organizations. Those reparations were made by the United Nations. Iraq has paid so far $17 billion, and we recognize and we salute the fact that the U.N. resolutions recently reduced the reparations from being 25 percent of oil revenue to five percent of oil revenue. And we also salute the fact that Kuwait accepted this. We want to have the best possible relations between Iraq and Kuwait. And we also have to recognize, immediately, right away, that Iraq is a state and Kuwait is a different state, and the borders between them are delineated by Resolution 833. That is the beginning of our relationship with Kuwait. Brotherhood, solidarity comes later. The fact, the recognition of the distinct entities is essential here. I do not want to make any vague references here. And we want to have the best possible relations with Kuwait. Indeed, now Kuwaitis are investing heavily in us. They are also working very well with U.S. contractors and the U.S. military on economic matters. We are buying fuel from Kuwait. We are going to send dry gas to Kuwait. We want to export oil through Kuwait. All these activities will come naturally, and we want to develop this further and further. (Off mike cross talk.) Q Paul Starabin (sp) with Atlantic Media. With Ayatollah Sistani, you called a friend of democracy. Is that consistent with his apparent vision of an Islamic state? Is that, in fact, not, do you believe, his vision? And what is your own relationship with him? MR. CHALABI: Ayatollah Sistani is not for an Islamic state. He is for a state in which Islam is respected, but he has never said that he is for an Islamic state or an Islamic republic. His view on that is that Islam is the religion of the majority of the people, and that it should be recognized as such and respected. But he is certainly not an advocate of a theocracy in Iraq. And his own beliefs and doctrines, as I just mentioned earlier, go through a lineage of previous marjahs (ph) and (divines ?) who have studied constitutionalism and democracy thoroughly, and they are for that in government. I have the highest regard for Ayatollah Sistani, and I recognize him as a very positive force now in Iraq. You have to remember that Ayatollah Sistani is not an Iraqi national. He is a citizen of Iran. He has been living in Iraq for 55 years. And, therefore, he seeks no political position in Iraq. He cannot even vote in Iraq, and he says that. But what he is concerned about is the welfare of his community. And he has tried to make sure that the will of this community is not usurped or distorted. That is his essential message now. MS. PLETKA: Why don't we try somebody in the back of the room on that side. Q Thanks. Elise Latho (sp) with CNN. If I might follow-up, I do have another question, but I'll be brief. To follow up on that, you say that Ayatollah Sistani is not in favor of an Islamic republic. How do you reconcile that with some of the movements towards Sharia law and the kind of denying of rights for women in that respect? But my question, my real question to you, Mr. Chalabi, is, do you think that all of these political kind of debates with Ayatollah Sistani, the protests and the U.S. saying now that it might try to go for direct elections, do you think that this is a pretext for the U.S. exit strategy? Are you afraid that the U.S. might try to get out a little early and leave Iraq without a stable government? Thank you. MR. CHALABI: Ayatollah Sistani did not make any laws. Q The governing council did. MR. CHALABI: Well, the governing council passed something saying about what is called civil marriage or personal status. (Speaks in Arabic.) That -- the details of that, I think, if you examine them are not against women's rights, and they are not in violation of any of the community's rights and -- (Arabic phrase) And Ayatollah Sistani had nothing to do with that. Furthermore, as for the U.S. strategy, the U.S. has recognized that Iraqis are competent people, that they did a great service to the Iraqi people by defeating Saddam's military, and dismantling Saddam's security structure, and given that, Iraqis should be given a chance to run their own affairs, and that is something that we should do. It's a great thing, and I do not think that the U.S. is seeking to just drop the bag and leave. No. I think the U.S. will continue to be engaged in Iraq. We hear stories that the U.S. embassy in Iraq will have 3,000 employees. I don't think that is an indicator that they don't want to continue to be fully engaged. MS. PLETKA: This lady here, and then we'll move over in that direction. Q Sir, I'm Ann Hess (sp) with the United Press International. What would be the ramifications if the United States decided to support free elections, thus delaying the transfer of sovereignty until after those elections are done, maybe December? MR. CHALABI: President Bush is committed to granting sovereignty to Iraqis on June 30th. And I think this commitment is very strong. Q But if that changed. MR. CHALABI: I do not believe so, and Iraqis don't want it to change, and certainly no one wants it to change. Now, having said that, I do not think this should be an obstacle in moving forward to handing over sovereignty and having elections. There are many suggestions. I read in the New York Times today a suggestion made by the president of the Governing Council Dr. Pachachi on how to proceed on this with handing over sovereignty on June 30th. There are many ideas going around. But the date is very important that we should stick to this date. Q Kenneth Timmerman (sp) from Insight Magazine. It's a pleasure to see you back in Washington, Dr. Chalabi. My question really has to do with the preparations for the trial of Saddam Hussein. You've made several references in your talk today to the thirst for truth of the Iraqi people, and the outrages that they are discovering of Saddam's behavior. You mentioned the bribery of foreign officials as one part of these outrages of Saddam, and the money that he spirited away. Will these things be brought up at the trial of Saddam Hussein, and what preparations are you actually taking right now towards that trial? Thank you. MR. CHALABI: One of the achievements of the Governing Council was the drafting and passing of a law for the specialized court to try people who are accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes from the previous regime, and others who are associated with it. The trial itself -- I mean, the law itself is in effect. We are working now to put together the structure of this court. It will have -- it will be headed by an appeals judge, and to have an appellate, and then it will have several chambers with five judges in each, and it will have a prosecution service, and it will have an investigation service. And we have also worked out very elaborate methods to allow the defense of the accused, according to international standards. Foreign judges are permitted to sit in the courts if the Governing Council decides so. And foreign lawyers are permitted to join the Iraqi defense team of the accused. And we intend to have the court be held to the highest standards of justice that are generally recognized in the civilized world. And we think that this is the best way forward to expose the crimes of the regime. All crimes of the regime that are war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide will be exposed through the trial. There are charges, there are documents, and there are witnesses to these. Saddam will be tried in this court. There was some consternation in Iraq when Saddam was declared a prisoner of war, but we had adequate and satisfactory explanations from the U.S. government that this does in no way preclude that Saddam should stand before this court, and that Saddam will face the trial by Iraqis in this court, and that this court has jurisdiction over. Q When? MR. CHALABI: The court will be formed -- is being formed now. And the investigation, there are charges that are ready against some of the accused, which they can be put there quickly. I do not want to give any dates specifically now. Q Thank you. Saul Hudson from Reuters. Just to clarify, back to the theme of direct elections. You said that you think they are possible, are you saying that they are possible before the June 30th handover? And if so, obviously that contradicts with what U.S. officials have said and what Kofi Annan has called very difficult. Why do you think it is possible? What are the logistics that the Americans say are difficult and you think are problems that are surmountable? MR. CHALABI: The elections that are possible are elections to test the will of the Iraqi people about their representatives in the transition period. They are possible, because there is enough data to get an electable body which will reflect the will of the people quickly, quite well. We have examples of that. In the Kurdish region, for example, they organized an election in a matter of three months in 1992. There were difficulties, there were problems, but they did organize elections, and very few people say that those elections did not reflect generally the will of the people in Iraq. I think the same can be done in other parts of Iraq. We have some very good census experts. We have a Department of Census, which is staffed by very competent people, and they say that elections are possible. They have told Ayatollah Sistani that elections are possible. They have requested certain equipment and funding to work on a voter roll that will make elections possible quickly. I think that this is an issue that should be dealt with in this way. Do not say -- do not seek to find a reason why elections are not possible. Seek to make them possible, and they will be possible. Q By June 30th? MR. CHALABI: Yes! Q Hi, I'm Bob Dreyfus (sp) from the American Prospect. I have two questions about your neighbors. One is, I wonder if you could say something about Iran and its intentions both toward Iraq and toward the United States, and its potential for mischief making among the Shi'a of Southern Iraq. And second, whether you could say something about your relations with the Sunni Arab countries, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Egypt, for instance. I recall seeing in the Washington Post that the Jordanian ambassador here accused the Iraqi National Congress of blowing up its embassy in Baghdad, and that doesn't bode well for Iraqi-Jordanian relations for him to make a charge like that, true or not. So I was wondering if you could say something about both Iran and your relations with the Sunni Arab states? MR. CHALABI: We enjoy very good relations with Iran now. In fact, Iran was the first country to recognize the governing council and deal with it. And Iran has received several delegations with the governing council, and they are cooperating with Iraq very well, in terms of economic activity. We are buying fuel products from them, oil products from them, and there is an important exchange of trade, and there are also thousands of Irani pilgrims who visit the holy sites every day. At any time of the year now, there are at least 40,000 to 50,000 Iranian visitors to the holy shrines in Iraq. And we see no adverse activity from them. The Iranian government has told us that they are committed to helping the process of political democratization in Iraq, and that they will take no action which will threaten our interests, and they will take no action to destabilize the country. Now, the speculation is, there is some confusion between their ability to cause difficulty and their intention to do so. I do not question the ability of any of Iraq's neighbors to cause difficulty inside Iraq. The borders are open. There's no control over the borders. If any of the countries wants to send people across the border to do sabotage, and to fund, and to send people to attack Iraqis or coalition forces, it's possible. Some of them are doing it now. But, Iran is not doing it at this time. And they are also for the unity of Iraq. We have a problem with MEK in Iraq, which the governing council passed a resolution saying that they are an illegal organization, and they should not remain in Iraq. The U.S. recognizes that they are a terrorist organization, they are currently being fingerprinted by U.S. authorities to determine whether any of them are wanted by the U.S. for terrorism, and they will leave Iraq sooner or later, and that will be the end of a chapter between Iraq and Iran. As for other Arab countries surrounding Iraq, you must recognize that democracy is not high on the agenda of a lot of countries surrounding Iraq in general. They also fear an emerging liberal democracy in Iraq, which is on very close and intimate terms with the United States. They have no reason to fear that, because Iraq is not going to be a threat to them, but Iraq will definitely, without doubt, curtail the looting of Iraq in which some of these people have participated. Iraq gave Jordan, since 1984, in excess of $3 billion of free oil. Jordanian financial institutions were a conduit for the abuse of the oil for food program, and were channels for the skimming off of large amounts of money from the oil for food program for the benefit of Saddam. That will stop, and we will get to the bottom of this. As for the charges that some Jordanians made that the INC was involved in the explosions at the embassy, they are frivolous, non- existent in fact, and have no basis in reality. They also have failed to produce a shred of evidence to back up this serious charge. And if this is the state of their intelligence, then I feel sorry for them in the coming days. Q (Off mike.) MR. : Hold it. Hold it. Hold it. The young lady in the back next to the pillar. Q Thank you. Terry Shilfer (sp), Fox News. Dr. Chalabi, I have a question about the Kurds, but your MEK statement begs a follow up. The U.S. has said it doesn't know exactly what the IDC wants them to do with the MEK. There seems to be some reluctance to send them back to Iran. Where do you expect them to expel these people -- to where do you expect them to expel these people? And my other question, could you talk about the Kurds and their desire for some semi-autonomy in the North, including Kirkuk. Thank you. MR. CHALABI: The governing council does not want the MEK in Iraq They have committed crimes against the Iraqi people. They were part of Saddam's apparatus of oppression. They participated in the suppression of the uprising in 1991, and they continue to act in this way. Also, they participated in the looting of Iraq. They had large contracts for the sale of oil, and they also used these funds for terrorist purposes. We don't want them in Iraq. Now, we want to treat them in a very humane way. There are several possibilities. I will not speculate on how these possibilities can take place. There are about 3,800 MEK people in Iraq. They are also leaving in dribs and drabs. They have been leaving. (End of available audio.) END LOAD-DATE: January 25, 2004
