Washington Rimes April 8 2004 Showdown in Iraq By Hiwa Osman The showdown between the United States and radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is long overdue, but it may be counterproductive in the long run. It may boost his popularity, which could undermine a smooth transition of power this summer.
The confrontation comes as no surprise to Iraqis. For the past year, Mr. Sadr has been trying to attract attention through provocation. But he failed in his face-off with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani over the control of the Shia holy shrines; and he failed to gain attention in declaring formation of a separate government. But this time, through inflammatory articles in his newspaper, al-Hawza, he managed to prod the United States to react: It closed his paper, which ignited demonstrations of his supporters who were later joined by people who normally support efforts toward a smooth reacquisition of sovereignty. Mr. Sadr mostly draws his support from the legacy of his father, who was killed by Saddam Hussein and is seen as a Shia symbol of resistance. The majority of his followers are among the Shia youth who knew nothing but Saddam. They grew up with the notion that Saddam was their enemy and Sadr (the father) a hero who defied him. At the same time, and as with many other Iraqis who lived under Saddam, these young people unconsciously indoctrinated into a chauvinistic Arab nationalist ideology and Iraqi xenophobia that Saddam's regime propagated for years. With his simplistic arguments, Muqtada Al-Sadr managed to ride the wave of popular feeling of a marginalized people who are still suffering from the aftermath of decades of oppression and believe that every foreigner is conspiring against them. The leadership of the Shia in Iraq may be divided at the top of the political hierarchy, but rank and file of the various political groups do not recognize or even understand these divisions. When members of one group are under pressure, others will come to their defense. Religious and tribal values trump political affiliation. Mr. Sadr is now exploiting this phenomenon, pulling grass-roots support from members of other Shia groups by telling them that the United States is victimizing him. Complicating the situation further is Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) equivocation in addressing his possible involvement in the assassination of leading exile cleric Abd-al-Majid al-Khoei a year ago. It was widely believed by friend and foe alike that Sadr followers were the perpetrators, but the United States failed to act until two days ago. The killing of al-Khoei is an Iraqi issue--even more, it is a Shia issue. But the news of the arrest warrant issued against Mr. Sadr by an Iraqi judge was first announced by a CPA spokesman, making it appear to be a U.S. case against him. The arrest warrant, issued a year after the fact and at a time when there are demonstrations in support of Mr. Sadr, fuels his reputation as the one leader who stands up and "resists the occupation." In this context, he can argue that the arrest warrant for the murder of Mr. al-Khoei is only a pretext to sideline him. In addition, the timing of this showdown is most unfortunate for the United States. With a massive military operation underway in Fallujah, radical Sunnis, who are otherwise adversaries of the Shia, are rallying behind Mr. Sadr, who is now seen an ally in their fight against the United States. To most Iraqis, the Sadr-U.S. showdown was inevitable. But the time and manner in which it is taking place enables Mr. Sadr to claim the confrontation as part of a larger popular uprising against the occupation. Iraqi politicians say they feel caught in the crossfire between CPA arrogance and an increasingly frustrated and rapidly radicalizing street. Unilateral CPA decisions, such as closing al-Hawza newspaper and announcing the arrest warrant, only strengthened Mr. Sadr's position. These actions have marginalized and further isolated Iraqi authorities. Apparently they were not consulted on the operation in Fallujah, nor on the newspaper closure or the arrest warrant. This behavior embarrasses and undermines the current Iraqi authorities who are most likely to form the new government that is supposed to be handed power on June 30. The Sadr issue is an internal Iraqi one; the United States does not need to be involved. Had the Iraqi Governing Council or the Ministry of Interior closed al-Hawza newspaper and issued the press statement of his arrest warrant, Mr. Sadr may well have remained the outlaw many Iraqis thought him to be, and he would have remained in political isolation. Hiwa Osman is a Baghdad-based journalist.
