NB: Today's WSJ refers to an established history of official US harassment of INC head Ahmed Chalabi and includes reference to an April 2003 WSJ editorial. It does not seem to be on-line, but the URL for a subsequent WSJ editorial referencing the original, is inserted into the text of today's piece, where the April 2003 editorial is cited.
REVIEW & OUTLOOK The Chalabi Fiasco Continued Same target, new smear. Wednesday, August 11, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT It's hard to see how the weekend arrest warrants for Ahmed Chalabi and his nephew Salem Chalabi advance the rule of law and the cause of justice in Iraq. If nothing else, they raise the question of judicial priorities. Moqtada al Sadr, after all, remains on the loose. And despite the recent pounding his Mahdi militia has been taking from American forces, there is no indication that Iraq's new government intends to enforce its arrest warrant for the cleric himself. Meanwhile, Iraq's Central Bank Governor has said that he issued no counterfeiting complaint against Ahmed Chalabi, contrary to the claims of the accusing judge in this case. As for the murder charges the same judge has levied against Salem--a respected lawyer in charge of the tribunal prosecuting Saddam and his henchmen--even Ahmed's enemies say they find them incredible. The only obvious winners here are the Baathists. One of Saddam's lawyers reacted to the news by calling it "a miracle from God to help Saddam Hussein." Both Chalabis have vigorously denied the charges and questioned the bona fides of the judge. Zuhair al Maliky is a former translator at the Coalition Provisional Authority who was elevated to his current position by the former U.S-appointed governor, L. Paul Bremer. In April Mr. Bremer amended his original order establishing Iraq's Central Criminal Court to eliminate a requirement that judges have five years of prior judicial experience; Mr. Maliky had none. The head of Iraq's union of judges has questioned the court's legitimacy. This is not the first time Judge Maliky has moved against Mr. Chalabi. In May security forces raided Mr. Chalabi's home and office. Attempts by Mr. Bremer and the White House to paint the raids as an all-Iraqi effort were complicated by the presence of two American employees of Mr. Chalabi, both of whom testified to the presence of plainclothed and uniformed Americans. In response, Judge Maliky issued further warrants for the Americans, absurdly charging them with "obstructing" his investigation. Adding to the appearance of a vendetta are still more Maliky arrest warrants for others belonging to Mr. Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress: spokesman Entifadh Qanbar and security chief Arras Karim. Mr. Karim was the head of the INC intelligence program that has been credited by Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard Myers as having "saved soldiers' lives." But such service apparently wasn't enough to save Mr. Chalabi from all the enemies he made while lobbying for a war that much of the Washington establishment bitterly opposed. Sometime early this year the decision was taken at the highest levels of the Administration to stabilize Iraq by reaching out to disaffected members of Saddam's Baath Party and to call on the United Nations for help. The Journal has been able to confirm that a document was drafted in the National Security Council outlining strategies to marginalize Mr. Chalabi, who was sure to be critical of U.S. plans, and who was then the most powerful member of the Governing Council. One particular concern vis-a-vis the U.N. strategy was that Mr. Chalabi was starting to expose the massive corruption that had characterized the Oil for Food program. Just prior the May raid, Mr. Bremer shut down the KPMG investigation that Mr. Chalabi had initiated, and hired accountants Ernst & Young instead, for no apparent reason other than delay. We acknowledge that some very serious allegations have been made against Mr. Chalabi in recent months. But not a single person has gone on record backing anonymous claims he spied for Iran. Nor has it been beyond certain actors in the U.S. government to attempt to fabricate charges against Mr. Chalabi in the past. In April 2003 we obtained and reported on minutes from the State Department that appeared to show employees of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs asking auditors to deliberately bias an audit against the INC. [ http://www.mail-archive.com/[EMAIL PROTECTED]/msg00098.html ] It's worth noting, finally, that Mr. Chalabi's ex-colleagues on the Governing Council continue to stand by him. If this time around someone finally produces actual evidence against Mr. Chalabi, we'll be the first to acknowledge it. But so far it all smells of the same old smears, and of something other than the rule of law our soldiers are fighting to bring to Iraq.
