The branch, master has been updated
via ef64cc0 NEWS[4.4.2]: Samba 4.4.2, 4.3.8 and 4.2.11 Security
Releases Available for Download
via 88454c6 NEWS[4.4.1]: Samba 4.4.1, 4.3.7 and 4.2.10 Security
Releases Available for Download
via b7365eb style/2010/grey/screen.css: fix ol ul nesting
from bf2c180 support: Update Catalyst entry and add primary global
offices
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba-web.git;a=shortlog;h=master
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit ef64cc0eba85eb294c40d9f54613817ab6b4f5cd
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Fri Apr 1 22:10:28 2016 +0200
NEWS[4.4.2]: Samba 4.4.2, 4.3.8 and 4.2.11 Security Releases Available for
Download
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org>
commit 88454c6198a6f76812fc916f027b7e12b23bd9ba
Author: Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org>
Date: Fri Apr 1 22:10:28 2016 +0200
NEWS[4.4.1]: Samba 4.4.1, 4.3.7 and 4.2.10 Security Releases Available for
Download
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org>
commit b7365ebd191643e60bd4b7f93051e156dd702571
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Tue Apr 12 13:58:42 2016 +0200
style/2010/grey/screen.css: fix ol ul nesting
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
history/header_history.html | 6 +
history/samba-4.2.10.html | 564 ++++++++++++++++++++++
history/samba-4.2.11.html | 590 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
history/samba-4.3.7.html | 533 +++++++++++++++++++++
history/samba-4.3.8.html | 563 ++++++++++++++++++++++
history/samba-4.4.1.html | 522 +++++++++++++++++++++
history/samba-4.4.2.html | 552 ++++++++++++++++++++++
history/security.html | 31 ++
posted_news/20160412-185634.4.4.2.body.html | 342 ++++++++++++++
posted_news/20160412-185634.4.4.2.headline.html | 3 +
posted_news/20160412-185634.4.4.2.snip.html | 13 +
security/CVE-2015-5370.html | 95 ++++
security/CVE-2016-2110.html | 108 +++++
security/CVE-2016-2111.html | 125 +++++
security/CVE-2016-2112.html | 128 +++++
security/CVE-2016-2113.html | 121 +++++
security/CVE-2016-2114.html | 92 ++++
security/CVE-2016-2115.html | 144 ++++++
security/CVE-2016-2118.html | 148 ++++++
style/2010/grey/screen.css | 4 +
20 files changed, 4684 insertions(+)
create mode 100755 history/samba-4.2.10.html
create mode 100755 history/samba-4.2.11.html
create mode 100644 history/samba-4.3.7.html
create mode 100644 history/samba-4.3.8.html
create mode 100644 history/samba-4.4.1.html
create mode 100644 history/samba-4.4.2.html
create mode 100644 posted_news/20160412-185634.4.4.2.body.html
create mode 100644 posted_news/20160412-185634.4.4.2.headline.html
create mode 100644 posted_news/20160412-185634.4.4.2.snip.html
create mode 100644 security/CVE-2015-5370.html
create mode 100644 security/CVE-2016-2110.html
create mode 100644 security/CVE-2016-2111.html
create mode 100644 security/CVE-2016-2112.html
create mode 100644 security/CVE-2016-2113.html
create mode 100644 security/CVE-2016-2114.html
create mode 100644 security/CVE-2016-2115.html
create mode 100644 security/CVE-2016-2118.html
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/history/header_history.html b/history/header_history.html
index 6fe75a1..1c4cdd3 100755
--- a/history/header_history.html
+++ b/history/header_history.html
@@ -9,7 +9,11 @@
<li><a href="/samba/history/">Release Notes</a>
<li class="navSub">
<ul>
+ <li><a href="samba-4.4.2.html">samba-4.4.2</a></li>
+ <li><a href="samba-4.4.1.html">samba-4.4.1 (do not
use)</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.4.0.html">samba-4.4.0</a></li>
+ <li><a href="samba-4.3.8.html">samba-4.3.8</a></li>
+ <li><a href="samba-4.3.7.html">samba-4.3.7 (do not
use)</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.3.6.html">samba-4.3.6</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.3.5.html">samba-4.3.5</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.3.4.html">samba-4.3.4</a></li>
@@ -17,6 +21,8 @@
<li><a href="samba-4.3.2.html">samba-4.3.2</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.3.1.html">samba-4.3.1</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.3.0.html">samba-4.3.0</a></li>
+ <li><a href="samba-4.2.11.html">samba-4.2.11</a></li>
+ <li><a href="samba-4.2.10.html">samba-4.2.10 (do not
use)</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.2.9.html">samba-4.2.9</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.2.8.html">samba-4.2.8</a></li>
<li><a href="samba-4.2.7.html">samba-4.2.7</a></li>
diff --git a/history/samba-4.2.10.html b/history/samba-4.2.10.html
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..5e2608e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/history/samba-4.2.10.html
@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN"
+ "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd";>
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";>
+
+<head>
+<title>Samba - Release Notes Archive</title>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+ <H2>Samba 4.2.10 Available for Download</H2>
+
+<p>
+<pre>
+ ==============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.2.10
+ April 12, 2016
+ ==============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following CVEs:
+
+o CVE-2015-5370 (Multiple errors in DCE-RPC code)
+
+o CVE-2016-2110 (Man in the middle attacks possible with NTLMSSP)
+
+o CVE-2016-2111 (NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability)
+
+o CVE-2016-2112 (LDAP client and server don't enforce integrity)
+
+o CVE-2016-2113 (Missing TLS certificate validation)
+
+o CVE-2016-2114 ("server signing = mandatory" not enforced)
+
+o CVE-2016-2115 (SMB IPC traffic is not integrity protected)
+
+o CVE-2016-2118 (SAMR and LSA man in the middle attacks possible)
+
+The number of changes are rather huge for a security release,
+compared to typical security releases.
+
+Given the number of problems and the fact that they are all related
+to man in the middle attacks we decided to fix them all at once
+instead of splitting them.
+
+In order to prevent the man in the middle attacks it was required
+to change the (default) behavior for some protocols. Please see the
+"New smb.conf options" and "Behavior changes" sections below.
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o CVE-2015-5370
+
+ Versions of Samba from 3.6.0 to 4.4.0 inclusive are vulnerable to
+ denial of service attacks (crashes and high cpu consumption)
+ in the DCE-RPC client and server implementations. In addition,
+ errors in validation of the DCE-RPC packets can lead to a downgrade
+ of a secure connection to an insecure one.
+
+ The above applies all possible server roles Samba can operate in.
+
+ Note that versions before 3.6.0 had completely different marshalling
+ functions for the generic DCE-RPC layer. It's quite possible that
+ that code has similar problems!
+
+ The downgrade of a secure connection to an insecure one may
+ allow an attacker to take control of Active Directory object
+ handles created on a connection created from an Administrator
+ account and re-use them on the now non-privileged connection,
+ compromising the security of the Samba AD-DC.
+
+o CVE-2016-2110:
+
+ There are several man in the middle attacks possible with
+ NTLMSSP authentication.
+
+ E.g. NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN and NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL
+ can be cleared by a man in the middle.
+
+ This was by protocol design in earlier Windows versions.
+
+ Windows Server 2003 RTM and Vista RTM introduced a way
+ to protect against the trivial downgrade.
+
+ See MsvAvFlags and flag 0x00000002 in
+ https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc236646.aspx
+
+ This new feature also implies support for a mechlistMIC
+ when used within SPNEGO, which may prevent downgrades
+ from other SPNEGO mechs, e.g. Kerberos, if sign or
+ seal is finally negotiated.
+
+ The Samba implementation doesn't enforce the existence of
+ required flags, which were requested by the application layer,
+ e.g. LDAP or SMB1 encryption (via the unix extensions).
+ As a result a man in the middle can take over the connection.
+ It is also possible to misguide client and/or
+ server to send unencrypted traffic even if encryption
+ was explicitly requested.
+
+ LDAP (with NTLMSSP authentication) is used as a client
+ by various admin tools of the Samba project,
+ e.g. "net", "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit", ...
+
+ As an active directory member server LDAP is also used
+ by the winbindd service when connecting to domain controllers.
+
+ Samba also offers an LDAP server when running as
+ active directory domain controller.
+
+ The NTLMSSP authentication used by the SMB1 encryption
+ is protected by smb signing, see CVE-2015-5296.
+
+o CVE-2016-2111:
+
+ It's basically the same as CVE-2015-0005 for Windows:
+
+ The NETLOGON service in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2,
+ Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, and Windows Server 2012 Gold
+ and R2, when a Domain Controller is configured, allows remote
+ attackers to spoof the computer name of a secure channel's
+ endpoint, and obtain sensitive session information, by running a
+ crafted application and leveraging the ability to sniff network
+ traffic, aka "NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability".
+
+ The vulnerability in Samba is worse as it doesn't require
+ credentials of a computer account in the domain.
+
+ This only applies to Samba running as classic primary domain controller,
+ classic backup domain controller or active directory domain controller.
+
+ The security patches introduce a new option called "raw NTLMv2 auth"
+ ("yes" or "no") for the [global] section in smb.conf.
+ Samba (the smbd process) will reject client using raw NTLMv2
+ without using NTLMSSP.
+
+ Note that this option also applies to Samba running as
+ standalone server and member server.
+
+ You should also consider using "lanman auth = no" (which is already the
default)
+ and "ntlm auth = no". Have a look at the smb.conf manpage for further
details,
+ as they might impact compatibility with older clients. These also
+ apply for all server roles.
+
+o CVE-2016-2112:
+
+ Samba uses various LDAP client libraries, a builtin one and/or the system
+ ldap libraries (typically openldap).
+
+ As active directory domain controller Samba also provides an LDAP server.
+
+ Samba takes care of doing SASL (GSS-SPNEGO) authentication with Kerberos or
NTLMSSP
+ for LDAP connections, including possible integrity (sign) and privacy (seal)
+ protection.
+
+ Samba has support for an option called "client ldap sasl wrapping" since
version
+ 3.2.0. Its default value has changed from "plain" to "sign" with version
4.2.0.
+
+ Tools using the builtin LDAP client library do not obey the
+ "client ldap sasl wrapping" option. This applies to tools like:
+ "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more. Some of them have command
line
+ options like "--sign" and "--encrypt". With the security update they will
+ also obey the "client ldap sasl wrapping" option as default.
+
+ In all cases, even if explicitly request via "client ldap sasl wrapping",
+ "--sign" or "--encrypt", the protection can be downgraded by a man in the
+ middle.
+
+ The LDAP server doesn't have an option to enforce strong authentication
+ yet. The security patches will introduce a new option called
+ "ldap server require strong auth", possible values are "no",
+ "allow_sasl_over_tls" and "yes".
+
+ As the default behavior was as "no" before, you may
+ have to explicitly change this option until all clients have
+ been adjusted to handle LDAP_STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED errors.
+ Windows clients and Samba member servers already use
+ integrity protection.
+
+o CVE-2016-2113:
+
+ Samba has support for TLS/SSL for some protocols:
+ ldap and http, but currently certificates are not
+ validated at all. While we have a "tls cafile" option,
+ the configured certificate is not used to validate
+ the server certificate.
+
+ This applies to ldaps:// connections triggered by tools like:
+ "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more. Note that it only applies
+ to the ldb tools when they are built as part of Samba or with Samba
+ extensions installed, which means the Samba builtin LDAP client library is
+ used.
+
+ It also applies to dcerpc client connections using ncacn_http (with
https://),
+ which are only used by the openchange project. Support for ncacn_http
+ was introduced in version 4.2.0.
+
+ The security patches will introduce a new option called
+ "tls verify peer". Possible values are "no_check", "ca_only",
+ "ca_and_name_if_available", "ca_and_name" and "as_strict_as_possible".
+
+ If you use the self-signed certificates which are auto-generated
+ by Samba, you won't have a crl file and need to explicitly
+ set "tls verify peer = ca_and_name".
+
+o CVE-2016-2114
+
+ Due to a regression introduced in Samba 4.0.0,
+ an explicit "server signing = mandatory" in the [global] section
+ of the smb.conf was not enforced for clients using the SMB1 protocol.
+
+ As a result it does not enforce smb signing and allows man in the middle
attacks.
+
+ This problem applies to all possible server roles:
+ standalone server, member server, classic primary domain controller,
+ classic backup domain controller and active directory domain controller.
+
+ In addition, when Samba is configured with "server role = active directory
domain controller"
+ the effective default for the "server signing" option should be "mandatory".
+
+ During the early development of Samba 4 we had a new experimental
+ file server located under source4/smb_server. But before
+ the final 4.0.0 release we switched back to the file server
+ under source3/smbd.
+
+ But the logic for the correct default of "server signing" was not
+ ported correctly ported.
+
+ Note that the default for server roles other than active directory domain
+ controller, is "off" because of performance reasons.
+
+o CVE-2016-2115:
+
+ Samba has an option called "client signing", this is turned off by default
+ for performance reasons on file transfers.
+
+ This option is also used when using DCERPC with ncacn_np.
+
+ In order to get integrity protection for ipc related communication
+ by default the "client ipc signing" option is introduced.
+ The effective default for this new option is "mandatory".
+
+ In order to be compatible with more SMB server implementations,
+ the following additional options are introduced:
+ "client ipc min protocol" ("NT1" by default) and
+ "client ipc max protocol" (the highest support SMB2/3 dialect by default).
+ These options overwrite the "client min protocol" and "client max protocol"
+ options, because the default for "client max protocol" is still "NT1".
+ The reason for this is the fact that all SMB2/3 support SMB signing,
+ while there are still SMB1 implementations which don't offer SMB signing
+ by default (this includes Samba versions before 4.0.0).
+
+ Note that winbindd (in versions 4.2.0 and higher) enforces SMB signing
+ against active directory domain controllers despite of the
+ "client signing" and "client ipc signing" options.
+
+o CVE-2016-2118 (a.k.a. BADLOCK):
+
+ The Security Account Manager Remote Protocol [MS-SAMR] and the
+ Local Security Authority (Domain Policy) Remote Protocol [MS-LSAD]
+ are both vulnerable to man in the middle attacks. Both are application level
+ protocols based on the generic DCE 1.1 Remote Procedure Call (DCERPC)
protocol.
+
+ These protocols are typically available on all Windows installations
+ as well as every Samba server. They are used to maintain
+ the Security Account Manager Database. This applies to all
+ roles, e.g. standalone, domain member, domain controller.
+
+ Any authenticated DCERPC connection a client initiates against a server
+ can be used by a man in the middle to impersonate the authenticated user
+ against the SAMR or LSAD service on the server.
+
+ The client chosen application protocol, auth type (e.g. Kerberos or NTLMSSP)
+ and auth level (NONE, CONNECT, PKT_INTEGRITY, PKT_PRIVACY) do not matter
+ in this case. A man in the middle can change auth level to CONNECT
+ (which means authentication without message protection) and take over
+ the connection.
+
+ As a result, a man in the middle is able to get read/write access to the
+ Security Account Manager Database, which reveals all passwords
+ and any other potential sensitive information.
+
+ Samba running as an active directory domain controller is additionally
+ missing checks to enforce PKT_PRIVACY for the
+ Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol [MS-DRSR] (drsuapi)
+ and the BackupKey Remote Protocol [MS-BKRP] (backupkey).
+ The Domain Name Service Server Management Protocol [MS-DNSP] (dnsserver)
+ is not enforcing at least PKT_INTEGRITY.
+
+====================
+New smb.conf options
+====================
+
+ allow dcerpc auth level connect (G)
+
+ This option controls whether DCERPC services are allowed to be used with
+ DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT, which provides authentication, but no per
+ message integrity nor privacy protection.
+
+ Some interfaces like samr, lsarpc and netlogon have a hard-coded default
+ of no and epmapper, mgmt and rpcecho have a hard-coded default of yes.
+
+ The behavior can be overwritten per interface name (e.g. lsarpc,
+ netlogon, samr, srvsvc, winreg, wkssvc ...) by using
+ 'allow dcerpc auth level connect:interface = yes' as option.
+
+ This option yields precedence to the implementation specific restrictions.
+ E.g. the drsuapi and backupkey protocols require DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY.
+ The dnsserver protocol requires DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY.
+
+ Default: allow dcerpc auth level connect = no
+
+ Example: allow dcerpc auth level connect = yes
+
+ client ipc signing (G)
+
+ This controls whether the client is allowed or required to use
+ SMB signing for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport. Possible
+ values are auto, mandatory and disabled.
+
+ When set to mandatory or default, SMB signing is required.
+
+ When set to auto, SMB signing is offered, but not enforced and
+ if set to disabled, SMB signing is not offered either.
+
+ Connections from winbindd to Active Directory Domain Controllers
+ always enforce signing.
+
+ Default: client ipc signing = default
+
+ client ipc max protocol (G)
+
+ The value of the parameter (a string) is the highest protocol level that
will
+ be supported for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport.
+
+ Normally this option should not be set as the automatic negotiation phase
+ in the SMB protocol takes care of choosing the appropriate protocol.
+
+ The value default refers to the latest supported protocol, currently
SMB3_11.
+
+ See client max protocol for a full list of available protocols.
+ The values CORE, COREPLUS, LANMAN1, LANMAN2 are silently upgraded to NT1.
+
+ Default: client ipc max protocol = default
+
+ Example: client ipc max protocol = SMB2_10
+
+ client ipc min protocol (G)
+
+ This setting controls the minimum protocol version that the will be
+ attempted to use for IPC$ connections as DCERPC transport.
+
+ Normally this option should not be set as the automatic negotiation phase
+ in the SMB protocol takes care of choosing the appropriate protocol.
+
+ The value default refers to the higher value of NT1 and the
+ effective value of "client min protocol".
+
+ See client max protocol for a full list of available protocols.
+ The values CORE, COREPLUS, LANMAN1, LANMAN2 are silently upgraded to NT1.
+
+ Default: client ipc min protocol = default
+
+ Example: client ipc min protocol = SMB3_11
+
+ ldap server require strong auth (G)
+
+ The ldap server require strong auth defines whether the
+ ldap server requires ldap traffic to be signed or
+ signed and encrypted (sealed). Possible values are no,
+ allow_sasl_over_tls and yes.
+
+ A value of no allows simple and sasl binds over all transports.
+
+ A value of allow_sasl_over_tls allows simple and sasl binds (without sign
or seal)
+ over TLS encrypted connections. Unencrypted connections only
+ allow sasl binds with sign or seal.
+
+ A value of yes allows only simple binds over TLS encrypted connections.
+ Unencrypted connections only allow sasl binds with sign or seal.
+
+ Default: ldap server require strong auth = yes
+
+ raw NTLMv2 auth (G)
+
+ This parameter determines whether or not smbd(8) will allow SMB1 clients
+ without extended security (without SPNEGO) to use NTLMv2 authentication.
+
+ If this option, lanman auth and ntlm auth are all disabled, then only
+ clients with SPNEGO support will be permitted. That means NTLMv2 is only
+ supported within NTLMSSP.
+
+ Default: raw NTLMv2 auth = no
+
+ tls verify peer (G)
+
+ This controls if and how strict the client will verify the peer's
+ certificate and name. Possible values are (in increasing order): no_check,
+ ca_only, ca_and_name_if_available, ca_and_name and as_strict_as_possible.
+
+ When set to no_check the certificate is not verified at all,
+ which allows trivial man in the middle attacks.
+
+ When set to ca_only the certificate is verified to be signed from a ca
+ specified in the "tls ca file" option. Setting "tls ca file" to a valid
file
+ is required. The certificate lifetime is also verified. If the "tls crl
file"
+ option is configured, the certificate is also verified against
+ the ca crl.
+
+ When set to ca_and_name_if_available all checks from ca_only are performed.
+ In addition, the peer hostname is verified against the certificate's
+ name, if it is provided by the application layer and not given as
+ an ip address string.
+
+ When set to ca_and_name all checks from ca_and_name_if_available are
performed.
+ In addition the peer hostname needs to be provided and even an ip
+ address is checked against the certificate's name.
+
+ When set to as_strict_as_possible all checks from ca_and_name are
performed.
+ In addition the "tls crl file" needs to be configured. Future versions
+ of Samba may implement additional checks.
+
+ Default: tls verify peer = as_strict_as_possible
+
+ tls priority (G) (backported from Samba 4.3 to Samba 4.2)
+
+ This option can be set to a string describing the TLS protocols to be
+ supported in the parts of Samba that use GnuTLS, specifically the AD DC.
+
+ The default turns off SSLv3, as this protocol is no longer considered
+ secure after CVE-2014-3566 (otherwise known as POODLE) impacted SSLv3 use
+ in HTTPS applications.
+
+ The valid options are described in the GNUTLS Priority-Strings
+ documentation at http://gnutls.org/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html
+
+ Default: tls priority = NORMAL:-VERS-SSL3.0
+
+================
+Behavior changes
+================
+
+o The default auth level for authenticated binds has changed from
+ DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT to DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY.
+ That means ncacn_ip_tcp:server is now implicitly the same
+ as ncacn_ip_tcp:server[sign] and offers a similar protection
+ as ncacn_np:server, which relies on smb signing.
+
+o The following constraints are applied to SMB1 connections:
+
+ - "client lanman auth = yes" is now consistently
+ required for authenticated connections using the
+ SMB1 LANMAN2 dialect.
+ - "client ntlmv2 auth = yes" and "client use spnego = yes"
+ (both the default values), require extended security (SPNEGO)
+ support from the server. That means NTLMv2 is only used within
+ NTLMSSP.
+
+o Tools like "samba-tool", "ldbsearch", "ldbedit" and more obey the
+ default of "client ldap sasl wrapping = sign". Even with
+ "client ldap sasl wrapping = plain" they will automatically upgrade
+ to "sign" when getting LDAP_STRONG_AUTH_REQUIRED from the LDAP
+ server.
+
+Changes since 4.2.9:
+--------------------
+
--
Samba Website Repository
