The branch, v4-6-test has been updated
via bb54467 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.6.9...
via adbe2eb Merge tag 'samba-4.6.8' into v4-6-test
via c66a4d9 smbd/ioctl: match WS2016 ReFS set compression behaviour
via be2ffca VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOTS for the 4.6.8 release.
via a308007 WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.6.8.
via 34dea82 selftest: make
samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*follow.symlinks.*no as flapping
via c848b10 CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write
from writing server memory to file.
via 105cc43 CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of
cli_state_is_encryption_on()
via 3157cce CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add cli_state_is_encryption_on()
helper function
via 2850666 CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if
authentication was not requested
via 28f4a8d CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add
smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory()
via d8c6ace CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials:
cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for
NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL
via f42ffde CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED in
gpo_connect_server()
via b760a46 CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of
SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for 'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal'
via 97a7ddf CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib: get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state
smb_encrypt SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED
via 9fb5283 CVE-2017-12150: s3:popt_common: don't turn a guessed
username into a specified one
from a86c837 ctdb-client: Initialize ctdb_ltdb_header completely for
empty record
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-6-test
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit bb54467ed822bf8d422f5a20db5362406398fbc0
Author: Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org>
Date: Wed Sep 20 13:01:46 2017 +0200
VERSION: Bump version up to 4.6.9...
and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOTS.
Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org>
commit adbe2ebe3ebdd37a38bf26f9609f44ba513d0325
Merge: c66a4d9 be2ffca
Author: Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org>
Date: Wed Sep 20 13:00:48 2017 +0200
Merge tag 'samba-4.6.8' into v4-6-test
samba: tag release samba-4.6.8
commit c66a4d91b1f6fd75d6d64ca30f04de88406589b6
Author: David Disseldorp <dd...@samba.org>
Date: Thu Jan 5 17:36:02 2017 +0100
smbd/ioctl: match WS2016 ReFS set compression behaviour
ReFS doesn't support compression, but responds to set-compression FSCTLs
with NT_STATUS_OK if (and only if) the requested compression format is
COMPRESSION_FORMAT_NONE.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12144
Reported-by: Nick Barrett <n...@barrett.org.nz>
Signed-off-by: David Disseldorp <dd...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 9 23:14:28 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
(cherry picked from commit 28cc347876b97b7409d6efd377f031fc6df0c5f3)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
VERSION | 2 +-
WHATSNEW.txt | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
auth/credentials/credentials.c | 16 ++++++++
libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c | 5 +++
libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h | 1 +
libgpo/gpo_fetch.c | 2 +-
selftest/flapping | 1 +
source3/include/auth_info.h | 1 +
source3/lib/popt_common.c | 6 +--
source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 32 +++++++++++++++
source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 20 +++-------
source3/libsmb/clientgen.c | 13 ++++++
source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c | 2 +-
source3/libsmb/proto.h | 1 +
source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c | 2 +-
source3/smbd/reply.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++
source3/smbd/smb2_ioctl_filesys.c | 26 ++++++------
17 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 3a8de1a..42fbbd7 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
########################################################
SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4
SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=6
-SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=8
+SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=9
########################################################
# If a official release has a serious bug #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index 87c4579..5b11c9f 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,84 @@
=============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.6.8
+ September 20, 2017
+ =============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
+
+o CVE-2017-12150 (SMB1/2/3 connections may not require signing where they
+ should)
+o CVE-2017-12151 (SMB3 connections don't keep encryption across DFS redirects)
+o CVE-2017-12163 (Server memory information leak over SMB1)
+
+
+=======
+Details
+=======
+
+o CVE-2017-12150:
+ A man in the middle attack may hijack client connections.
+
+o CVE-2017-12151:
+ A man in the middle attack can read and may alter confidential
+ documents transferred via a client connection, which are reached
+ via DFS redirect when the original connection used SMB3.
+
+o CVE-2017-12163:
+ Client with write access to a share can cause server memory contents to be
+ written into a file or printer.
+
+For more details and workarounds, please see the security advisories:
+
+ o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12150.html
+ o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12151.html
+ o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12163.html
+
+
+Changes since 4.6.7:
+--------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
+ * BUG 12836: s3: smbd: Fix a read after free if a chained SMB1 call goes
+ async.
+ * BUG 13020: CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from
+ writing server memory to file.
+
+o Ralph Boehme <s...@samba.org>
+ * BUG 12885: s3/smbd: Let non_widelink_open() chdir() to directories
+ directly.
+
+o Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
+ * BUG 12996: CVE-2017-12151: Keep required encryption across SMB3 dfs
+ redirects.
+ * BUG 12997: CVE-2017-12150: Some code path don't enforce smb signing
+ when they should.
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net.
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
+
+ =============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.6.7
August 9, 2017
=============================
@@ -81,8 +161,8 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
======================================================================
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
=============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.6.6
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
index 06648c7..5e3b5e8 100644
--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */
#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
#include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h"
+#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h"
#include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
#include "tevent.h"
#include "param/param.h"
@@ -300,6 +301,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct
cli_credentials *cre
_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials
*cred)
{
+ uint32_t gensec_features = 0;
+
if (cred->bind_dn) {
return true;
}
@@ -327,6 +330,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool
cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c
return true;
}
+ gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred);
+ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
return false;
}
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
index b21d796..239e5eb 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c
@@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
return false;
}
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
+{
+ return conn->mandatory_signing;
+}
+
void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options)
{
set_socket_options(conn->sock_fd, options);
diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
index e48fc35..2594f07 100644
--- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
+++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
+bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn);
void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options);
const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_local_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn
*conn);
diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
index 836bc23..3740d4e 100644
--- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
+++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads,
ads->auth.password,
CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS |
CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS,
- Undefined);
+ SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) {
DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: "
"failed to connect: %s\n",
diff --git a/selftest/flapping b/selftest/flapping
index 50fdf1e..8ea36e9 100644
--- a/selftest/flapping
+++ b/selftest/flapping
@@ -34,3 +34,4 @@
^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_tar.* # fails very, very often on sn-devel
^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*.sending a message to the remote server #
flakey on sn-devel-104 and sn-devel-144
^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*.creating a good symlink and deleting it by
path # flakey on sn-devel-104 and sn-devel-144
+^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*follow.symlinks.*no # fails sometimes on
sn-devel
diff --git a/source3/include/auth_info.h b/source3/include/auth_info.h
index c6f71ad..8212c27 100644
--- a/source3/include/auth_info.h
+++ b/source3/include/auth_info.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_from_file(struct user_auth_info
*auth_info,
const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_username(const struct user_auth_info
*auth_info);
void set_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
const char *username);
+void reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info);
const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(const struct user_auth_info
*auth_info);
void set_cmdline_auth_info_domain(struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
const char *domain);
diff --git a/source3/lib/popt_common.c b/source3/lib/popt_common.c
index 9928c70..36b5e92 100644
--- a/source3/lib/popt_common.c
+++ b/source3/lib/popt_common.c
@@ -238,7 +238,6 @@ void popt_common_credentials_set_delay_post(void)
void popt_common_credentials_post(void)
{
struct user_auth_info *auth_info = cmdline_auth_info;
- const char *username = NULL;
if (get_cmdline_auth_info_use_machine_account(auth_info) &&
!set_cmdline_auth_info_machine_account_creds(auth_info))
@@ -259,10 +258,7 @@ void popt_common_credentials_post(void)
* correctly parsed yet. If we have a username we need to set it again
* to run the string parser for the username correctly.
*/
- username = get_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info);
- if (username != NULL && username[0] != '\0') {
- set_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info, username);
- }
+ reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info);
}
static void popt_common_credentials_callback(poptContext con,
diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
index ad51a4f..90ee67c 100644
--- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
+++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
struct user_auth_info {
struct cli_credentials *creds;
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
+ bool got_username;
bool got_pass;
int signing_state;
bool smb_encrypt;
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_from_file(struct user_auth_info
*auth_info,
if (!ok) {
exit(EIO);
}
+ auth_info->got_username = true;
}
const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_username(const struct user_auth_info
*auth_info)
@@ -123,11 +125,38 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info
*auth_info,
exit(ENOMEM);
}
+ auth_info->got_username = true;
if (strchr_m(username, '%') != NULL) {
auth_info->got_pass = true;
}
}
+void reset_cmdline_auth_info_username(struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
+{
+ const char *username = NULL;
+ const char *new_val = NULL;
+
+ if (!auth_info->got_username) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ username = cli_credentials_get_username(auth_info->creds);
+ if (username == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (username[0] == '\0') {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cli_credentials_parse_string(auth_info->creds,
+ username,
+ CRED_SPECIFIED);
+ new_val = cli_credentials_get_username(auth_info->creds);
+ if (new_val == NULL) {
+ exit(ENOMEM);
+ }
+}
+
const char *get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(const struct user_auth_info
*auth_info)
{
const char *domain = NULL;
@@ -236,6 +265,9 @@ void set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state_raw(struct
user_auth_info *auth_info,
int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info)
{
+ if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) {
+ return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
+ }
return auth_info->signing_state;
}
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
index 75012b2..b8edeb6 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include "trans2.h"
#include "libsmb/nmblib.h"
#include "../libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h"
+#include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
/********************************************************************
Important point.
@@ -145,9 +146,6 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
char *servicename;
char *sharename;
char *newserver, *newshare;
- const char *username;
- const char *password;
- const char *domain;
NTSTATUS status;
int flags = 0;
int signing_state = get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info);
@@ -225,21 +223,15 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
smb2cli_conn_set_max_credits(c->conn, DEFAULT_SMB2_MAX_CREDITS);
}
- username = get_cmdline_auth_info_username(auth_info);
- password = get_cmdline_auth_info_password(auth_info);
- domain = get_cmdline_auth_info_domain(auth_info);
- if ((domain == NULL) || (domain[0] == '\0')) {
- domain = lp_workgroup();
- }
-
creds = get_cmdline_auth_info_creds(auth_info);
status = cli_session_setup_creds(c, creds);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* If a password was not supplied then
* try again with a null username. */
- if (password[0] || !username[0] ||
- get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) ||
+ if (force_encrypt || smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) ||
+ cli_credentials_authentication_requested(creds) ||
+ cli_credentials_is_anonymous(creds) ||
!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup_anon(c)))
{
d_printf("session setup failed: %s\n",
@@ -980,7 +972,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
"IPC$",
dfs_auth_info,
false,
- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
0,
0x20,
@@ -1038,7 +1030,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
dfs_refs[count].share,
dfs_auth_info,
false,
- smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn),
+ cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli),
smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn),
0,
0x20,
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
index 2b53a93..e675f95 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c
@@ -334,6 +334,19 @@ uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli)
return cli->smb1.pid;
}
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli)
+{
+ if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
+ return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn);
+ }
+
+ if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon);
+}
+
bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli)
{
uint32_t tid;
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
index ed6ca2b..b55cf1e 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context,
for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) {
num_servers++;
- if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) {
+ if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) {
return (void *)false;
}
}
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
index 44f4d04..e92057d 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h
+++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h
@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ const char *cli_state_remote_realm(struct cli_state *cli);
uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli);
uint32_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t pid);
uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli);
+bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli);
bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli);
uint32_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli);
uint32_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t tid);
diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
index 59c0998..350c6d4 100644
--- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
+++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self,
PyObject *args,
req = cli_full_connection_creds_send(
NULL, self->ev, "myname", host, NULL, 0, share, "?????",
- cli_creds, 0, 0);
+ cli_creds, 0, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT);
if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) {
return -1;
}
diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c
index 82dcbba..a40ff81 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/reply.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c
@@ -4489,6 +4489,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
}
/* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */
+ /*
+ * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163.
+ */
if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) {
reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
error_to_writebrawerr(req);
@@ -4589,6 +4592,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed");
}
+ /*
+ * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163
+ * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite
+ * bytes available - we just read from the client.
+ */
nwritten =
write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite);
if (nwritten == -1) {
TALLOC_FREE(buf);
@@ -4670,6 +4678,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
ssize_t nwritten = -1;
size_t numtowrite;
+ size_t remaining;
off_t startpos;
const char *data;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
@@ -4702,6 +4711,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
+ /*
+ * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than
+ * they sent. CVE-2017-12163.
+ */
+ remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data);
+ if (numtowrite > remaining) {
+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+ END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) {
init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid,
(uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK,
@@ -4783,6 +4803,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
{
connection_struct *conn = req->conn;
size_t numtowrite;
+ size_t remaining;
ssize_t nwritten = -1;
off_t startpos;
const char *data;
@@ -4823,6 +4844,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0);
data = (const char *)req->buf + 3;
--
Samba Shared Repository
