The branch, v4-5-test has been updated via aba4994 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.5.15... via f84484a Merge tag 'samba-4.5.14' into v4-5-test via f261c9a VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOTS for the 4.5.14 release. via bb90fee WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.5.14. via b5178cb selftest: make samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*follow.symlinks.*no as flapping via a43b36f CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from writing server memory to file. via 157f2a7 CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: make use of cli_state_is_encryption_on() via 282a1d1 CVE-2017-12151: s3:libsmb: add cli_state_is_encryption_on() helper function via 609e6b0 CVE-2017-12150: s3:libsmb: only fallback to anonymous if authentication was not requested via f30ea84 CVE-2017-12150: libcli/smb: add smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory() via dc24ef0 CVE-2017-12150: auth/credentials: cli_credentials_authentication_requested() should check for NTLM_CCACHE/SIGN/SEAL via 5d296e6 CVE-2017-12150: libgpo: make use of SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED in gpo_connect_server() via f82c235 CVE-2017-12150: s3:pylibsmb: make use of SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT for 'samba.samba3.libsmb_samba_internal' via f14a94b CVE-2017-12150: s3:lib: get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state smb_encrypt SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED from 5c645ed VERSION: Bump version up to 4.5.14...
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-5-test - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- commit aba4994bd071bdef8c623632ee248cb99d68ed05 Author: Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org> Date: Wed Sep 20 13:03:53 2017 +0200 VERSION: Bump version up to 4.5.15... and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOTS. Signed-off-by: Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org> commit f84484ac9dc52062cefd0ab055670985d394588d Merge: 5c645ed f261c9a Author: Karolin Seeger <ksee...@samba.org> Date: Wed Sep 20 13:03:09 2017 +0200 Merge tag 'samba-4.5.14' into v4-5-test samba: tag release samba-4.5.14 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: VERSION | 2 +- WHATSNEW.txt | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- auth/credentials/credentials.c | 16 +++++++++ libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c | 5 +++ libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h | 1 + libgpo/gpo_fetch.c | 2 +- selftest/flapping | 1 + source3/lib/util_cmdline.c | 3 ++ source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 6 ++-- source3/libsmb/clientgen.c | 13 +++++++ source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c | 2 +- source3/libsmb/proto.h | 1 + source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c | 2 +- source3/smbd/reply.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 14 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) Changeset truncated at 500 lines: diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION index 199992e..e5753d2 100644 --- a/VERSION +++ b/VERSION @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ######################################################## SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4 SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=5 -SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=14 +SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=15 ######################################################## # If a official release has a serious bug # diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt index f3fccf7..ea845c3 100644 --- a/WHATSNEW.txt +++ b/WHATSNEW.txt @@ -1,4 +1,78 @@ ============================== + Release Notes for Samba 4.5.14 + September 20, 2017 + ============================== + + +This is a security release in order to address the following defects: + +o CVE-2017-12150 (SMB1/2/3 connections may not require signing where they + should) +o CVE-2017-12151 (SMB3 connections don't keep encryption across DFS redirects) +o CVE-2017-12163 (Server memory information leak over SMB1) + + +======= +Details +======= + +o CVE-2017-12150: + A man in the middle attack may hijack client connections. + +o CVE-2017-12151: + A man in the middle attack can read and may alter confidential + documents transferred via a client connection, which are reached + via DFS redirect when the original connection used SMB3. + +o CVE-2017-12163: + Client with write access to a share can cause server memory contents to be + written into a file or printer. + +For more details and workarounds, please see the security advisories: + + o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12150.html + o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12151.html + o https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2017-12163.html + + +Changes since 4.5.13: +--------------------- + +o Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org> + * BUG 13020: CVE-2017-12163: s3:smbd: Prevent client short SMB1 write from + writing server memory to file. + +o Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org> + * BUG 12996: CVE-2017-12151: Keep required encryption across SMB3 dfs + redirects. + * BUG 12997: CVE-2017-12150: Some code path don't enforce smb signing + when they should. + + +####################################### +Reporting bugs & Development Discussion +####################################### + +Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by +joining the #samba-technical IRC channel on irc.freenode.net. + +If you do report problems then please try to send high quality +feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down +the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should +be filed under the "Samba 4.1 and newer" product in the project's Bugzilla +database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/). + + +====================================================================== +== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility. +== The Samba Team +====================================================================== + + +Release notes for older releases follow: +---------------------------------------- + + ============================== Release Notes for Samba 4.5.13 August 31, 2017 ============================== @@ -61,8 +135,8 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/). ====================================================================== -Release notes for older releases follow: ----------------------------------------- +---------------------------------------------------------------------- + ============================== Release Notes for Samba 4.5.12 diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.c b/auth/credentials/credentials.c index bfa397c..194b5c2 100644 --- a/auth/credentials/credentials.c +++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "librpc/gen_ndr/samr.h" /* for struct samrPassword */ #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h" #include "auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h" +#include "auth/gensec/gensec.h" #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h" #include "tevent.h" #include "param/param.h" @@ -347,6 +348,8 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_principal_callback(struct cli_credentials *cre _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *cred) { + uint32_t gensec_features = 0; + if (cred->bind_dn) { return true; } @@ -374,6 +377,19 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_authentication_requested(struct cli_credentials *c return true; } + gensec_features = cli_credentials_get_gensec_features(cred); + if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_NTLM_CCACHE) { + return true; + } + + if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SIGN) { + return true; + } + + if (gensec_features & GENSEC_FEATURE_SEAL) { + return true; + } + return false; } diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c index 43294be..9d801c9 100644 --- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c +++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.c @@ -468,6 +468,11 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn) return false; } +bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn) +{ + return conn->mandatory_signing; +} + void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options) { set_socket_options(conn->sock_fd, options); diff --git a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h index 55d3f78..f320500 100644 --- a/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h +++ b/libcli/smb/smbXcli_base.h @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ bool smbXcli_conn_dfs_supported(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); enum protocol_types smbXcli_conn_protocol(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); bool smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); +bool smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); void smbXcli_conn_set_sockopt(struct smbXcli_conn *conn, const char *options); const struct sockaddr_storage *smbXcli_conn_local_sockaddr(struct smbXcli_conn *conn); diff --git a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c index 836bc23..3740d4e 100644 --- a/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c +++ b/libgpo/gpo_fetch.c @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static NTSTATUS gpo_connect_server(ADS_STRUCT *ads, ads->auth.password, CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS | CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_FALLBACK_AFTER_KERBEROS, - Undefined); + SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { DEBUG(10,("check_refresh_gpo: " "failed to connect: %s\n", diff --git a/selftest/flapping b/selftest/flapping index 50fdf1e..8ea36e9 100644 --- a/selftest/flapping +++ b/selftest/flapping @@ -34,3 +34,4 @@ ^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_tar.* # fails very, very often on sn-devel ^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*.sending a message to the remote server # flakey on sn-devel-104 and sn-devel-144 ^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*.creating a good symlink and deleting it by path # flakey on sn-devel-104 and sn-devel-144 +^samba3.blackbox.smbclient_s3.*follow.symlinks.*no # fails sometimes on sn-devel diff --git a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c index 80c3ecd..539fa55 100644 --- a/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c +++ b/source3/lib/util_cmdline.c @@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ bool set_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(struct user_auth_info *auth_info, int get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(const struct user_auth_info *auth_info) { + if (auth_info->smb_encrypt) { + return SMB_SIGNING_REQUIRED; + } return auth_info->signing_state; } diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c index 16b21bd..d9c9e27 100644 --- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c +++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c @@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ static NTSTATUS do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, /* If a password was not supplied then * try again with a null username. */ if (password[0] || !username[0] || + force_encrypt || smbXcli_conn_signing_mandatory(c->conn) || get_cmdline_auth_info_use_kerberos(auth_info) || + get_cmdline_auth_info_use_ccache(auth_info) || !NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status = cli_session_setup(c, "", "", 0, "", 0, @@ -952,7 +954,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, "IPC$", dfs_auth_info, false, - smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn), + cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli), smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn), 0, 0x20, @@ -1010,7 +1012,7 @@ NTSTATUS cli_resolve_path(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, dfs_refs[count].share, dfs_auth_info, false, - smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(rootcli->conn), + cli_state_is_encryption_on(rootcli), smbXcli_conn_protocol(rootcli->conn), 0, 0x20, diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c index 2b53a93..e675f95 100644 --- a/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c +++ b/source3/libsmb/clientgen.c @@ -334,6 +334,19 @@ uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli) return cli->smb1.pid; } +bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli) +{ + if (smbXcli_conn_protocol(cli->conn) < PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) { + return smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(cli->conn); + } + + if (cli->smb2.tcon == NULL) { + return false; + } + + return smb2cli_tcon_is_encryption_on(cli->smb2.tcon); +} + bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli) { uint32_t tid; diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c index a956058..74adade 100644 --- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c +++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_context.c @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ smbc_option_get(SMBCCTX *context, for (s = context->internal->servers; s; s = s->next) { num_servers++; - if (!smb1cli_conn_encryption_on(s->cli->conn)) { + if (!cli_state_is_encryption_on(s->cli)) { return (void *)false; } } diff --git a/source3/libsmb/proto.h b/source3/libsmb/proto.h index 340cd22..f276b74 100644 --- a/source3/libsmb/proto.h +++ b/source3/libsmb/proto.h @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ const char *cli_state_remote_realm(struct cli_state *cli); uint16_t cli_state_get_vc_num(struct cli_state *cli); uint32_t cli_setpid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t pid); uint32_t cli_getpid(struct cli_state *cli); +bool cli_state_is_encryption_on(struct cli_state *cli); bool cli_state_has_tcon(struct cli_state *cli); uint32_t cli_state_get_tid(struct cli_state *cli); uint32_t cli_state_set_tid(struct cli_state *cli, uint32_t tid); diff --git a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c index 0c5d7e9..97aa39e 100644 --- a/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c +++ b/source3/libsmb/pylibsmb.c @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ static int py_cli_state_init(struct py_cli_state *self, PyObject *args, cli_credentials_get_username(cli_creds), cli_credentials_get_domain(cli_creds), cli_credentials_get_password(cli_creds), - 0, 0); + 0, SMB_SIGNING_DEFAULT); if (!py_tevent_req_wait_exc(self->ev, req)) { return -1; } diff --git a/source3/smbd/reply.c b/source3/smbd/reply.c index 82dcbba..a40ff81 100644 --- a/source3/smbd/reply.c +++ b/source3/smbd/reply.c @@ -4489,6 +4489,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req) } /* Ensure we don't write bytes past the end of this packet. */ + /* + * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163. + */ if (data + numtowrite > smb_base(req->inbuf) + smb_len(req->inbuf)) { reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); error_to_writebrawerr(req); @@ -4589,6 +4592,11 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req) exit_server_cleanly("secondary writebraw failed"); } + /* + * We are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-12163 + * here as we are guarenteed to have numtowrite + * bytes available - we just read from the client. + */ nwritten = write_file(req,fsp,buf+4,startpos+nwritten,numtowrite); if (nwritten == -1) { TALLOC_FREE(buf); @@ -4670,6 +4678,7 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req) connection_struct *conn = req->conn; ssize_t nwritten = -1; size_t numtowrite; + size_t remaining; off_t startpos; const char *data; NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK; @@ -4702,6 +4711,17 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req) startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0); data = (const char *)req->buf + 3; + /* + * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than + * they sent. CVE-2017-12163. + */ + remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data); + if (numtowrite > remaining) { + reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock); + return; + } + if (!fsp->print_file && numtowrite > 0) { init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid, (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK, @@ -4783,6 +4803,7 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req) { connection_struct *conn = req->conn; size_t numtowrite; + size_t remaining; ssize_t nwritten = -1; off_t startpos; const char *data; @@ -4823,6 +4844,17 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req) startpos = IVAL_TO_SMB_OFF_T(req->vwv+2, 0); data = (const char *)req->buf + 3; + /* + * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than + * they sent. CVE-2017-12163. + */ + remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data); + if (numtowrite > remaining) { + reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + END_PROFILE(SMBwrite); + return; + } + if (!fsp->print_file) { init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid, (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK, @@ -5049,6 +5081,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req) goto out; } } else { + /* + * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163. + */ if (smb_doff > smblen || smb_doff + numtowrite < numtowrite || smb_doff + numtowrite > smblen) { reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); @@ -5477,6 +5512,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req) { connection_struct *conn = req->conn; size_t numtowrite; + size_t remaining; ssize_t nwritten = -1; NTSTATUS close_status = NT_STATUS_OK; off_t startpos; @@ -5510,6 +5546,17 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req) mtime = convert_time_t_to_timespec(srv_make_unix_date3(req->vwv+4)); data = (const char *)req->buf + 1; + /* + * Ensure client isn't asking us to write more than + * they sent. CVE-2017-12163. + */ + remaining = smbreq_bufrem(req, data); + if (numtowrite > remaining) { + reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose); + return; + } + if (fsp->print_file == NULL) { init_strict_lock_struct(fsp, (uint64_t)req->smbpid, (uint64_t)startpos, (uint64_t)numtowrite, WRITE_LOCK, @@ -6105,6 +6152,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req) numtowrite = SVAL(req->buf, 1); + /* + * This already protects us against CVE-2017-12163. + */ if (req->buflen < numtowrite + 3) { reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr); -- Samba Shared Repository