The branch, v4-14-test has been updated
via 1d181de02de auth/ntlmssp: make sure we return INVALID_PARAMETER for
NTLMv2_RESPONSE parsing errors
via 13ba2002bc1 libcli/auth: let NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds
ignore invalid netapp requests
via 74aca02a8f1 libcli/auth: let NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds
ignore BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
via ab38fec433f s4:torture/rpc: add test for invalid av_pair content in
LogonSamLogonEx
via c51625b4830 auth/credentials: cli_credentials_set_ntlm_response()
pass session_keys
from be1b37e7c6e s3:libsmb: fix signing regression SMBC_server_internal()
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-14-test
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 1d181de02de351c106fbea694a922e39ffbbae63
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Fri Dec 17 23:32:28 2021 +0100
auth/ntlmssp: make sure we return INVALID_PARAMETER for NTLMv2_RESPONSE
parsing errors
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jan 4 20:57:41 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit dd9886100514941aa16af8566faf41501b601a44)
Autobuild-User(v4-14-test): Jule Anger <jan...@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-14-test): Wed Jan 19 09:11:23 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
commit 13ba2002bc1d1407eb71a59dbe9d6bbfa153f249
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Wed Dec 15 17:25:06 2021 +0100
libcli/auth: let NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds ignore invalid
netapp requests
We should avoid spamming the logs with wellknown messages like:
ndr_pull_error(Buffer Size Error): Pull bytes 39016
They just confuse admins (and developers).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 23bedd69b2db0dd6de98ed147eddcba799694de7)
commit 74aca02a8f152cc99c32fb4e371a9db34772a5f7
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Wed Dec 15 17:25:06 2021 +0100
libcli/auth: let NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds ignore
BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
Windows doesn't complain about invalid av_pair blobs,
we need to do the same.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f123c1a171e59113feb688523b499dab0b824528)
commit ab38fec433f42cae11cd6d61a80c40fb57d017c3
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Fri Dec 17 22:28:51 2021 +0100
s4:torture/rpc: add test for invalid av_pair content in LogonSamLogonEx
A netapp diag tool uses a NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE with invalid bytes
as av_pair blob. Which is supposed to be ignored by DCs.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
(similar to commit e7e521fe9b947e553e2bf093e93f1d66ae9c95b9)
commit c51625b48308e3ac5f4e450e748fc17bdd9fb7bf
Author: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Date: Sat Dec 18 10:40:36 2021 +0100
auth/credentials: cli_credentials_set_ntlm_response() pass session_keys
Otherwise cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response() will return session keys
with a 0 length, which leads to errors in the NTLMSSP code.
This wasn't noticed as cli_credentials_set_ntlm_response() has no
callers yet, but that will change in the next commits.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ef1254f4428ab83ab6c8ca5e3415a1a9e069c92)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
auth/credentials/credentials.h | 6 +-
auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h | 2 +
auth/credentials/credentials_ntlm.c | 65 ++++++++--
auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_server.c | 8 ++
libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c | 89 +++++++++++++-
source4/torture/rpc/schannel.c | 209 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 365 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials.h b/auth/credentials/credentials.h
index 1fff37e8154..e1648677fda 100644
--- a/auth/credentials/credentials.h
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials.h
@@ -218,8 +218,10 @@ bool cli_credentials_set_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials
*cred,
bool cli_credentials_set_old_nt_hash(struct cli_credentials *cred,
const struct samr_Password *nt_hash);
bool cli_credentials_set_ntlm_response(struct cli_credentials *cred,
- const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
- const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
+ const DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key,
+ const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ const DATA_BLOB *nt_session_key,
enum credentials_obtained obtained);
int cli_credentials_set_keytab_name(struct cli_credentials *cred,
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h
b/auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h
index 3b86b742448..ef37c9a6eec 100644
--- a/auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials_internal.h
@@ -68,7 +68,9 @@ struct cli_credentials {
/* Allows NTLM pass-though authentication */
DATA_BLOB lm_response;
+ DATA_BLOB lm_session_key;
DATA_BLOB nt_response;
+ DATA_BLOB nt_session_key;
struct ccache_container *ccache;
struct gssapi_creds_container *client_gss_creds;
diff --git a/auth/credentials/credentials_ntlm.c
b/auth/credentials/credentials_ntlm.c
index 1bec60e5dce..5995835e9a1 100644
--- a/auth/credentials/credentials_ntlm.c
+++ b/auth/credentials/credentials_ntlm.c
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ _PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(struct
cli_credentials *cred
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
+ if (cred->nt_session_key.length != 0) {
+ session_key = data_blob_dup_talloc(frame,
+
cred->nt_session_key);
+ if (session_key.data == NULL) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ }
if (cred->lm_response.length != 0) {
lm_response = data_blob_dup_talloc(frame,
cred->lm_response);
@@ -77,6 +85,14 @@ _PUBLIC_ NTSTATUS cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(struct
cli_credentials *cred
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
}
+ if (cred->lm_session_key.length != 0) {
+ lm_session_key = data_blob_dup_talloc(frame,
+
cred->lm_session_key);
+ if (lm_session_key.data == NULL) {
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ }
if (cred->lm_response.data == NULL) {
*flags = *flags & ~CLI_CRED_LANMAN_AUTH;
@@ -483,19 +499,54 @@ _PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_old_nt_hash(struct
cli_credentials *cred,
}
_PUBLIC_ bool cli_credentials_set_ntlm_response(struct cli_credentials *cred,
- const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
- const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ const DATA_BLOB *lm_response,
+ const DATA_BLOB *lm_session_key,
+ const DATA_BLOB *nt_response,
+ const DATA_BLOB *nt_session_key,
enum credentials_obtained
obtained)
{
if (obtained >= cred->password_obtained) {
cli_credentials_set_password(cred, NULL, obtained);
- if (nt_response) {
- cred->nt_response = data_blob_talloc(cred,
nt_response->data, nt_response->length);
- talloc_steal(cred, cred->nt_response.data);
+
+ data_blob_clear_free(&cred->lm_response);
+ data_blob_clear_free(&cred->lm_session_key);
+ data_blob_clear_free(&cred->nt_response);
+ data_blob_clear_free(&cred->nt_session_key);
+
+ if (lm_response != NULL && lm_response->length != 0) {
+ cred->lm_response = data_blob_talloc(cred,
+ lm_response->data,
+ lm_response->length);
+ if (cred->lm_response.data == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
}
- if (nt_response) {
- cred->lm_response = data_blob_talloc(cred,
lm_response->data, lm_response->length);
+ if (lm_session_key != NULL && lm_session_key->length != 0) {
+ cred->lm_session_key = data_blob_talloc(cred,
+ lm_session_key->data,
+ lm_session_key->length);
+ if (cred->lm_session_key.data == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
}
+
+ if (nt_response != NULL && nt_response->length != 0) {
+ cred->nt_response = data_blob_talloc(cred,
+ nt_response->data,
+ nt_response->length);
+ if (cred->nt_response.data == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ if (nt_session_key != NULL && nt_session_key->length != 0) {
+ cred->nt_session_key = data_blob_talloc(cred,
+ nt_session_key->data,
+ nt_session_key->length);
+ if (cred->nt_session_key.data == NULL) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
return true;
}
diff --git a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_server.c b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_server.c
index 939aa0ef4aa..ce78af1d32d 100644
--- a/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_server.c
+++ b/auth/ntlmssp/ntlmssp_server.c
@@ -532,6 +532,14 @@ static NTSTATUS ntlmssp_server_preauth(struct
gensec_security *gensec_security,
(ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_NTLMv2_RESPONSE);
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(err);
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status,
NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {
+ /*
+ * Note that invalid blobs should result in
+ * INVALID_PARAMETER, as demonstrated by
+ * smb2.session.ntlmssp_bug14932
+ */
+ nt_status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ }
DEBUG(1,("%s: failed to parse NTLMv2_RESPONSE of length
%zu for "
"user=[%s] domain=[%s] workstation=[%s] - %s
%s\n",
__func__, ntlmssp_state->nt_resp.length,
diff --git a/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
index 468374699f7..fe20fe4e2a3 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
+++ b/libcli/auth/smbencrypt.c
@@ -675,6 +675,69 @@ NTSTATUS NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds(const char
*account_name,
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
+ if (response.length == 95) {
+ /*
+ * ndr_pull_NTLMv2_RESPONSE() fails on this strange blob,
+ * because the AvPairs content is not valid
+ * as AvLen of the first pair is 33032 (0x8108).
+ *
+ * I saw a single machine sending the following 3 times
+ * in a row, but I'm not sure if everything is static.
+ *
+ * Note this is NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE only, not
+ * the full NTLMv2_RESPONSE (which has Response of 16 bytes
+ * before the NTLMv2_CLIENT_CHALLENGE).
+ *
+ * Note this code only prevents
+ * ndr_pull_error(Buffer Size Error): Pull bytes 39016
+ * debug message for a known case, the actual
+ * bug is also handled below in a generic way to
+ * map NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL to NT_STATUS_OK.
+ *
+ * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
+ */
+ static const char *netapp_magic =
+ "\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f"
+ "\xb8\x82\x3a\xf1\xb3\xdd\x08\x15"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x11\xa2\x08\x81"
+ "\x50\x38\x22\x78\x2b\x94\x47\xfe"
+ "\x54\x94\x7b\xff\x17\x27\x5a\xb4"
+ "\xf4\x18\xba\xdc\x2c\x38\xfd\x5b"
+ "\xfb\x0e\xc1\x85\x1e\xcc\x92\xbb"
+ "\x9b\xb1\xc4\xd5\x53\x14\xff\x8c"
+ "\x76\x49\xf5\x45\x90\x19\xa2";
+ /*
+ * First we check the initial bytes
+ * and the 0x3F timestamp.
+ */
+ cmp = memcmp(response.data + 16,
+ netapp_magic,
+ 16);
+ if (cmp == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Then check everything after the
+ * client challenge
+ */
+ cmp = memcmp(response.data + 40,
+ netapp_magic + 24,
+ response.length - 40);
+ if (cmp == 0) {
+ DBG_DEBUG("Invalid NETAPP NTLMv2_RESPONSE "
+ "for user[%s\\%s] against "
+ "SEC_CHAN(%u)[%s/%s] "
+ "in workgroup[%s]\n",
+ account_domain,
+ account_name,
+ creds->secure_channel_type,
+ creds->computer_name,
+ creds->account_name,
+ workgroup);
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
frame = talloc_stackframe();
err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&response, frame, &v2_resp,
@@ -682,11 +745,27 @@ NTSTATUS NTLMv2_RESPONSE_verify_netlogon_creds(const char
*account_name,
if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(err)) {
NTSTATUS status;
status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(err);
- DEBUG(2,("Failed to parse NTLMv2_RESPONSE "
- "length %u - %s - %s\n",
- (unsigned)response.length,
- ndr_map_error2string(err),
- nt_errstr(status)));
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {
+ /*
+ * We are supposed to ignore invalid buffers,
+ * see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
+ */
+ status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ DEBUG(2,("%s: Failed to parse NTLMv2_RESPONSE length=%u "
+ "for user[%s\\%s] against SEC_CHAN(%u)[%s/%s] "
+ "in workgroup[%s] - %s %s %s\n",
+ __func__,
+ (unsigned)response.length,
+ account_domain,
+ account_name,
+ creds->secure_channel_type,
+ creds->computer_name,
+ creds->account_name,
+ workgroup,
+ ndr_map_error2string(err),
+ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) ? "(ignoring) =>" : "=>",
+ nt_errstr(status)));
dump_data(2, response.data, response.length);
TALLOC_FREE(frame);
return status;
diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/schannel.c b/source4/torture/rpc/schannel.c
index 08a5120b66d..a3c1766cfa2 100644
--- a/source4/torture/rpc/schannel.c
+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/schannel.c
@@ -241,6 +241,211 @@ bool test_netlogon_ex_ops(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, struct
torture_context *tctx,
return true;
}
+static bool test_netlogon_ex_bug14932(struct dcerpc_pipe *p,
+ struct torture_context *tctx,
+ struct cli_credentials *credentials,
+ struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState
*creds)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct netr_LogonSamLogonEx r;
+ struct netr_NetworkInfo ninfo;
+ union netr_LogonLevel logon;
+ union netr_Validation validation;
+ uint8_t authoritative = 1;
+ uint32_t _flags = 0;
+ static const char *netapp_magic =
+ "\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+ "\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f\x3f"
+ "\xb8\x82\x3a\xf1\xb3\xdd\x08\x15"
+ "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x11\xa2\x08\x81"
+ "\x50\x38\x22\x78\x2b\x94\x47\xfe"
+ "\x54\x94\x7b\xff\x17\x27\x5a\xb4"
+ "\xf4\x18\xba\xdc\x2c\x38\xfd\x5b"
+ "\xfb\x0e\xc1\x85\x1e\xcc\x92\xbb"
+ "\x9b\xb1\xc4\xd5\x53\x14\xff\x8c"
+ "\x76\x49\xf5\x45\x90\x19\xa2";
+ NTTIME timestamp = BVAL(netapp_magic, 8);
+ DATA_BLOB names_blob = data_blob_string_const(netapp_magic + 28);
+ DATA_BLOB chal, lm_resp, nt_resp;
+ int i;
+ int flags = CLI_CRED_NTLM_AUTH;
+ struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
+ struct netr_UserSessionKey key;
+ struct netr_LMSessionKey LMSessKey;
+ uint32_t validation_levels[] = { 2, 3 };
+ struct netr_SamBaseInfo *base = NULL;
+ const char *crypto_alg = "";
+ bool can_do_validation_6 = true;
+ enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level = DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_NONE;
+
+ flags |= CLI_CRED_NTLMv2_AUTH;
+
+ cli_credentials_get_ntlm_username_domain(popt_get_cmdline_credentials(),
+ tctx,
+ &ninfo.identity_info.account_name.string,
+ &ninfo.identity_info.domain_name.string);
+
+ generate_random_buffer(ninfo.challenge,
+ sizeof(ninfo.challenge));
+
+ chal = data_blob_const(ninfo.challenge,
+ sizeof(ninfo.challenge));
+
+ status = cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response(
+ popt_get_cmdline_credentials(),
+ tctx,
+ &flags,
+ chal,
+ ×tamp,
+ names_blob,
+ &lm_resp, &nt_resp,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, status,
+ "cli_credentials_get_ntlm_response failed");
+
+ ninfo.lm.data = lm_resp.data;
+ ninfo.lm.length = lm_resp.length;
+
+ ninfo.nt.data = nt_resp.data;
+ ninfo.nt.length = nt_resp.length;
+
+ ninfo.identity_info.parameter_control = 0;
+ ninfo.identity_info.logon_id = 0;
+ ninfo.identity_info.workstation.string =
cli_credentials_get_workstation(credentials);
+
+ logon.network = &ninfo;
+
+ r.in.server_name = talloc_asprintf(tctx, "\\\\%s",
dcerpc_server_name(p));
+ r.in.computer_name = cli_credentials_get_workstation(credentials);
+ r.in.logon_level = NetlogonNetworkInformation;
+ r.in.logon= &logon;
+ r.in.flags = &_flags;
+ r.out.validation = &validation;
+ r.out.authoritative = &authoritative;
+ r.out.flags = &_flags;
+
+ /*
+ - retrieve level6
+ - save usrsession and lmsession key
+ - retrieve level 2
+ - calculate, compare
+ - retrieve level 3
+ - calculate, compare
+ */
+
+ if (creds != NULL) {
+ if (creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
+ crypto_alg = "AES";
+ } else if (creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_ARCFOUR) {
+ crypto_alg = "ARCFOUR";
+ }
+ }
+
+ dcerpc_binding_handle_auth_info(b, NULL, &auth_level);
+ if (auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+ r.in.validation_level = 6;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx,
+ "Testing LogonSamLogonEx with name %s using %s
and validation_level: %d\n",
+ ninfo.identity_info.account_name.string,
crypto_alg,
+ r.in.validation_level);
+
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
+ dcerpc_netr_LogonSamLogonEx_r(b, tctx, &r),
+ "LogonSamLogonEx failed");
+ } else {
+ torture_comment(tctx,
+ "Skip auth_level[%u] Testing LogonSamLogonEx
with name %s using %s and validation_level: %d\n",
+ auth_level,
ninfo.identity_info.account_name.string, crypto_alg,
+ r.in.validation_level);
+ r.out.result = NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS;
+ }
+
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(r.out.result, NT_STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS)) {
+ can_do_validation_6 = false;
+ } else {
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, r.out.result,
+ "LogonSamLogonEx failed");
+
+ key = r.out.validation->sam6->base.key;
+ LMSessKey = r.out.validation->sam6->base.LMSessKey;
+
+ DEBUG(1,("unencrypted session keys from validation_level
6:\n"));
+ dump_data(1, r.out.validation->sam6->base.key.key, 16);
+ dump_data(1, r.out.validation->sam6->base.LMSessKey.key, 8);
+ }
+
+ for (i=0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(validation_levels); i++) {
+
+ r.in.validation_level = validation_levels[i];
+
+ torture_comment(tctx,
+ "Testing LogonSamLogonEx with name %s using %s and
validation_level: %d\n",
+ ninfo.identity_info.account_name.string, crypto_alg,
+ r.in.validation_level);
+
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx,
+ dcerpc_netr_LogonSamLogonEx_r(b, tctx, &r),
+ "LogonSamLogonEx failed");
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, r.out.result,
+ "LogonSamLogonEx failed");
+
+ if (creds == NULL) {
+ /* when this test is called without creds no point in
+ * testing the session keys */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ switch (validation_levels[i]) {
+ case 2:
+ base = &r.out.validation->sam2->base;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ base = &r.out.validation->sam3->base;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(1,("encrypted keys validation_level %d:\n",
+ validation_levels[i]));
+ dump_data(1, base->key.key, 16);
+ dump_data(1, base->LMSessKey.key, 8);
+
+ if (creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
+ netlogon_creds_aes_decrypt(creds, base->key.key, 16);
+ netlogon_creds_aes_decrypt(creds, base->LMSessKey.key,
8);
+ } else if (creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_ARCFOUR) {
+ netlogon_creds_arcfour_crypt(creds, base->key.key, 16);
+ netlogon_creds_arcfour_crypt(creds,
base->LMSessKey.key, 8);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(1,("decryped keys validation_level %d\n",
+ validation_levels[i]));
+
+ dump_data(1, base->key.key, 16);
+ dump_data(1, base->LMSessKey.key, 8);
+
+ if (!can_do_validation_6) {
+ /* we cant compare against unencrypted keys */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ torture_assert_mem_equal(tctx,
+ base->key.key,
+ key.key,
+ 16,
+ "unexpected user session key\n");
+ torture_assert_mem_equal(tctx,
+ base->LMSessKey.key,
+ LMSessKey.key,
+ 8,
+ "unexpected LM session key\n");
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/*
do some samr ops using the schannel connection
*/
@@ -436,6 +641,10 @@ static bool test_schannel(struct torture_context *tctx,
torture_assert(tctx, test_netlogon_ex_ops(p_netlogon, tctx,
credentials, creds),
"Failed to process schannel secured NETLOGON EX ops");
+ /* regression test for https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14932
*/
+ torture_assert(tctx, test_netlogon_ex_bug14932(p_netlogon, tctx,
credentials, creds),
+ "Failed to process schannel secured NETLOGON EX for BUG
14932");
+
/* we *MUST* use ncacn_np for openpolicy etc. */
transport = dcerpc_binding_get_transport(b);
status = dcerpc_binding_set_transport(b, NCACN_NP);
--
Samba Shared Repository
