The branch, v4-15-test has been updated
via 0b4f495e810 VERSION: Bump version up to Samba 4.15.13...
via b86b889c522 VERSION: Disable GIT_SNAPSHOT for the 4.15.12 release.
via e5b3def0534 WHATSNEW: Add release notes for Samba 4.15.12.
via a3816433ae9 CVE-2022-42898 source4/heimdal: PAC parse integer
overflows
via 9c909c57ce7 CVE-2022-42898 source4/heimdal: Round #2 of scan-build
warnings cleanup
via f792d3e3906 CVE-2022-42898 source4/heimdal: Add
krb5_ret/store_[u]int64()
via 8369aee33a0 CVE-2022-42898 source4/heimdal: Add bswap64()
from 1e557547523 VERSION: Bump version up to Samba 4.15.12...
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=v4-15-test
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 0b4f495e81010bafa5b94553f1f8cfbfe57adc1e
Author: Jule Anger <jan...@samba.org>
Date: Tue Nov 15 17:02:07 2022 +0100
VERSION: Bump version up to Samba 4.15.13...
and re-enable GIT_SNAPSHOT.
Signed-off-by: Jule Anger <jan...@samba.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
VERSION | 2 +-
WHATSNEW.txt | 49 ++-
source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c | 583 ++++++++++++++++++---------
source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/store-int.c | 13 +-
source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/store.c | 133 +++++-
source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/version-script.map | 4 +
source4/heimdal/lib/roken/bswap.c | 17 +
source4/heimdal/lib/roken/roken.h.in | 5 +
source4/heimdal/lib/roken/version-script.map | 1 +
9 files changed, 589 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-)
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 1a5355b8a03..85392db92a0 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
########################################################
SAMBA_VERSION_MAJOR=4
SAMBA_VERSION_MINOR=15
-SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=12
+SAMBA_VERSION_RELEASE=13
########################################################
# If a official release has a serious bug #
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index b62e20cbc53..4c2a4bd596f 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,3 +1,49 @@
+ ===============================
+ Release Notes for Samba 4.15.12
+ November 15, 2022
+ ===============================
+
+
+This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
+
+o CVE-2022-42898: Samba's Kerberos libraries and AD DC failed to guard against
+ integer overflows when parsing a PAC on a 32-bit system,
which
+ allowed an attacker with a forged PAC to corrupt the heap.
+ https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2022-42898.html
+
+Changes since 4.15.11
+---------------------
+o Joseph Sutton <josephsut...@catalyst.net.nz>
+ * BUG 15203: CVE-2022-42898
+
+o Nicolas Williams <n...@twosigma.com>
+ * BUG 15203: CVE-2022-42898
+
+
+#######################################
+Reporting bugs & Development Discussion
+#######################################
+
+Please discuss this release on the samba-technical mailing list or by
+joining the #samba-technical:matrix.org matrix room, or
+#samba-technical IRC channel on irc.libera.chat.
+
+
+If you do report problems then please try to send high quality
+feedback. If you don't provide vital information to help us track down
+the problem then you will probably be ignored. All bug reports should
+be filed under the Samba 4.1 and newer product in the project's Bugzilla
+database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
+
+
+======================================================================
+== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
+== The Samba Team
+======================================================================
+
+
+Release notes for older releases follow:
+----------------------------------------
===============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.15.11
October 25, 2022
@@ -47,8 +93,7 @@ database (https://bugzilla.samba.org/).
======================================================================
-Release notes for older releases follow:
-----------------------------------------
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
===============================
Release Notes for Samba 4.15.10
September 28, 2022
diff --git a/source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c b/source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c
index 100de904662..0641c0c57bc 100644
--- a/source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c
+++ b/source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/pac.c
@@ -34,19 +34,34 @@
#include "krb5_locl.h"
#include <wind.h>
+/*
+ *
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-pac/3341cfa2-6ef5-42e0-b7bc-4544884bf399
+ */
struct PAC_INFO_BUFFER {
- uint32_t type;
- uint32_t buffersize;
- uint32_t offset_hi;
- uint32_t offset_lo;
+ uint32_t type; /* ULONG ulType in the original */
+ uint32_t buffersize; /* ULONG cbBufferSize in the original */
+ uint64_t offset; /* ULONG64 Offset in the original
+ * this being the offset from the beginning of the
+ * struct PACTYPE to the beginning of the buffer
+ * containing data of type ulType
+ */
};
+/*
+ *
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-pac/6655b92f-ab06-490b-845d-037e6987275f
+ */
struct PACTYPE {
- uint32_t numbuffers;
- uint32_t version;
- struct PAC_INFO_BUFFER buffers[1];
+ uint32_t numbuffers; /* named cBuffers of type ULONG in the original */
+ uint32_t version; /* Named Version of type ULONG in the original */
+ struct PAC_INFO_BUFFER buffers[1]; /* an ellipsis (...) in the original */
};
+/*
+ * A PAC starts with a PACTYPE header structure that is followed by an array of
+ * numbuffers PAC_INFO_BUFFER structures, each of which points to a buffer
+ * beyond the last PAC_INFO_BUFFER structures.
+ */
+
struct krb5_pac_data {
struct PACTYPE *pac;
krb5_data data;
@@ -80,6 +95,60 @@ struct krb5_pac_data {
static const char zeros[PAC_ALIGNMENT] = { 0 };
+/*
+ * Returns the size of the PACTYPE header + the PAC_INFO_BUFFER array. This is
+ * also the end of the whole thing, and any offsets to buffers from
+ * thePAC_INFO_BUFFER[] entries have to be beyond it.
+ */
+static krb5_error_code
+pac_header_size(krb5_context context, uint32_t num_buffers, uint32_t *result)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ uint32_t header_size;
+
+ /* Guard against integer overflow */
+ if (num_buffers > UINT32_MAX / PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE) {
+ ret = EOVERFLOW;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "PAC has too many buffers");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ header_size = PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * num_buffers;
+
+ /* Guard against integer overflow */
+ if (header_size > UINT32_MAX - PACTYPE_SIZE) {
+ ret = EOVERFLOW;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "PAC has too many buffers");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ header_size += PACTYPE_SIZE;
+
+ *result = header_size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Output `size' + `addend' + padding for alignment if it doesn't overflow */
+static krb5_error_code
+pac_aligned_size(krb5_context context,
+ uint32_t size,
+ uint32_t addend,
+ uint32_t *aligned_size)
+{
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+
+ if (size > UINT32_MAX - addend ||
+ (size + addend) > UINT32_MAX - (PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1)) {
+ ret = EOVERFLOW;
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ size += addend;
+ size += PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1;
+ size &= ~(PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1);
+ *aligned_size = size;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* HMAC-MD5 checksum over any key (needed for the PAC routines)
*/
@@ -125,149 +194,150 @@ KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
krb5_pac_parse(krb5_context context, const void *ptr, size_t len,
krb5_pac *pac)
{
- krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_pac p;
krb5_storage *sp = NULL;
- uint32_t i, tmp, tmp2, header_end;
+ uint32_t i, num_buffers, version, header_size = 0;
+ uint32_t prev_start = 0;
+ uint32_t prev_end = 0;
+ *pac = NULL;
p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
- if (p == NULL) {
- ret = krb5_enomem(context);
- goto out;
- }
-
- sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem(ptr, len);
- if (sp == NULL) {
+ if (p)
+ sp = krb5_storage_from_readonly_mem(ptr, len);
+ if (sp == NULL)
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
- goto out;
- }
- krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE);
-
- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &tmp), out);
- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &tmp2), out);
- if (tmp < 1) {
- ret = EINVAL; /* Too few buffers */
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, N_("PAC has too few buffers", ""));
- goto out;
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE);
+ ret = krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &num_buffers);
}
- if (tmp2 != 0) {
- ret = EINVAL; /* Wrong version */
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &version);
+ if (ret == 0 && num_buffers < 1)
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
+ N_("PAC has too few buffers", ""));
+ if (ret == 0 && num_buffers > 1000)
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
+ N_("PAC has too many buffers", ""));
+ if (ret == 0 && version != 0)
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
N_("PAC has wrong version %d", ""),
- (int)tmp2);
- goto out;
- }
-
- p->pac = calloc(1,
- sizeof(*p->pac) + (sizeof(p->pac->buffers[0]) * (tmp - 1)));
- if (p->pac == NULL) {
+ (int)version);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = pac_header_size(context, num_buffers, &header_size);
+ if (ret == 0 && header_size > len)
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EOVERFLOW,
+ N_("PAC encoding invalid, would overflow
buffers", ""));
+ if (ret == 0)
+ p->pac = calloc(1, header_size);
+ if (ret == 0 && p->pac == NULL)
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
- goto out;
- }
- p->pac->numbuffers = tmp;
- p->pac->version = tmp2;
-
- header_end = PACTYPE_SIZE + (PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * p->pac->numbuffers);
- if (header_end > len) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- goto out;
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ p->pac->numbuffers = num_buffers;
+ p->pac->version = version;
}
- for (i = 0; i < p->pac->numbuffers; i++) {
- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].type), out);
- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize), out);
- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo), out);
- CHECK(ret, krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].offset_hi), out);
+ for (i = 0; ret == 0 && i < p->pac->numbuffers; i++) {
+ ret = krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].type);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = krb5_ret_uint32(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = krb5_ret_uint64(sp, &p->pac->buffers[i].offset);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
- /* consistency checks */
- if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo & (PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1)) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ /* Consistency checks (we don't check for wasted space) */
+ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset & (PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1)) {
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
N_("PAC out of alignment", ""));
- goto out;
- }
- if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset_hi) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
- N_("PAC high offset set", ""));
- goto out;
+ break;
}
- if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo > len) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
- N_("PAC offset overflow", ""));
- goto out;
+ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset > len ||
+ p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize > len ||
+ len - p->pac->buffers[i].offset < p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize) {
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EOVERFLOW,
+ N_("PAC buffer overflow", ""));
+ break;
}
- if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo < header_end) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset < header_size) {
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
N_("PAC offset inside header: %lu %lu", ""),
- (unsigned long)p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo,
- (unsigned long)header_end);
- goto out;
- }
- if (p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize > len - p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo){
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, N_("PAC length overflow", ""));
- goto out;
+ (unsigned long)p->pac->buffers[i].offset,
+ (unsigned long)header_size);
+ break;
}
- /* let save pointer to data we need later */
- if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM) {
- if (p->server_checksum) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ /*
+ * We'd like to check for non-overlapping of buffers, but the buffers
+ * need not be in the same order as the PAC_INFO_BUFFER[] entries
+ * pointing to them! To fully check for overlap we'd have to have an
+ * O(N^2) loop after we parse all the PAC_INFO_BUFFER[].
+ *
+ * But we can check that each buffer does not overlap the previous
+ * buffer.
+ */
+ if (prev_start) {
+ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset >= prev_start &&
+ p->pac->buffers[i].offset < prev_end) {
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
+ N_("PAC overlap", ""));
+ break;
+ }
+ if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset < prev_start &&
+ p->pac->buffers[i].offset +
+ p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize > prev_start) {
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
+ N_("PAC overlap", ""));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ prev_start = p->pac->buffers[i].offset;
+ prev_end = p->pac->buffers[i].offset + p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize;
+
+ /* Let's save pointers to buffers we'll need later */
+ switch (p->pac->buffers[i].type) {
+ case PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM:
+ if (p->server_checksum)
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
N_("PAC has multiple server checksums",
""));
- goto out;
- }
- p->server_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i];
- } else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM) {
- if (p->privsvr_checksum) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
- N_("PAC has multiple KDC checksums",
""));
- goto out;
- }
- p->privsvr_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i];
- } else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_LOGON_NAME) {
- if (p->logon_name) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
- N_("PAC has multiple logon names", ""));
- goto out;
- }
- p->logon_name = &p->pac->buffers[i];
- } else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM) {
- if (p->ticket_checksum) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
+ else
+ p->server_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i];
+ break;
+ case PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM:
+ if (p->privsvr_checksum)
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
+ N_("PAC has multiple KDC checksums",
""));
+ else
+ p->privsvr_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i];
+ break;
+ case PAC_LOGON_NAME:
+ if (p->logon_name)
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
+ N_("PAC has multiple logon names", ""));
+ else
+ p->logon_name = &p->pac->buffers[i];
+ break;
+ case PAC_TICKET_CHECKSUM:
+ if (p->ticket_checksum)
+ krb5_set_error_message(context, ret = EINVAL,
N_("PAC has multiple ticket checksums",
""));
- goto out;
- }
- p->ticket_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i];
- }
+ else
+ p->ticket_checksum = &p->pac->buffers[i];
+ break;
+ default: break;
+ }
}
- ret = krb5_data_copy(&p->data, ptr, len);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
-
- krb5_storage_free(sp);
-
- *pac = p;
- return 0;
-
-out:
- if (sp)
- krb5_storage_free(sp);
- if (p) {
- if (p->pac)
- free(p->pac);
- free(p);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = krb5_data_copy(&p->data, ptr, len);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ *pac = p;
+ p = NULL;
}
- *pac = NULL;
-
+ if (sp)
+ krb5_storage_free(sp);
+ krb5_pac_free(context, p);
return ret;
}
@@ -294,75 +364,109 @@ krb5_pac_init(krb5_context context, krb5_pac *pac)
free(p);
return krb5_enomem(context);
}
+ memset(p->data.data, 0, p->data.length);
*pac = p;
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * Add a PAC buffer `nd' of type `type' to the pac `p'.
+ *
+ * @param context
+ * @param p
+ * @param type
+ * @param nd
+ *
+ * @return 0 on success or a Kerberos or system error.
+ */
KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
krb5_pac_add_buffer(krb5_context context, krb5_pac p,
- uint32_t type, const krb5_data *data)
+ uint32_t type, const krb5_data *nd)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
void *ptr;
- size_t len, offset, header_end, old_end;
+ size_t old_len = p->data.length;
+ uint32_t len, offset, header_size;
uint32_t i;
+ uint32_t num_buffers;
- len = p->pac->numbuffers;
+ num_buffers = p->pac->numbuffers;
+ ret = pac_header_size(context, num_buffers + 1, &header_size);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
- ptr = realloc(p->pac,
- sizeof(*p->pac) + (sizeof(p->pac->buffers[0]) * len));
+ ptr = realloc(p->pac, header_size);
if (ptr == NULL)
return krb5_enomem(context);
--
Samba Shared Repository
