The branch, master has been updated
via 56837f3d316 CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: Avoid
unnecessary loadparm_context allocations
via 02fba22b8c9 CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: The "server
schannel require seal[:COMPUTERACCOUNT]" options are also honoured by s3
netlogon server.
via a0b97e26231 CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: Check for global
"server schannel require seal"
via ca07f4340ce CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: make sure all
_netr_LogonSamLogon*() calls go through dcesrv_netr_check_schannel()
via 25300d354c8 CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: Use
dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()
via 121e7b0e394 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: Move schannel
and credentials check functions to librpc
via d9e6b490db3 CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server:wscript: Reformat
following pycodestyle
via 3cd18690f83 CVE-2022-38023 selftest:Samba3: avoid global 'server
schannel = auto'
via 8141eae47aa CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: 'server schannel
!= yes' warning to dcesrv_interface_netlogon_bind
from 7779050a676 source3/wscript: Remove implicit int and implicit
function declarations
https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=shortlog;h=master
- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 56837f3d3169a02d0d92bd085d9c8250415ce29b
Author: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@suse.de>
Date: Thu Dec 22 16:32:40 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: Avoid unnecessary loadparm_context
allocations
After s3 and s4 rpc servers merge the loadparm_context is available in
the dcesrv_context structure.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <a...@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 9 15:17:14 UTC 2023 on sn-devel-184
commit 02fba22b8c9e9b33ab430555ef45500c45eaa9d1
Author: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Date: Mon Jan 9 12:17:48 2023 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 docs-xml/smbdotconf: The "server schannel require
seal[:COMPUTERACCOUNT]" options are also honoured by s3 netlogon server.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
commit a0b97e262318dc56fe663da89b0ee3172b2e7848
Author: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@suse.de>
Date: Thu Dec 22 11:05:33 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: Check for global "server schannel
require seal"
By default we'll now require schannel connections with
privacy/sealing/encryption.
But we allow exceptions for specific computer/trust accounts.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
commit ca07f4340ce58a7e940a1123888b7409176412f7
Author: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@suse.de>
Date: Thu Dec 22 09:29:04 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: make sure all _netr_LogonSamLogon*()
calls go through dcesrv_netr_check_schannel()
Some checks are also required for _netr_LogonSamLogonEx().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
commit 25300d354c80995997d552581cd91dddaf4bbf48
Author: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@suse.de>
Date: Thu Dec 22 16:30:26 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: Use
dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()
After s3 and s4 rpc servers merge we can avoid duplicated code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
commit 121e7b0e39478c5291100652ac92c263f406076b
Author: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@suse.de>
Date: Thu Dec 22 14:03:23 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: Move schannel and credentials check
functions to librpc
Will be used later by s3 netlogon server.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
commit d9e6b490db3ead7e79bb3ff0c1f9ef8ab8bdc65b
Author: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Date: Thu Jan 5 18:13:09 2023 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s4:rpc_server:wscript: Reformat following pycodestyle
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
commit 3cd18690f83d2f85e847fc703ac127b4b04189fc
Author: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@suse.de>
Date: Thu Dec 22 16:46:15 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 selftest:Samba3: avoid global 'server schannel = auto'
Instead of using the generic deprecated option use the specific
server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no in order to allow
legacy tests for pass.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
commit 8141eae47aad849741beb138fae866c772e4ec4c
Author: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@suse.de>
Date: Wed Dec 21 15:53:04 2022 +0100
CVE-2022-38023 s3:rpc_server/netlogon: 'server schannel != yes' warning to
dcesrv_interface_netlogon_bind
Follow s4 netlogon server changes and move the checks to the RPC bind
hook. Next commits will remove the s3 netr_creds_server_step_check()
function.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabr...@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
.../security/serverschannelrequireseal.xml | 5 +-
librpc/rpc/server/netlogon/schannel_util.c | 570 +++++++++++++++++++++
librpc/rpc/server/netlogon/schannel_util.h | 54 ++
librpc/wscript_build | 12 +
selftest/target/Samba3.pm | 30 +-
source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 318 ++++--------
source3/rpc_server/wscript_build | 2 +-
source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 546 +-------------------
source4/rpc_server/wscript_build | 292 ++++++-----
9 files changed, 951 insertions(+), 878 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 librpc/rpc/server/netlogon/schannel_util.c
create mode 100644 librpc/rpc/server/netlogon/schannel_util.h
Changeset truncated at 500 lines:
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannelrequireseal.xml
b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannelrequireseal.xml
index d4620d1252d..0bec67d2519 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannelrequireseal.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannelrequireseal.xml
@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@
</para>
<para>
- This option controls whether the netlogon server (currently
- only in 'active directory domain controller' mode), will
- reject the usage of netlogon secure channel without privacy/enryption.
+ This option controls whether the netlogon server, will reject the usage
+ of netlogon secure channel without privacy/enryption.
</para>
<para>
diff --git a/librpc/rpc/server/netlogon/schannel_util.c
b/librpc/rpc/server/netlogon/schannel_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b14497b13ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/librpc/rpc/server/netlogon/schannel_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,570 @@
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+
+ netlogon schannel utility functions
+
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abart...@samba.org> 2004-2008
+ Copyright (C) Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org> 2005
+ Copyright (C) Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer 2009-2010
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "schannel_util.h"
+#include "param/param.h"
+#include "libcli/security/dom_sid.h"
+#include "libcli/auth/schannel.h"
+#include "librpc/rpc/dcesrv_core.h"
+#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_netlogon.h"
+#include "lib/util/util_str_escape.h"
+
+struct dcesrv_netr_check_schannel_state {
+ struct dom_sid account_sid;
+ enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type;
+ enum dcerpc_AuthLevel auth_level;
+
+ bool schannel_global_required;
+ bool schannel_required;
+ bool schannel_explicitly_set;
+
+ bool seal_global_required;
+ bool seal_required;
+ bool seal_explicitly_set;
+
+ NTSTATUS result;
+};
+
+static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_check_schannel_get_state(struct dcesrv_call_state
*dce_call,
+ const struct
netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ enum dcerpc_AuthType
auth_type,
+ enum dcerpc_AuthLevel
auth_level,
+ struct
dcesrv_netr_check_schannel_state **_s)
+{
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx;
+ int schannel = lpcfg_server_schannel(lp_ctx);
+ bool schannel_global_required = (schannel == true);
+ bool schannel_required = schannel_global_required;
+ const char *explicit_opt = NULL;
+ bool global_require_seal = lpcfg_server_schannel_require_seal(lp_ctx);
+ bool require_seal = global_require_seal;
+ const char *explicit_seal_opt = NULL;
+#define DCESRV_NETR_CHECK_SCHANNEL_STATE_MAGIC
(NETLOGON_SERVER_PIPE_STATE_MAGIC+1)
+ struct dcesrv_netr_check_schannel_state *s = NULL;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ *_s = NULL;
+
+ s = dcesrv_iface_state_find_conn(dce_call,
+ DCESRV_NETR_CHECK_SCHANNEL_STATE_MAGIC,
+ struct dcesrv_netr_check_schannel_state);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ if (!dom_sid_equal(&s->account_sid, creds->sid)) {
+ goto new_state;
+ }
+ if (s->auth_type != auth_type) {
+ goto new_state;
+ }
+ if (s->auth_level != auth_level) {
+ goto new_state;
+ }
+
+ *_s = s;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+
+new_state:
+ TALLOC_FREE(s);
+ s = talloc_zero(dce_call,
+ struct dcesrv_netr_check_schannel_state);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ s->account_sid = *creds->sid;
+ s->auth_type = auth_type;
+ s->auth_level = auth_level;
+ s->result = NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't use lpcfg_parm_bool(), as we
+ * need the explicit_opt pointer in order to
+ * adjust the debug messages.
+ */
+ explicit_seal_opt = lpcfg_get_parametric(lp_ctx,
+ NULL,
+ "server schannel require seal",
+ creds->account_name);
+ if (explicit_seal_opt != NULL) {
+ require_seal = lp_bool(explicit_seal_opt);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't use lpcfg_parm_bool(), as we
+ * need the explicit_opt pointer in order to
+ * adjust the debug messages.
+ */
+ explicit_opt = lpcfg_get_parametric(lp_ctx,
+ NULL,
+ "server require schannel",
+ creds->account_name);
+ if (explicit_opt != NULL) {
+ schannel_required = lp_bool(explicit_opt);
+ }
+
+ s->schannel_global_required = schannel_global_required;
+ s->schannel_required = schannel_required;
+ s->schannel_explicitly_set = explicit_opt != NULL;
+
+ s->seal_global_required = global_require_seal;
+ s->seal_required = require_seal;
+ s->seal_explicitly_set = explicit_seal_opt != NULL;
+
+ status = dcesrv_iface_state_store_conn(dce_call,
+ DCESRV_NETR_CHECK_SCHANNEL_STATE_MAGIC,
+ s);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ *_s = s;
+ return NT_STATUS_OK;
+}
+
+static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_check_schannel_once(struct dcesrv_call_state
*dce_call,
+ struct
dcesrv_netr_check_schannel_state *s,
+ const struct
netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
+ uint16_t opnum)
+{
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx;
+ int CVE_2020_1472_warn_level = lpcfg_parm_int(lp_ctx, NULL,
+ "CVE_2020_1472", "warn_about_unused_debug_level", DBGLVL_ERR);
+ int CVE_2020_1472_error_level = lpcfg_parm_int(lp_ctx, NULL,
+ "CVE_2020_1472", "error_debug_level", DBGLVL_ERR);
+ int CVE_2022_38023_warn_level = lpcfg_parm_int(lp_ctx, NULL,
+ "CVE_2022_38023", "warn_about_unused_debug_level", DBGLVL_ERR);
+ int CVE_2022_38023_error_level = lpcfg_parm_int(lp_ctx, NULL,
+ "CVE_2022_38023", "error_debug_level", DBGLVL_ERR);
+ TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe();
+ unsigned int dbg_lvl = DBGLVL_DEBUG;
+ const char *opname = "<unknown>";
+ const char *reason = "<unknown>";
+
+ if (opnum < ndr_table_netlogon.num_calls) {
+ opname = ndr_table_netlogon.calls[opnum].name;
+ }
+
+ if (s->auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
+ if (s->auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) {
+ reason = "WITH SEALED";
+ } else if (s->auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_INTEGRITY) {
+ reason = "WITH SIGNED";
+ } else {
+ reason = "WITH INVALID";
+ dbg_lvl = DBGLVL_ERR;
+ s->result = NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ reason = "WITHOUT";
+ }
+
+ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(s->result, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(s->result)) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_INFO);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(dbg_lvl, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)/CVE-2022-38023: "
+ "%s request (opnum[%u]) %s schannel from "
+ "client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s] %s\n",
+ opname, opnum, reason,
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name),
+ nt_errstr(s->result)));
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return s->result;
+ }
+
+ if (s->auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL &&
+ s->auth_level == DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY)
+ {
+ s->result = NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+ if (s->schannel_explicitly_set && !s->schannel_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2020_1472_warn_level);
+ } else if (!s->schannel_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_INFO);
+ }
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set && !s->seal_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2022_38023_warn_level);
+ } else if (!s->seal_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_INFO);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(dbg_lvl, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)/CVE-2022-38023: "
+ "%s request (opnum[%u]) %s schannel from "
+ "client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s] %s\n",
+ opname, opnum, reason,
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name),
+ nt_errstr(s->result)));
+
+ if (s->schannel_explicitly_set && !s->schannel_required) {
+ DEBUG(CVE_2020_1472_warn_level, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+ "Option 'server require schannel:%s = no' not
needed for '%s'!\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name)));
+ }
+
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set && !s->seal_required) {
+ DEBUG(CVE_2022_38023_warn_level, (
+ "CVE-2022-38023: "
+ "Option 'server schannel require seal:%s = no'
not needed for '%s'!\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name)));
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return s->result;
+ }
+
+ if (s->auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
+ if (s->seal_required) {
+ s->result = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set) {
+ dbg_lvl = DBGLVL_NOTICE;
+ } else {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl,
CVE_2022_38023_error_level);
+ }
+ if (s->schannel_explicitly_set &&
!s->schannel_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl,
CVE_2022_38023_warn_level);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(dbg_lvl, (
+ "CVE-2022-38023: "
+ "%s request (opnum[%u]) %s schannel from "
+ "from client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]
%s\n",
+ opname, opnum, reason,
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name),
+ nt_errstr(s->result)));
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set) {
+ D_NOTICE("CVE-2022-38023: Option "
+ "'server schannel require seal:%s =
yes' "
+ "rejects access for client.\n",
+ log_escape(frame,
creds->account_name));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(CVE_2020_1472_error_level, (
+ "CVE-2022-38023: Check if option "
+ "'server schannel require seal:%s = no' "
+ "might be needed for a legacy client.\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name)));
+ }
+ if (s->schannel_explicitly_set &&
!s->schannel_required) {
+ DEBUG(CVE_2020_1472_warn_level, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): Option "
+ "'server require schannel:%s = no' "
+ "not needed for '%s'!\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name)));
+ }
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return s->result;
+ }
+
+ s->result = NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+ if (s->schannel_explicitly_set && !s->schannel_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2020_1472_warn_level);
+ } else if (!s->schannel_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_INFO);
+ }
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set && !s->seal_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_INFO);
+ } else if (!s->seal_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2022_38023_error_level);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(dbg_lvl, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+ "%s request (opnum[%u]) %s schannel from "
+ "client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s] %s\n",
+ opname, opnum, reason,
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name),
+ nt_errstr(s->result)));
+ if (s->schannel_explicitly_set && !s->schannel_required) {
+ DEBUG(CVE_2020_1472_warn_level, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+ "Option 'server require schannel:%s = no' not
needed for '%s'!\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name)));
+ }
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set && !s->seal_required) {
+ D_INFO("CVE-2022-38023: "
+ "Option 'server schannel require seal:%s = no'
still needed for '%s'!\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name));
+ } else if (!s->seal_required) {
+ /*
+ * admins should set
+ * server schannel require seal:COMPUTER$ = no
+ * in order to avoid the level 0 messages.
+ * Over time they can switch the global value
+ * to be strict.
+ */
+ DEBUG(CVE_2022_38023_error_level, (
+ "CVE-2022-38023: "
+ "Please use 'server schannel require seal:%s =
no' "
+ "for '%s' to avoid this warning!\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name)));
+ }
+
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return s->result;
+ }
+
+ if (s->seal_required) {
+ s->result = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_NOTICE);
+ } else {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2022_38023_error_level);
+ }
+ if (!s->schannel_explicitly_set) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2020_1472_error_level);
+ } else if (s->schannel_required) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_NOTICE);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(dbg_lvl, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)/CVE-2022-38023: "
+ "%s request (opnum[%u]) %s schannel from "
+ "from client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s] %s\n",
+ opname, opnum, reason,
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name),
+ nt_errstr(s->result)));
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set) {
+ D_NOTICE("CVE-2022-38023: Option "
+ "'server schannel require seal:%s = yes' "
+ "rejects access for client.\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(CVE_2022_38023_error_level, (
+ "CVE-2022-38023: Check if option "
+ "'server schannel require seal:%s = no' "
+ "might be needed for a legacy client.\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name)));
+ }
+ if (!s->schannel_explicitly_set) {
+ DEBUG(CVE_2020_1472_error_level, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): Check if option "
+ "'server require schannel:%s = no' "
+ "might be needed for a legacy client.\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name)));
+ } else if (s->schannel_required) {
+ D_NOTICE("CVE-2022-38023: Option "
+ "'server require schannel:%s = yes' "
+ "also rejects access for client.\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name));
+ }
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return s->result;
+ }
+
+ if (s->schannel_required) {
+ s->result = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+ if (s->schannel_explicitly_set) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_NOTICE);
+ } else {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2020_1472_error_level);
+ }
+ if (!s->seal_explicitly_set) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2022_38023_error_level);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(dbg_lvl, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)/CVE-2022-38023: "
+ "%s request (opnum[%u]) %s schannel from "
+ "client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s] %s\n",
+ opname, opnum, reason,
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name),
+ nt_errstr(s->result)));
+ if (s->schannel_explicitly_set) {
+ D_NOTICE("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): Option "
+ "'server require schannel:%s = yes' "
+ "rejects access for client.\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name));
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(CVE_2020_1472_error_level, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): Check if option "
+ "'server require schannel:%s = no' "
+ "might be needed for a legacy client.\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name)));
+ }
+ if (!s->seal_explicitly_set) {
+ DEBUG(CVE_2022_38023_error_level, (
+ "CVE-2022-38023: Check if option "
+ "'server schannel require seal:%s = no' "
+ "might be needed for a legacy client.\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name)));
+ }
+ TALLOC_FREE(frame);
+ return s->result;
+ }
+
+ s->result = NT_STATUS_OK;
+
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_INFO);
+ } else {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2022_38023_error_level);
+ }
+
+ if (s->schannel_explicitly_set) {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, DBGLVL_INFO);
+ } else {
+ dbg_lvl = MIN(dbg_lvl, CVE_2020_1472_error_level);
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(dbg_lvl, (
+ "CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)/CVE-2022-38023: "
+ "%s request (opnum[%u]) %s schannel from "
+ "client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s] %s\n",
+ opname, opnum, reason,
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name),
+ nt_errstr(s->result)));
+
+ if (s->seal_explicitly_set) {
+ D_INFO("CVE-2022-38023: Option "
+ "'server schannel require seal:%s = no' "
+ "still needed for '%s'!\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name));
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * admins should set
+ * server schannel require seal:COMPUTER$ = no
+ * in order to avoid the level 0 messages.
+ * Over time they can switch the global value
+ * to be strict.
+ */
+ DEBUG(CVE_2022_38023_error_level, (
+ "CVE-2022-38023: Please use "
+ "'server schannel require seal:%s = no' "
+ "for '%s' to avoid this warning!\n",
+ log_escape(frame, creds->account_name),
+ log_escape(frame, creds->computer_name)));
+ }
--
Samba Shared Repository
