I saw your email to the remediation list, so I guess I was granted access.  I 
suppose it's just quiet.

Thanks for your help Luis!

Thanks,
Chad

-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Nunez, 
Luis K
Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2013 9:25 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: Remediation Scripts

Hi Chad,
I've not seen any further dialog specific to the topic.  Remediation has the 
tendency to scare people off :(

I'll check with the moderator of the remediation-dev list on you request to 
join.

Thanks.

-ln

-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Truhn, 
Chad M CTR NSWCDD, CXA30
Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2013 9:05 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: Remediation Scripts

Did anything ever come of this conversation on the other lists?  I tried 
joining the Remediation-dev mailing list last week, but I got the "Your request 
has been forwarded to the list moderator for approval." and have never seen any 
traffic from it.  Unsure if the list is just quiet or if my account was never 
approved.  I can't seem to find an online archive either...

Thanks,
Chad

-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Nunez, 
Luis K
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:37 AM
To: [email protected]; Simon Lukasik
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: RE: Remediation Scripts

This is good a conversation worth informing others on.   I am cross posting to 
the Open-SCAP-list and Remediation-dev mailing lists.

I’ve noticed pockets of remediation discussions in the various email-lists and 
would like to align them to a forum where can work as a collective. 
I don’t want to stifle this effort or conversation but would like to move the 
discussion to the remediation-dev list. The remediation-dev list, is an open 
list for all to participate, was setup to inform and to foster capabilities to 
enable automated enterprise remediation.  The list members constitute industry 
vendors and government constituents.  It contains experience and knowledge from 
previous attempts at remediation capabilities. 

Some observations on the current discussion. The OpenSCAP remediation 
capability addresses part of the problem.  The current discourse (OpenSCAP 
XCCDF remediation) is beginning to touch on various Remediation Architectural 
issues (Workflow, tasking, reporting, OVRL, etc…).  As you know the subject of 
Remediation is broad with many perspectives and implications.  Before we spiral 
out control, I’ve seen it happen many times before with this subject, lets 
break them down into manageable sets.  

For lack of better reference material on Remediation Architecture, I would like 
to propose the NIST IR 7670 as a frame of reference for topic of discussions.  
The NIST IR 7670  is by no means a standard, but it is something to reference 
form a work flow and use cases. Certainly the NIST IR 7670 is subject to 
revision to suit the needs of the community as it evolves and it invites any 
and all for critics to make it better. 

And so using the “Derived Requirements” from the IR 7670 I believe we can have 
meaningful discourse and solutions.  The current discussions on  “Remediation 
Scripting” seems to originate and is related to DR 5 – Remediation Policy 
specification.  It would be great to leverage the existing capabilities in 
OpenSCAP as a way to prototype and exercise elements in the XCCDF specification 
for remedial needs. We could also use this effort to propose revisions in 
specifications and guidance as needed. The prototype working code and content 
will be the mechanism by which a rough consensus from the community is 
achieved.  

Going forward I would like to invite thoughts and ideas to further innovate 
remediation capabilities.

Thank you.

Link to NIST IR 7670
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-7670/Draft-NISTIR-7670_Feb2011.pdf
Link to Remediation (dev) Discussion list http://scap.nist.gov/community.html


Luis Nunez
G022 - IA Industry Collaboration
The MITRE Corporation
www.mitre.org



-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Truhn, 
Chad M CTR NSWCDD, CXA30
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2013 11:14 AM
To: Simon Lukasik
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: RE: Remediation Scripts

I think every option has it's good and bad sides and no clear 'winner' appears 
to me.  I'll try to comment on my feelings of each.



  > (*) Remove the fix element from that source XCCDF document

I think this way is always an option.  It isn't necessarily graceful, but IMO 
any admin worth their weight should be able to manage this.  But I think this 
would be a short term 'hacky' way of handling it.  It isn't a solution as much 
as a work around.  I'm not saying this is bad, but I don't think it can be 
called a solution.  This might actually work nicely for some scenarios where 
you know that you don't want Fix ABC on every machine you can just remove it 
from the source XCCDF and then use that as your 'baseline' XCCDF for the 
remediation of the rest of the machines.  When running on 100s of machines if 
you can save 5 steps from each that turns into substantial savings.

  > (*) Create new (inherited) profile for this special machine
  >     which has the given Rule unselected. This option is getting
  >     easier, as Martin has recently added tailoring file support
  >     into OpenSCAP -> thus your new profile may be in external file.

This might be a workable way to do it.  Especially if you are doing offline 
remediation.  Run the initial scan to find out what's broke, review the output, 
disable the check (which disables the fix), run the remediation, re-run the 
full scan (no remediation) for final analysis.  This doesn't scale well though.

  > (*) Use CPE identifier assigned to the fix. If the CPE does not match
  >     on given system, the fix will not be executed.
  >     Moreover, I can think of having some file like /etc/NONCRITICAL on
  >     all my non critical systems. And then having CPE identifier which
  >     matches this exact file. That way, no fix (with this CPE) will be
  >     executed unless the machine has /etc/NONCRITICAL.

I think I like this train of thought.  More on this below...

  > (*) Use offline remediation and proceed as described at 
https://www.redhat.com/archives/open-scap-list/2013-March/msg00016.html

I would comment similar to the one above about inherited profiles.  Scan, 
review, modify, remediate, scan

  > (*) Wait for new SCAP-Workbench, which should allow users to select
  >     fix elements in GUI.

I can see where this is useful, but I think the majority of users won't 
have/use a true GUI.  I think the concept is valid though.

  > (*) File a feature request against OpenSCAP for interactive
  >     (like: Yes/No/Quit) remediation.

Again, this can be useful especially if you just have a machine or two to 
handle.  This doesn't scale well to large enterprises though, but I definitely 
think it has it's merits.  Maybe if we can create some kind of answer file to 
automate this it might scale a bit better.  But that answer file would have to 
be handled carefully since every machine might not be identical.  You can't 
just say "Question 1: yes", "Question 2: no", etc because the first question on 
System A might not be the first question on System B.  If the answer can be 
mapped to a specific identifier and somehow manage the outliers manually it 
could work.  Again, I would have to spend more cycles of thought about it and 
I'm not software developer so I have no idea how hard/easy this is.  I'm just 
spitballing here.

  > >  Without thinking about it too much I can't think of a good way to do 
  > > that without it being cumbersome.  But I can say that in my years 
  > > working with security measures I have never been able to take the 
  > > 'recommended' solution and fit 100% of it to my system.
  > > There are always outliers.

  > I understand this. What of the above mentioned approaches would be the 
viable for You? Or can You see any other?


So building on your /etc/NONCRITICAL topic from above...

I had a similar thought, but I am not sure how feasible it is.  In my head the 
first thing I jump to is a include or exclude file.  Kind of 
hosts.allow/hosts.deny type of thing.  

1)  Specify a particular id in scap.deny which doesn't get run and either no 
entry or something like 'All' in scap.allow
2)  Deny 'All' with the exception of what is specified in the scap.allow.

This way I can custom tailor which particular remediation steps I want done per 
box.  If the scan decides it wants to remediate ID 1234, it checks the list to 
see if it should or not, then proceeds based on that input.  Now as an admin I 
just have to read through the checks one time and make a list then I can run 
the scan/remediation at any time in the future without having to re-invest time 
in the applicability of the content again.

In MY perfect world (I am sure others would disagree) I would like if the check 
was performed regardless of the statement in allow/deny and only the 
remediation step be concerned with it.  I have to show every check to my 
security guys so I am OK with a failed check and no remediation being done.  
But, again, I have no idea how that would be handled within the content or if 
it is even really an option.  This way I would be pretty OK with having oscap 
make the changes automatically because I have already declared that the listed 
elements are OK to be changed.

I could do this within the bash remediation content as well if there is an 
ability to import functions or if the function declaration is persistent 
throughout the run (declare it once at the top).  If there is some way to check 
this outside of the bash remediation content (built into some part of the SCAP 
content or something like that) I think we could skip some issues that would 
arrive when doing this through the bash content (what happens if I skip the 
remediation step that declares this function?).


I'm just an admin with no real software development experience so feel free to 
tell me to go away.

Thanks again,
Chad


Attachment: smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature

_______________________________________________
scap-security-guide mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide

Reply via email to