Good afternoon,

I normally lurk and would ordinarily try to stay out of these discussions, but 
there's a discrepancy between the SSG version and the Draft version posted on 
DISA's with respect to SELinux policy. 

I'd like to pose this question, if I may, as I am currently working with a 
vendor on this precise issue. The SSG draft had a control as shown below:

<Rule id="selinux_confinement_of_daemons" severity="medium"> 
<title>Ensure No Daemons are Unconfined by SELinux</title> 
<description> 
Daemons for which the SELinux policy does not contain rules will inherit the 
context of the parent process. Because daemons are launched during 
startup and descend from the <tt>init</tt> process, they inherit the 
<tt>initrc_t</tt> context. 
<br/> 
<br/> 
To check for unconfined daemons, run the following command: 
<pre>$ sudo ps -eZ | egrep "initrc" | egrep -vw "tr|ps|egrep|bash|awk" | tr ':' 
' ' | awk '{ print $NF }'</pre> 
It should produce no output in a well-configured system. 
</description> 
<rationale> 
Daemons which run with the <tt>initrc_t</tt> context may cause AVC denials, 
or allow privileges that the daemon does not require. 
</rationale> 
<oval id="selinux_confinement_of_daemons" /> 
<ref nist="AC-6,AU-9,CM-7" /> 
<ident cce="27288-0" /> 
</Rule>

Is this rule intended to be in the Release version of the DISA RHEL7 STIG? I 
hate to kick a hornet's nest here, but I've been working rather extensively 
with a vendor to ensure this possibility gets covered and the lack of inclusion 
in the Draft STIG may undermine those efforts. 

Thanks in advance,

Mark Salowitz
Linux SA, USCG OSC Martinsburg

-----Original Message-----
From: Wei N Chen (CENSUS/OIS FED) [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2016 2:52 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: RHEL 7 Draft STIG release

Putting the so called personal attacks aside, I think what most of us want to 
know is what does the support vendor in question know that we, the SSG 
community and maker of the software, don't know about RHEL7 security 
configuration that warrants the additional checks being put into the draft.

Regards,
Wei Chen 

________________________________________

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Fri, 05 Feb 2016 02:47:03 -0000
From: "Roger Greenwell" <[email protected]>
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: RHEL 7 Draft STIG release
To: [email protected]
Message-ID:
        <[email protected]>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Community Participants,

Earlier this week a post was made to this forum/thread that made disparaging 
comments regarding DISA’s leadership over the STIG development process and our 
contractor’s support in this effort.   I want to share with this group that 
DISA government leadership is fully in charge of our actions/decisions and our 
contract staff is there to provide support to us.

Having just signed into this forum tonight, I noted the following from Fedora’s 
Rules of Conduct:  “Be respectful. Not all of us will agree all the time, but 
disagreement is no excuse for poor behavior and poor manners. We might all 
experience some frustration now and then, but we cannot allow that frustration 
to turn into a personal attack. It's important to remember that a community 
where people feel uncomfortable or threatened is not a productive one.”  To the 
author of this, WELL SAID!!!!

Shawn Wells, in his post, noted that DISA has been a cooperative partner in the 
STIG process.  DISA greatly values the contributions and recommendations from 
Red Hat and communities such as this, and it’s welcomed.   I would simply ask 
that everyone please be respectful.  If there are concerns outside of the 
technical area associated with this, please drop me a line and we can discuss.  
My email address is [email protected].

Respectfully,
Roger Greenwell
Chief, Cybersecurity – DISA
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