On 05/23/2016 02:53 AM, Inamdar Sharif wrote:
> Hi Guys,
>
>
>
> While going through the policies I came across the following two changes :
>
>
>
> 1) In platform_app.te
>
> bluetooth_domain(platform_app)
>
>
>
> 2) In untrusted_app.te
>
> bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
>
>
>
> Since both platform and untrusted apps have this capability, is there
> any reason why system apps don’t have this??
>
>
>
> Can we not make it generic by adding the below in app.te:
>
> allow appdomain self:socket create_socket_perms;
>
> allow appdomain bluetooth:unix_stream_socket { getopt setopt getattr
> read write ioctl shutdown };
The first rule has been removed from AOSP policy; it seemed to be a
leftover of the older Android bluetooth implementation. So you
shouldn't need that one.
As to whether or not it makes sense to allow the second one for all
apps, it depends on whether it is legitimate for all apps to be clients
of the bluetooth app. If so, then yes, you could generalize the rule.
However, doing so is counter to least privilege, and for system UID apps
in particular, we want to limit their exposure and potential for misuse
since they are privileged.
_______________________________________________
Seandroid-list mailing list
Seandroid-list@tycho.nsa.gov
To unsubscribe, send email to seandroid-list-le...@tycho.nsa.gov.
To get help, send an email containing "help" to
seandroid-list-requ...@tycho.nsa.gov.
